

BATTALION COMMANDER

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COMBAT ARMS MANEUVER BATTALION

AD 731305

**IDENTIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS
AND INVESTIGATION OF THOUGHT PROCESSING**

1971

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HumRkO Division No. 4

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INTRODUCTION

At the request of the U. S. Army Infantry School (USAIS), Work Unit CAMBCOM conducted research that identified the knowledge, skills, and investigated the thought processing of the battalion commander of the six types of maneuver battalions (Infantry, Lt Infantry, Mechanized, Airborne, Airmobile and Armored). USAIS will use this work to (1) validate that portion of the Infantry Officers Advanced Course that deals with the battalion commander, (2) serve as a basis for the development of Student Performance Objectives by the USAIS, and (3) to revise USAIS student literature where appropriate. The detailed results of this research are reported in this document.

The first step in this research required the development of a task inventory for the battalion commander. This was accomplished by using the existing information to design a tentative list which was then commented on extensively by elements of the USAIS. Former brigade commanders, offered their views of the position of the battalion commander, former battalion staff officers were elicited to add their experiences. Former battalion commanders were interviewed. The tentative list was then revised and distributed to selected maneuver battalions for comments by job incumbents. Based on their returns, a final inventory was prepared and mailed to the commanders of over 80% of all maneuver battalions located all over the world.

The inventory generated data on the personal backgrounds of the job incumbents and their principal staff officers; the functional areas of command (Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Training, Management, Decision-Making, and Leadership); and command-related topics. The incumbent was asked to respond to that part of the inventory dealing with the 8 functional areas in terms of his current involvement. An example of this part of the inventory is shown on page iv. The instructions were that the respondent was to consider (1) the importance of the item, (2) the frequency of occurrence, (3) relevance, or (4) any other factor which he thought determined to what extent the item under consideration was deemed to be a part of the position of battalion commander. Having made his assessments, he was asked to indicate them by assigning values from 1 through 10. A value of from 1-3 given an item indicated the item was considered, at that time, a minor part of the position of battalion commander. A value in the upper range of the scale indicated the item was considered at that time, a most significant part of the position. A zero indicated the item was not considered to be a part of the position.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<p>1. <u>Personnel</u></p> <p>2. <u>Intelligence</u></p> <p>3. <u>Operations</u></p> <p>4. <u>Logistics</u></p> <p>5. <u>Training</u></p> <p>6. <u>Management</u></p> <p>7. <u>Decision-Making</u></p> <p>8. <u>Leadership</u></p>									
<p>9. <u>Other</u></p>									

1

It is emphasized here that this research effort was focused on the position of the battalion commander; what it includes, what it does not include, and how the various parts of the position are assessed by a given set of individuals over a given period of time. The respondents in this data collection effort were incumbents stationed worldwide representing over 80% of the population. The battalion commanders were operating under a variety of missions; their strengths varied; their problems unique, perhaps to them at the time of reporting; their backgrounds (in service and achievements) generally similar. Each respondent was declaring his assessment of each item under consideration in the light of his personal involvement with that item at that time. His assessment reflected a combination of importance, criticality, and time spent. Users of the data may question the assessments. If this be so, the users are reminded they are reflecting on their experiences. These data, on the other hand, are those of job incumbents who were responding to the pressures impinging upon him at the time of reporting their assessments.

After the example inventory page, a general ranking of OBJECTS in each of the 8 functional areas is presented. The ranking of each OBJECT is derived from data collected worldwide and the results are reflected in 4 columns. The 1st column shows the percent of subjects responding to that OBJECT. The 2nd shows the average percent that OBJECT is in relation to the whole "Part of the Position" as assessed by the subjects responding to that OBJECT. The 3rd column shows the average percent that OBJECT is in relation to the whole part of the position as assessed by all subjects. The 4th column shows the cumulative sum of the average percents shown in column 3. Following the rankings of OBJECTS, there are discussions of the data to point up some of the highlights. Where appropriate, differences in rankings as they occurred in Vietnam orientation, are related. An example of the derivation of the data is given on the next page.

Presentations and discussions of the CAMBCOM data as it pertains (a) the Combat Arms Maneuver Battalion, (b) the Battalion Staff, and (c) the Battalion Commander follow the general ranking of the OBJECTS. The portion of the discussion concerning the thought processing of the principal staff officers is based upon Work Unit FORGE, an on-going HumRRO research effort being conducted at Division No. 4 which addresses the factors of organizational effectiveness. A simulation of an Infantry battalion in action generated the data.

DERIVATION OF RANKING DATA

EXAMPLE

The ranking of each OBJECT was obtained by converting raw scores to percentages and then determining average percentages. This example refers to the Leadership area, starting on Page 16, and to the particular OBJECT identified as "Motivating." It will be noted that "Motivating" is ranked 10th. The figures in the 4 columns opposite "Motivating" (98.8, 1.5, 1.5, 15.9) were determined as follows.

1st Column: 83 of 84 incumbents reported a score for "Motivating":
 $83/84 \times 100$ or 98.8%

2nd Column: First, the raw score reported for "Motivating" by an incumbent is converted to a percent of the whole. This is obtained by dividing the score assigned to "Motivating" by the incumbent by the sum of the scores given to all the OBJECTS in the Leadership area by the same incumbent multiplied by 100.

Second, since 83 incumbents reported a score, an average percent is obtained. This is found by summing the percents resulting from the first step above and dividing by 83. In our example, this is $127.7/83$ or 1.5%.

3rd Column: The average percent shown in Column 3 is obtained by dividing 127.7 by 84 or 1.5% since there were a total of 84 incumbents who could have given "Motivating" a score.

4th Column: Column 4 is a running total of the percentages shown in Column 3. In our example, the running total for "Motivating" is 15.9 obtained by adding the preceding 9 percents and the percent for "Motivating." This column permits selection of cut-off points as desired by the user of the data, i.e., "22 of the Leadership OBJECTS appear in the upper third (33.4%) of the rankings."

LEADERSHIP

Leadership -- the process of influencing the actions of individuals and organizations in order to obtain desired results.

Listed below are various OBJECTS in the area of Leadership. As you read each OBJECT, consider whether or not you are personally involved with it. If you are, place a check (✓) in the first column on the right side of the page. If you are not, draw a line through it and leave the column blank.

When you have completed this action, go back to the first item and indicate the extent each is "Part-of-the-Position" of battalion commander by writing a number opposite each item. You are reminded, with respect to each item, to consider and weigh its (a) importance, (b) frequency of occurrence, (c) relevance, or (d) any other factor which you think determines to what extent the item is Part-of-the-Position. The scale is repeated below to refresh your memory.

- A
3
D
- 1 Under unusual circumstances, may be a minor part of the position
 - 2 -----
 - 3 -----
 - 4 -----
 - 5 A substantial part of the position
 - 6 -----
 - 7 -----
 - 8 -----
 - 9 -----
 - 10 A most significant part of the position

<u>OBJECT</u>	Check if Involved	<u>PART-OF-THE-POSITION</u>
1. Formal relationship with officers	✓	8
2. Formal relationship with enlisted men	✓	8
3. Informal relationship with officers	✓	3
4. Officers' safety and welfare	✓	5

31. Persuading	✓	6
32. Motivating	✓	7

65. Establishing and maintaining esprit de corps	✓	8

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ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS

PERSONNEL

RANKING OF OBJECTS: WORLDWIDE

Cumulative sum of Average Percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by subjects responding ...
 Percent of subjects responding

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OBJECTS</u>				
	
*1	Discipline: State of	98.8	3.9	3.9	3.9
*2	Officer efficiency report	98.8	3.7	3.7	7.6
*3	Military justice	100.0	3.6	3.6	11.2
*4	Officer assignments	97.6	3.7	3.6	14.8
*5	Morale: State of	93.9	3.4	3.2	18.0
*6	Decorations and awards	100.0	3.1	3.1	21.1
*7	Law and order	95.1	3.3	3.1	24.2
*8	Enlisted promotions	43.9	3.6	3.1	27.3
9	Unit readiness report	91.5	3.3	3.0	30.3
*10	Replacements	98.8	2.8	2.8	33.1
11	Enlisted reduction/elimination/transfer	100.0	2.8	2.8	35.9
12	Enlisted assignments	97.6	2.4	2.4	38.3
13	Disciplinary reports	91.5	2.5	2.3	40.6
14	Battalion CP & HQ SOP	95.1	2.4	2.3	42.9
15	Administrative reports to higher HQ	95.1	2.3	2.2	45.1
16	Safety program	97.6	2.2	2.2	47.3
17	Army info program/command info	93.9	2.1	2.0	49.3
18	Religious services	97.6	2.0	1.9	51.2
19	Medical services	95.1	2.0	1.9	53.1
20	Congressional actions	93.9	2.0	1.9	55.0
21	Community relations/civic actions	91.5	2.0	1.9	56.9
22	AWOL's	90.2	2.1	1.9	58.8
23	Social events	76.8	2.3	1.8	60.6
24	Customs/courtesies of the service	87.8	2.0	1.8	62.4
25	Battalion daily status report	82.9	2.1	1.7	64.1
26	Interior guard	86.6	2.0	1.7	65.8
27	Summary authorized/assigned strength	82.9	2.0	1.6	67.4
28	A & R program	82.9	1.9	1.6	69.0
29	Postal service	92.7	1.7	1.6	70.6
30	DA form 20/enlisted efficiency report	91.5	1.7	1.6	72.2

PERSONNEL

RANKING OF OBJECTS: WORLDWIDE, Con't

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OBJECTS</u>				
31	Rotation	76.8	1.9	1.5	73.7
32	Unit funds	86.6	1.7	1.5	75.2
33	Duty officers	90.2	1.7	1.5	76.7
34	Daily status report	75.6	1.9	1.4	78.1
35	Educational development	81.7	1.7	1.4	79.5
36	Office ceremonies	73.2	1.9	1.4	80.9
37	Morale reports	64.6	1.9	1.3	82.2
38	Letters from relatives ("Family Letters")	89.0	1.4	1.3	83.5
39	Sympathy letter	72.0	1.7	1.2	84.7
40	The MOS code/officer & EM	74.4	1.5	1.1	85.8
41	Personnel estimate	61.0	1.8	1.1	86.9
42	Civil disturbance/martial law	56.1	2.0	1.1	88.0
43	Rest and recuperation	64.6	1.6	1.0	89.0
44	Unit journal	75.6	1.3	1.0	90.0
45	Code of conduct	68.3	1.3	.9	90.9
46	Off limits	75.6	1.1	.9	91.8
47	Battalion daily strength message	53.7	1.5	.8	92.6
48	Personnel daily summary	53.7	1.4	.8	93.4
49	Periodic personnel report	56.1	1.2	.7	94.1
50	American Red Cross	70.7	1.0	.7	94.8
51	Army emergency relief	68.3	1.0	.7	95.5
52	Prisoners of war	43.9	1.6	.7	96.2
53	Army aptitude scores	61.0	1.1	.7	96.9
54	Line of duty	72.0	1.0	.7	97.6
55	Morning reports	56.1	.9	.5	98.1
56	Casualty feeder report	40.2	1.2	.5	98.6
57	Company daily strength message	31.7	1.2	.4	99.0
58	Survivor's assistance program	40.2	1.0	.4	99.4
59	Graves registration service	23.2	1.4	.3	99.7
60	Army standard scoring system	31.7	1.0	.3	100.0
61	Civilian employees	26.8	1.3	.3	100.3

PERSONNEL DISCUSSION:

It is significant that only 10 of the 61 OBJECTS were ranked in the upper third, and the commanders, both worldwide and in Vietnam, agreed on 9 of them. These are marked with an asterisk (*) in the Rank column. This implies the commanders have identified these OBJECTS as the key ones in the entire field of personnel.

The incumbents reported many OBJECTS to add to the list and offered some comments. Those added were:

- Stockade Visits
- Officer Retention
- In-processing System
- Reenlistment
- Public Relations
- Post Schools
- Racial Relations
- Fund Drives
- Post Exchange Activities
- Hospital Visits
- EM Councils
- Jr Officer Councils
- Board Actions
- Youth Activities
- Community Activities
- Officer & NCO Clubs

The comments were:

"There is increasing emphasis on battalion commanders to know all details on all personnel matters at all times. This is detrimental to training subordinates and tends to produce unnecessary administrative work in the form of statistics and reports. The combat battalion headquarters was not designed to support garrison administrative requirements which exist today." (A commander in CONUS)

"Personnel actions and problems take more of my time than any other single functional area." (A commander in Europe)

"Virtually every aspect of personnel is a significant part of command in combat because our individual soldier is our most vital asset. Bear in mind also that many of the personnel assigned to perform personnel functions are not trained. This requires direct involvement by the battalion commander." (A commander in Vietnam)

INTELLIGENCE

RANKING OF OBJECTS: WORLDWIDE

Cumulative sum of Average Percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects

Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects

Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by subjects responding . . .

Percent of subjects responding

• • • •

• • • •

• • • • •

 $\frac{1}{2} \quad \frac{1}{2} \quad \frac{1}{2} \quad \frac{1}{2}$

RANK

OBJECTS

*1	Scout/reconnaissance platoon	97.6	6.0	5.9	5.9
*2	Analysis of the Area of Operations	92.7	5.8	5.4	11.3
*3	Enemy situation	92.7	5.5	5.1	16.4
4	Ground surveillance section	85.4	5.1	4.3	20.7
*5	Situation map	90.2	4.3	3.9	24.6
*6	Patrol plans	86.6	4.2	3.7	28.3
7	Intelligence/counterintelligence training program	91.5	3.9	3.6	31.9
8	After-action report	82.9	4.1	3.4	35.3
9	Classified documents	93.9	3.5	3.3	38.6
10	Security clearance/personnel security	87.8	3.7	3.3	41.9
11	Spot report [enemy activity]	76.8	4.2	3.2	45.1
12	Hq physical security survey	81.7	3.8	3.1	48.2
13	Intelligence estimate	84.1	3.6	3.0	51.2
14	Weather	81.7	3.7	3.0	54.2
15	Intelligence requirements	80.5	3.4	2.8	57.0
16	Surveillance plans	82.9	3.4	2.8	59.8
17	Maps	84.1	3.3	2.7	62.5
18	Target acquisition & information	74.4	3.6	2.7	65.2
19	Intelligence resources	79.3	3.4	2.7	67.9
20	INTSUM	75.6	3.1	2.4	70.3
21	Dissidents	67.1	3.5	2.3	72.6
22	Collection planning	68.3	3.2	2.2	74.8
23	Aerial reconnaissance requests	69.5	3.0	2.1	76.9
24	Security lectures	73.2	2.8	2.0	78.9
25	Captured documents	61.0	3.0	1.9	80.8
26	Local civilians/refugees	56.1	2.8	1.6	82.4
27	Captured materiel	61.0	2.7	1.6	84.0
28	Aerial photographs	68.3	2.4	1.6	85.6
29	Pilots/air observers	52.4	2.9	1.5	87.1
30	Prisoners of war	52.4	2.8	1.5	88.6
31	Aggressor	45.1	3.3	1.5	90.1
32	Counterintelligence plan	64.6	2.4	1.5	91.6
33	Aerial battlefield surveillance requests	47.6	3.0	1.4	93.0
34	MORTREP, SHELLREP, BOMBREP	59.8	2.4	1.4	94.4
35	Unattended ground sensors	41.5	2.7	1.4	95.5
36	Evaluation [A-3, B-2, etc.]	42.7	2.3	1.0	96.5
37	Military intelligence detachment	39.0	1.9	.8	97.3
38	OB Handbook	48.8	1.7	.8	98.1
39	Technical intelligence bulletin/summary	43.9	1.8	.8	98.9
40	Wind messages	37.8	1.7	.6	99.5
41	Unit censorship	12.2	1.1	.1	99.6

INTELLIGENCE DISCUSSION:

Of a total of 41 OBJECTS, the respondents, worldwide and in Vietnam, signalled out 8 as being in the upper third of the rankings. Of these 8, the commanders in Vietnam agreed on the 5 marked with an asterisk (*) in the Rank column. They selected in addition to those 5, the following: "Spot Reports", "Captured Documents", and "Target Acquisition and Information."

The incumbents reported additional OBJECTS as follows:

Weapon Security
Motor Pool Security
Crypto Security
Long Range Patrols

Selected comments on the Intelligence function were:

"A greater personal involvement is required in some of these OBJECTS because of the untrained and/or inexperienced officers assigned as S-2." (A commander in CONUS)

"In a garrison situation, S-2 functions are played down or certain other requirements take more priority." (A commander in Europe)

"Finding the enemy is the biggest part of my position." (A commander in Vietnam)

"An Infantry battalion commander is his own Intelligence Officer. He requires assistance in administration associated with Intelligence. The battalion Liaison Officers play a vital role in battalion-level Intelligence." (A commander in Vietnam)

"I personally consider the battalion S-2 to be the most important staff position. The S-2's contribution can save the rifle companies days of "bush beating" by methodical study of all available intelligence. His analysis has led us to significant cache sites and has enabled us to find the enemy's mortar and rocket sites. Additionally, by carefully studying trail activity and movements, we have had great success in killing the enemy with mechanical ambushes." (A commander in Vietnam)

OPERATIONS

RANKING OF OBJECTS; WORLDWIDE

Cumulative sum of Average Percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by subjects responding ...
 Percent of subjects responding

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OBJECTS</u>				
	
	
	
	
*1	Priorities	97.6	6.3	6.1	6.1
*2	Scheme of maneuver or plan of defense	97.6	5.8	5.7	11.8
3	Unit readiness report	95.2	5.8	5.6	17.4
*4	Plan of fire support	97.6	5.2	5.0	22.4
*5	Tactical troop movements	95.2	5.0	4.8	27.2
6	Operation Orders	96.4	4.8	4.6	31.8
*7	Battalion operation center	96.4	4.6	4.5	36.3
8	Tactical (field) SOP	97.6	4.2	4.1	40.4
9	Contingency plans	96.4	4.3	4.1	44.5
10	Communications plan	96.4	4.1	3.9	48.4
11	Air-ground operations	92.9	4.2	3.9	52.3
12	Policy file	94.0	3.6	3.6	59.5
13	After-action report	98.8	3.6	3.6	59.5
14	Command report	82.1	4.3	3.6	63.1
15	Situation map	95.2	3.7	3.5	66.6
16	Situation reports	95.2	3.5	3.3	69.9
17	TOE changes	84.5	3.7	3.1	73.0
18	Operational report or lessons learned	89.3	3.3	3.0	76.0
19	March planning/air corridor planning	86.9	3.5	3.0	79.0
20	Troop list	84.5	3.4	2.9	81.9
21	Operations estimate	84.5	3.4	2.8	84.7
22	Rear area security	84.5	3.2	2.8	87.5
23	Spot reports	86.9	3.0	2.7	90.2
24	SOI/SSI	86.9	2.7	2.4	92.6
25	Civil military operations	75.0	3.2	2.4	95.0
26	Periodic reports	84.5	2.5	2.2	97.2
27	Administrative marches	84.5	3.2	2.1	99.3

OPERATIONS DISCUSSION:

The respondents placed 7 out of 27 OBJECTS in the upper third of the rankings. Of these 7, the commanders in Vietnam also chose the 5 marked by an asterisk (*) in the ranking column. Those commanders, as expected, included "Air-Ground Operations" in their upper third listings.

Several OBJECTS were reported to be added to the Operations list:

Civil Disturbance
Control of Air Space
Rules of Engagement

Comments offered by several incumbents follow:

"I spend most of my time in the area of operations." (A commander in Vietnam)

"The average battalion commander has more personal contact with the Operations area than any of the other 3 staff functions." (A commander in Korea)

"Airmobile operations and Fire Support Base Operations are characteristic of unit. Consequently, emphasis is placed on air movement and defensive tactics simultaneously." (A commander in Vietnam)

"The extent of my involvement in Operations reflects a lack of experienced and school trained personnel." (A commander in Vietnam)

LOGISTICS

RANKING OF OBJECTS; WORLDWIDE

Cumulative sum of Average Percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by subjects responding ...
 Percent of subjects responding

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OBJECTS</u>				
*1	Maintenance - vehicles and aircraft	98.8	5.5	5.4	5.4
*2	Maintenance-weapons	98.8	5.2	5.1	10.5
*3	Maintenance-communication equipment	98.8	5.1	5.1	15.6
*4	Unit readiness report	95.2	5.2	5.0	20.6
*5	Prescribed load list	94.0	3.6	3.4	24.0
*6	Food service	96.4	3.4	3.3	27.3
*7	Report of survey	97.6	3.2	3.2	30.5
*8	Class V	88.1	3.0	2.6	33.1
9	Movement planning	88.1	2.8	2.5	35.6
10	Class I supplies	91.7	2.6	2.4	38.0
11	Maintenance-medical equipment	79.8	2.9	2.3	40.3
12	Battalion combat trains	88.1	2.5	2.2	42.5
13	Individual organizational clothing/equipment	88.1	2.4	2.1	44.6
14	Class III	85.7	2.4	2.1	46.7
15	Transportation	84.5	2.5	2.1	48.8
16	Rear area security	83.3	2.5	2.1	50.9
17	Quarterly report of operational loss	86.9	2.3	2.0	52.9
18	Inventories	79.8	2.4	1.9	54.8
19	Battalion feeding plan	83.3	2.3	1.9	56.7
20	Administrative/logistic order	78.6	2.2	1.8	58.5
21	Administrative/logistic plans	77.4	2.3	1.8	60.3
22	Aerial resupply	69.0	2.6	1.8	62.1
23	Battalion field trains	81.0	2.2	1.8	63.9
24	Laundry-clothing exchange service	81.0	2.0	1.6	65.5
25	Maps	81.0	2.0	1.6	67.1
26	Water	72.6	2.2	1.6	68.7
27	Logistical estimate	71.4	2.2	1.6	70.3
28	Logistical fragmentary orders	71.4	2.3	1.6	71.9
29	Document Register	63.1	2.5	1.5	73.4
30	Organizational property book	75.0	2.0	1.5	74.9

LOGISTICS

RANKING OF OBJECTS: WORLDWIDE, Con't

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OBJECTS</u>				
31	Expendable supplies	78.6	1.9	1.5	76.4
32	Class IX	64.3	2.3	1.5	77.9
33	Class II	77.4	1.8	1.4	79.3
34	Class IV	78.6	1.8	1.4	80.7
35	DA Form 2765, 2765-1 or DA Form 1150	61.9	2.0	1.2	81.9
36	Traffic control	72.6	1.7	1.2	83.1
37	Document file	52.4	2.1	1.1	84.2
38	Installation property book	59.5	1.9	1.1	85.3
39	Bath service	67.9	1.6	1.1	86.4
40	Captured enemy materiel	54.8	2.0	1.1	87.5
41	Hand receipt file	58.3	1.7	1.0	88.5
42	Real estate	50.0	1.9	1.0	89.5
43	Class VII	57.1	1.8	1.0	90.5
44	Statement of charges	60.7	1.5	.9	91.4
45	Salvage materiel	61.9	1.4	.9	92.3
46	Class X	57.1	1.6	.9	93.2
47	Area damage control plan	51.2	1.7	.9	94.1
48	Class VI	53.6	1.4	.8	94.9
49	Combat loss certificate	45.2	1.9	.8	95.7
50	Class VIII	50.0	1.4	.7	96.4
51	Daily battle loss report	42.9	1.7	.7	97.1
52	Decontamination squads	50.0	1.4	.7	97.8
53	Cash collection voucher	51.2	1.2	.6	98.4
54	Due-in suspense file	45.2	1.4	.6	99.0
55	Control & assessment team	42.9	1.3	.5	99.5
56	Rescue squads	41.7	1.3	.5	100.0

LOGISTICS DISCUSSION:

It is significant that the same 8 OBJECTS appear in the upper third of the rankings both worldwide and in Vietnam. Whatever the mission, wherever located, battalion commanders seem to have the same high regard for:

- Maintenance -- weapons, vehicles, aircraft, communications
- Unit Readiness Report
- Prescribed Load List
- Food Services
- Class V Supplies
- Report of Survey

The most common OBJECTS that were reported by respondents for adding to the list were:

- Self-Service Activities
- R & U
- CMMI

Job incumbents offered the following comments pertaining to Logistics:

"Logistics is maintenance." (A commander in Europe)

"The management of resources" (A commander in CONUS)

"Logistics is a constant challenge especially when funding has been curtailed. Much interest from higher headquarters is shown in deadline rates 2404 and unit readiness reports. Knowledge of the report of survey system is also very important." (A commander in Korea)

TRAINING

RANKING OF OBJECTS: WORLDWIDE

Cumulative sum of Average Percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by subjects responding
 Percent of subjects responding

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OBJECTS</u>				
	
	
	
	
*1	Unit training program	98.8	13.6	13.4	13.4
*2	Training schedules	92.9	9.1	8.4	21.8
3	Training facilities	89.3	7.7	6.9	28.7
4	Policy file	85.7	7.9	6.8	35.5
5	Training schools	91.7	7.1	6.5	42.0
6	Training calendar	82.1	7.7	6.3	48.3
7	Command post exercise	67.9	7.9	6.3	54.6
8	Army training tests	59.5	7.7	5.3	59.9
9	Battlefield exercise	63.1	8.4	5.3	65.2
10	Training reports	81.0	5.8	4.7	69.9
11	Field manuals	71.4	3.8	4.6	74.5
12	Battalion training circular	67.9	6.5	4.4	78.9
13	Training circulars/regulations	79.8	5.0	4.0	82.9
14	Training records	73.8	4.9	3.6	86.5
15	Training aids	75.0	4.5	3.4	89.9
16	Operational readiness tests	69.0	9.2	3.0	92.9
17	Physical combat proficiency test	66.7	4.5	2.7	95.6
18	Army training programs	60.7	4.3	2.4	98.0
19	Army subject schedules	53.6	3.3	1.7	99.7

TRAINING DISCUSSION:

Of 19 OBJECTS listed in the Training area, 4 appear in the upper third of the rankings, worldwide, and just 2 of the same 4 appear in the Vietnam list, namely, "Unit Training Program" and "Training Schedules."

Job incumbents offered the following comments:

"This battalion is engaged in combat. Training conducted consists of special training to overcome deficiencies noted during operations. Such training is done informally." (A commander in Vietnam)

"My S-3 Section uses ATP's, Subject Schedules, Training Tests, and Field Manuals. Maybe I should also, but the day isn't long enough." (A commander in Vietnam)

"With inexperienced staff and company officers, there is no other area that required greater command supervision to ensure high standards. The Basic Infantry Officer Course apparently fails to instill an appreciation for good training. More emphasis is required to develop instructional skills, control, and implementation on FTX, and the use of field expedients for training aids." (A commander in Panama)

"Obviously the training function of a battalion in combat is limited to the necessary to maintain proficiency in individual skills and unit SOPs, and to correct deficiencies." (A commander in Vietnam)

"During the 4 months training cycle, the battalion commander spends 90% of this time coordinating and inspecting training. Great emphasis is placed on training by the Commanding General; consequently, great pressure is exerted in this function." (A commander in Korea)

MANAGEMENT

RANKING OF OBJECTS: WORLDWIDE

The following definitions were used in this research:

Management -- "Consists of those continuing actions of planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and evaluating the use of men, money, materials, and facilities to accomplish missions and tasks." (AR 310-25, Mar 69)

Management System -- "An integrated group of procedures, methods, policies, practices, and personnel used by a commander in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling an organization." (AR 310-25, Mar 69)

Cumulative sum of Average Percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects . . .
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by subjects responding ...
 Percent of subjects responding

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OBJECTS</u>				
	
	
*1	Selecting and indoctrinating personnel who assist in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of men	97.6	8.4	8.2	8.2
*2	Creating policies which provide guidance in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of men	96.4	8.2	7.9	15.1
*3	Establishing procedures which govern planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of men	96.4	7.9	7.7	23.8
4	Selecting methods which serve as guides in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of men	96.4	7.2	7.0	30.8
5	Initiating practices which assist in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of men	95.2	7.0	6.7	37.5
6	Selecting and indoctrinating personnel who assist in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of materials	97.6	6.7	6.5	44.0

MANAGEMENT

RANKING OF OBJECTS: WORLDWIDE, Con't

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OBJECTS</u>				
7	Establishing procedures which govern planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of materials	96.4	6.2	6.0	50.0
8	Creating policies which provide guidance in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of materials	91.7	6.5	5.9	55.9
9	Selecting and indoctrinating personnel who assist in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of facilities	91.7	5.5	5.1	61.0
10	Selecting methods which serve as guides in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of materials	94.0	5.3	5.0	66.0
11	Initiating practices which assist in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of materials	91.7	5.2	4.7	70.7
12	Creating policies which provide guidance in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of facilities	88.1	5.0	4.4	75.1
13	Establishing procedures which govern planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of facilities	94.0	4.5	4.3	79.4
14	Initiating practices which assist in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of facilities	90.5	4.0	3.6	83.0
15	Selecting methods which serve as guides in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of facilities	89.3	3.8	3.4	86.4
16	Selecting and indoctrinating personnel who assist in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of money	71.4	4.6	3.3	89.7
17	Creating policies which provide guidance in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of money	70.2	4.3	3.0	92.7
18	Establishing procedures which govern planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of money	75.0	3.7	2.8	95.5
19	Initiating practices which assist in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of money	72.6	3.6	2.6	98.1
20	Selecting methods which serve as guides in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling the use of money	70.2	3.1	2.2	100.3

MANAGEMENT DISCUSSION:

4 of the 20 OBJECTS are placed in the upper third, by the respondents, worldwide, 3 of which shown by asterisk (*) in the rank column, are also given the same ranking by the incumbents in Vietnam. The 4th OBJECT listed by the latter group is "Creating policies which provide guidance in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling the use of materials."

The following was reported for addition to the OBJECT list:

"Creating policy on the use of time."

Respondents offered the following comments:

"This area is the single most important aspect of commanding a battalion." (A commander in CONUS)

"As much as being a leader, the commander must be a manager. This requires being up to date on the total spectrum of actions and shifting resources and priorities to accomplish the mission at hand." (A commander in CONUS)

"The abundance of inexperienced junior officers on the battalion staff and in the companies results in the battalion commander's spending an inordinate amount of attention to management and management systems." (A commander in Korea)

"----[aspects of] facilities at battalion level can be considered most significant [part of the position of battalion commander] if one considers ranges, fire support bases, base camps, field bivouac sites, etc." (A commander in Vietnam)

LEADERSHIP

RANKING OF OBJECTS: WORLDWIDE

NOTE: The following definition of Leadership was used in this research:

"Leadership is the process of influencing the actions of individuals and organizations in order to obtain desired results." (DA Pam 600-15)

Cumulative sum of Average Percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by subjects responding
 Percent of subjects responding

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OBJECT</u>				
*1	Setting and maintaining standards	98.8	1.7	1.7	1.7
*2	Setting the example	98.8	1.7	1.7	3.4
*3	Enlisted men's safety and welfare	98.8	1.6	1.6	5.0
*4	Organizing	97.6	1.6	1.6	6.6
*5	Setting goals/levels of achievement or effort	98.8	1.6	1.6	8.2
*6	Giving clear, positive, and timely orders	98.8	1.6	1.6	9.8
*7	Establishing and maintaining esprit de corps	98.8	1.6	1.6	11.4
*8	Rewarding/praising subordinates	98.8	1.5	1.5	12.9
9	Initiating actions	98.8	1.5	1.5	14.4
10	Motivating	98.8	1.5	1.5	15.9
11	Inspecting	98.8	1.5	1.5	17.4
12	Planning	98.8	1.5	1.5	18.9
13	Directing	98.8	1.5	1.5	20.4
*14	Keeping subordinates informed	98.8	1.5	1.5	21.9
*15	Fostering individual and unit confidence	95.2	1.5	1.5	23.4
*16	Personal visits	98.8	1.6	1.5	24.9
*17	Consistency in disciplinary matters	96.4	1.6	1.5	26.4
18	Accessibility to officers	97.6	1.4	1.4	27.8
19	Accessibility to enlisted men	97.6	1.4	1.4	29.2
20	Acts expressing approval	97.6	1.4	1.4	30.6
*21	Controlling	97.6	1.4	1.4	32.0
22	Evaluating	98.8	1.4	1.4	33.4
23	Making policy	98.8	1.5	1.4	34.8

LEADERSHIP OBJECTS, (Con't)

24	Allowing subordinates to develop procedures and techniques to implement policies	96.8	1.4	1.4	36.2
25	Creating an atmosphere which fosters mutual confidence and respect	98.8	1.5	1.4	37.6
26	Fostering the expression of new ideas, frank appraisals, & honest convictions through personal encouragement	98.8	1.4	1.4	39.0
27	Giving staff every opportunity to participate in the development of plans, policies, and procedures	98.8	1.4	1.4	40.4
28	Disseminating information on plans and operations as completely as security requirements permit	98.8	1.4	1.4	41.8
29	Finding out and attempting to eliminate the basic conditions creating uncertainty and frustrations before they accumulate	97.6	1.4	1.4	43.2
30	Assuring men know what is expected of them	97.6	1.5	1.4	44.6
31	Expressing confidence in the unit's combat ability	95.2	1.5	1.4	46.0
32	Providing a sense of accomplishment	97.6	1.5	1.4	47.4
33	High energy	95.2	1.5	1.4	48.8
34	Mission type orders	94.0	1.5	1.4	50.2
35	Informal relationship with officers	98.8	1.3	1.3	51.5
36	Courage	97.6	1.3	1.3	52.8
37	Serving as spokesman for the unit	97.6	1.3	1.3	54.1
38	Performing as counselor	97.6	1.3	1.3	55.4
39	Teaching	98.8	1.3	1.3	56.7
40	Delegating authority	98.8	1.4	1.3	58.0
41	Enforcing policies/regulations	97.6	1.3	1.3	59.3
42	Considering staff recommendations fully and objectively before making final decision	97.6	1.4	1.3	60.6
43	Developing confidence in individuals toward their leaders	98.8	1.3	1.3	61.9
44	Aesthetic and moral commitment to work	94.0	1.4	1.3	63.2
45	Originating new ideas or practices	98.8	1.3	1.3	64.5
46	Formal relationship with officers	98.8	1.2	1.2	65.7
47	Formal relationship with enlisted men	97.6	1.2	1.2	66.9
48	Officer's safety and welfare	98.8	1.2	1.2	68.1

LEADERSHIP OBJECTS (Con't)

49	Enlisted men's personal matters	97.6	1.2	1.2	69.3
50	Soliciting opinions of subordinates	98.8	1.2	1.2	70.5
51	Giving opinions to subordinates	98.8	1.3	1.2	71.7
52	Suggesting ways to accomplish tasks	98.8	1.2	1.2	72.9
53	Explaining the why of orders, etc.	97.6	1.2	1.2	74.1
54	Warning/reprimanding subordinates	98.8	1.2	1.2	75.3
55	Sense of humor	98.8	1.2	1.2	76.5
56	Prodding members for effort or achievement	97.6	1.2	1.2	77.7
57	Coordinating	98.8	1.2	1.2	78.9
58	Informing men what means they have at their disposal to assist them in accomplishing the mission	95.2	1.3	1.2	80.1
59	Instilling in the men an aggressive attitude and desire to destroy the enemy	86.9	1.4	1.2	81.3
60	Great work output	92.9	1.3	1.2	82.5
61	Persuading	97.6	1.1	1.1	83.6
62	Welcoming	98.8	1.1	1.1	84.7
63	Interviewing	98.8	1.1	1.1	85.8
64	Keeping informed of current rumors in the unit	95.2	1.1	1.1	86.9
65	Strength	88.1	1.2	1.1	88.0
66	Informal relationship with enlisted men	98.8	1.0	1.0	89.0
67	Encouraging pleasant group atmosphere	96.4	1.0	1.0	90.0
68	Briefing	98.8	1.0	1.0	91.0
69	Determining when/how work will be evaluated	94.0	1.0	1.0	92.0
70	Knowing enemy's capabilities	61.0	1.3	1.0	93.0
71	Officer's personal matters	98.8	.9	.9	93.9
72	Acts expressing disapproval	95.2	1.0	.9	94.8
73	Esteem by others	91.7	1.0	.9	95.7
74	Handling of attached/supporting units	91.7	1.0	.9	96.6
75	Reducing conflicts between members	96.4	1.0	.9	97.5
76	Serving as mediator	98.8	.8	.8	98.3
77	Determining differences of opinion between subcommanders and staff	98.8	.9	.8	99.1

LEADERSHIP DISCUSSION

13 of the 22 OBJECTS appearing in the upper third of the rankings, world-wide, were also placed in that category by the commanders in Vietnam. The 13 are identified by an asterisk (*) shown in the Rank column. It is noteworthy that "Setting and maintaining standards" and "Setting the example" were also chosen one-two in the rankings of the Vietnam commanders. The other OBJECTS placed in the upper third by the commanders in Vietnam were:

Instilling in the men an aggressive attitude and desire to destroy the enemy.

Mission type orders.

Creating an atmosphere which fosters mutual confidence and respect.

Disseminating information on plans and operations as completely as security requirements permit.

Knowing enemy's capabilities.

Providing a sense of accomplishment.

Expressing confidence in the unit's combat ability.

Several incumbents volunteered some comments on this area of command. Selected ones appear below.

"This is a description in the daily life of a commander. The degree of involvement depends on the strength and character of personalities." (A commander in Vietnam)

"This is a nebulous area. The commander sets the standards. He must, however, work with the assets provided him. This includes both quality and quantity of personnel, equipment, and support." (A commander in Vietnam)

"Any conceivable object/trait of leadership is a most significant part of command at battalion level." (A commander in Vietnam)

"A unit, even of battalion size, emulates to a high degree the personality and attitude of the unit commander." (A commander in Vietnam)

DECISION-MAKING

RANKING OF OBJECTS; WORLDWIDE

The following definition was used in this research:

Decision-Making -- The activity concerned with those decisions which are critical to the mission of the organization and which can be made only by the commander in the accomplishment of the mission. (DA PAM 600-15)

Cumulative sum of Average Percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by all subjects
 Average percent "Part-of-the-Position" by subjects responding
 Percent of subjects responding

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OBJECTS</u>				
*1	Personal knowledge of situation	100.0	4.4	4.4	4.4
*2	Knowledge of internal conditions of the battalion	98.8	4.4	4.4	8.8
*3	Military experience	100.0	4.1	4.1	12.9
*4	Own personality [courage, aggressiveness, etc]	100.0	3.9	3.9	16.8
*5	Actions/orders of higher commander	100.0	3.7	3.7	20.5
6	Use of recommendations of higher commanders	100.0	3.7	3.7	24.2
*7	Use of staff knowledge of situation	100.0	3.6	3.6	27.8
*8	Recognizing "real" versus "perceived" situation	98.8	3.5	3.5	31.3
9	Short-term effects [less than 3 months]	97.6	3.6	3.5	34.8
10	Use of recommendations of staff members	100.0	3.4	3.4	38.2
11	Use of recommendations of sub-commanders	100.0	3.4	3.4	41.6
12	Estimate of the situation	98.8	3.5	3.4	45.0
13	Requests of subordinate commanders	100.0	3.3	3.3	48.3
14	Techniques of operations	95.2	3.4	3.2	51.5
15	Past performance/lessons learned	97.6	3.3	3.2	54.7
16	Acceptance/denial of requested support	97.6	3.2	3.1	57.8
17	Inductive reasoning (general to specific)	95.2	3.1	3.0	60.8
18	Anticipated positive outcomes	98.8	3.1	3.0	63.8
19	Actions/orders of subcommanders	98.8	3.0	2.9	66.7
20	Risks	98.8	2.9	2.9	69.6
21	Deductive reasoning (specific to general)	95.2	3.0	2.8	72.4
22	Personality of higher commander	97.6	2.9	2.8	75.2
23	Creativity	97.6	2.8	2.7	77.9
24	Theory of operations	90.5	2.8	2.5	80.4
25	Use of recommendations of higher staff officers	96.4	2.6	2.5	82.9
26	Uncertainties	95.2	2.6	2.5	85.4
27	Actions of enemy	65.5	3.6	2.4	87.8
28	Anticipated negative outcomes	94.0	2.6	2.4	90.2
29	Long term effects [greater than 3 months]	92.9	2.6	2.4	92.6
30	Actions/orders of supporting commanders	95.2	2.3	2.2	94.8
31	Intuition	94.0	2.3	2.2	97.0
32	Actions/orders of adjacent commanders	90.5	1.7	1.6	98.6
33	Laws of probability and statistics	69.0	2.0	1.4	100.0

DECISION-MAKING DISCUSSION:

The respondents, worldwide and in Vietnam, placed 9 of the 33 OBJECTS in the upper third of the rankings with 7 of the 9 (shown by an asterisk(*) in the Rank column) also appearing in the Vietnam list. The combat commanders in Vietnam chose "Actions of the Enemy" and "Use of Recommendations of Staff Members" to complete their upper third.

It is noteworthy that only 7 respondents offered additional OBJECTS for consideration. The most repeated suggestion was "Personality and Capability of Subordinate Commanders."

Again it is noteworthy that only 6 comments were made by job incumbents. They are:

"Decision-making is a continuous process of evaluating and re-evaluating the situation at hand. A flexible attitude and snap decisions are required in the type war we are fighting today." (A commander in Vietnam)

"At the battalion level, long term effects are less significant in a combat environment than they would be in a stateside garrison." (A commander in Vietnam)

"Inexperience at the company level required current battalion commanders to become involved in company business to a greater extent than before -- when the average length of service for company commanders was longer. Considerable care must be taken to simulate inactivity and avoid over-supervision while assisting these commanders to anticipate problems and structure appropriate solutions." (A commander in Europe)

"Tactical decisions must be made quickly and are easily made after a few minutes of conscious thought and comprehensive estimate of the situation. Uncertainties and unknowns plus risks are conscientiously considered and are quickly integrated. The commander alone makes tactical decisions. An excellent executive officer who marshals facts accurately and succinctly with the pros and cons is indispensable in other matters." (A commander in Vietnam)

"Due to the nature of our mission here and the plans aspect of USAREUR today, most decisions are made by the battalion commander. I feel, though, that with each decision I try to explain why so that my people will gain some insight to the future use. I am just trying to rationalize my decision making with some confidence that my staff won't 'sell the store'." (A commander in Europe)

"Essential decisions in this battalion and the division as a whole are based on allocations of shortages and crisis management." (A commander in Europe)

THE COMBAT ARMS MANEUVER BATTALION

BACKGROUND DATA

This research focused on the commander of the combat arms maneuver battalions; namely, Infantry, Light Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, Airborne, Airmobile, and Tank. These battalions were organized, at the time of the survey April - October 1970, as follows:

Battalion	Totals			HHC (1)			Rifle (3)			Comb Spt (1)			Tank (3)		
	O	W	E	O	W	E	O	W	E	O	W	E	O	W	E
Infantry	40	2	799	16	2	160	6	0	165	6	0	141	-	-	-
Lt. Inf	38	1	770	14	1	134	6	0	166	6	0	138	-	-	-
Mech Inf	40	2	878	16	2	175	6	0	184	6	0	151	-	-	-
Airborne	36	2	768	18	2	240	6	0	176	-	-	-	-	-	-
Airmobile	38	1	741	14	1	119	6	0	164	6	0	130	-	-	-
Tank	35	3	561	20	3	300	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	0	87

NOTE: O- Officers, W - Warrant Officers, E - Enlisted Men

It is obvious by the titles that the commanders of these types of battalions consider themselves uniquely involved since each type is organized differently and contains equipment peculiar to the organization; i.e., tanks obviously create unique problems to an Armor commander. Similarly, helicopters make a unique impact on the Airmobile battalion commander. Be that as it may, an objective of the research was to examine the battalions worldwide to gain an insight in their influence on the commanders. Accordingly, some general data were collected on missions, strengths, and performances. These data and discussions of the data are presented next.

TABLE 1
BATTALION MISSIONS

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>NO. BATTALIONS</u>
TRAINING	21
COMBAT OPERATIONS	31
OTHER	33

DISCUSSION:

Aside from the explicit missions, training and combat operations, the battalion commanders expressed a variety of missions which ranged from supporting the ROTC program to training for civil disturbances. It is most evident that combat arms maneuver battalions are involved in a wide spectrum of tasks which impose many demands upon the commander. Of the 85 respondents, 33 reported missions other than Combat Operations or training as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 2
BATTALION STRENGTH

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>						
	100%	90%	80%	70%	Below 70%	MEAN	MODE
OFFICER	35	21	10	8	10	88.1%	100%
NCO	7	24	16	22	13	85.6%	90%
EM	8	30	18	18	7	81.9%	90%

DISCUSSION:

Table 2 reflects the strengths of the battalions at the time of the survey. Worldwide reports indicated an officer strength mean of 88.1%, NCO strength at 85.6%, and EM strength at 81.9%. The mean strengths in Vietnam were 81.3%, 80%, and 87.2% respectively.

TABLE 3

BATTALION PERFORMANCE: COMPARATIVE STUDY

	N=84 MEAN
UPON ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND	5.05
DATE OF REPORT	7.20

NOTE: Scale of 1 ~ 10

1 - Not a very good battalion

10 - An outstanding battalion. The best battalion
I have ever served in.

DISCUSSION:

The commanders were asked to evaluate their battalions upon assuming command and at the time of the survey. They were to make their judgments on a scale of 1 thru 10 with 1 representing "Not a Very Good Battalion" and 10 representing "An Outstanding Battalion. The best battalion I have ever served in." Table 3 shows that the mean for the first judgment was 5.05 and 7.20 for the date of the survey. It is interesting to note that 70.23% of the commanders reported their battalions had improved after some time in command while 4.76% reported their battalions regressed. 25% reported no change.

THE STAFF OF THE COMBAT ARMS MANEUVER BATTALION

Background Data

The performance of the battalion commander is influenced greatly by his staff. Each of the 6-type battalion commanders has as his principal staff officers the following:

Unit Adjutant, S-1 -- Captain
Intelligence Officer, S-2 -- Captain
Operations/Training Officer, S-3 -- Major
Logistics Officer, S-4 -- Captain

To appreciate the impact of these individuals on the performance of the commander, some background data were collected and are presented in the next 20 tables. A discussion follows each Table. The results of the investigation into the thought processing of the staff are introduced following the general data.

TABLE 4

BATTALION STAFF ORGANIZATION

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>% AGREE</u>	<u>% DISAGREE</u>
STAFF SPECIALIST	6%	94%
SOUND ORGANIZATION	98%	2%
NEED FOR CHANGE	32%	68%

DISCUSSION:

When asked if they agree or disagree that the principal staff officers, S1, S2, S3, and S4, should be specialists, only 6% agreed as shown in Table 4. This report confirms data asked of battalion commanders in an earlier survey. Their reasoning is based upon the need for each staff officer to have a "total battalion feel" which can only be acquired by being an Infantryman with typical, pre-staff assignments in a platoon and company.

There is no question that the current battalion organization is judged to be a sound one. Only 2% indicated it was not. Some 32% of the commanders offered some minor changes. A sampling is shown below:

"Add personnel to T/O for garrison situations, such as, Assistant S1 and Assistant S4, battalion mess supervisor, training records manager."

"Eliminate CSM positions."

"Based on quick promotion policy the S4 should be a Major in addition to the S3."

"Make the S3 a Captain."

"In combat, additional officers are necessary as TOC duty officers, a most responsible position. 3 are needed for 24 hour duty. Liaison officers are necessary also. Only the best Lieutenants who are taken from line platoons can be used."

"Typical CONUS complaints -- need provision for legal clerks."

"Let it remain the commander's prerogative to utilize his assigned assets to accomplish his mission."

"Have a CWO as administrative officer."

"Establish a deputy for Operations and Intelligence and a deputy for Administration and Logistics rather than an XO and S3. The senior would then assume command when required. Captains and Lieutenants could then function to assist these deputies."

"Make all principal staff officers Majors because of the relative inexperience of Captains."

Commanders use their executive officers mainly as coordinator of the entire staff. In Vietnam, because of the splitting of forces among base camps, fire bases, etc., the XO is assigned some command functions to assist the battalion commander in rear area functions. On the other hand, the XO is restricted in Vietnam, in many battalions, to coordinating the Administration and Logistics functions.

When asked the duties/responsibilities of their Command Sergeant Majors, the common answer given by the commanders focused on "principal assistant in EM affairs". Next are some assignments which were reported.

"Police and assist in solving enlisted problems."

"Chief assistant dealing with enlisted men's morale, welfare, and utilization."

"He is the leader of the NCOs and together we lead the troops."

"He is basically an assistant XO and acts as a fireman to supervise critical projects."

"Acts as my alter ego and performs duties similar to mine. Handles all EM personnel problems, visits, conferences, etc."

"Heads the enlisted Chain of Command. Responsible only to the battalion XO or battalion commander. He has a role and function in all elements of battalion activity."

"Acts as a counselor for all NCOs and EMs. Recommends assignments for all senior NCOs."

"I can not even begin to explain. I would say he is the 1st Sergeant for all my companies. I could not effectively command without him."

Of the battalions surveyed, 33% had an S5. The majority held rank of 1st LT. The duty cited most often was "psychological operations".

TABLE 5

SOURCE OF COMMISSION;STAFF OFFICERS

SOURCE	S1				S2				S3				S4			
	N=27 VN	N=21 E	N=29 O	N=77 WW	24 VN	14 E	25 O	63 WW	28 VN	21 E	29 O	78 WW	25 VN	21 E	27 O	73 WW
USMA	19%	10	4	11	8%	7	8	8	7%	14	10	8	16%	5	-	7
ROTC	26%	57	27	35	29	36	12	22	57	38	38	45	32	48	30	36
OCS	55%	29	65	52	58	50	80	65	29	33	34	32	44	43	63	51
OTHER	-	4	4	2	5	7	-	5	7	15	18	15	8	4	7	6

VN - Vietnam, E- Europe, O- Other, WW - Worldwide

DISCUSSION:

Table 5 shows the sources of commissions for the principal staff officers of the surveyed battalions. Significantly, world-wide, over 50% of the staff officers, except the S3's, are OCS graduates as compared to about 8% USMA graduates. Noteworthy, is the 45% of the S3's, world-wide, who received their commissions from ROTC.

TABLE 6

COMMISSION YEAR;STAFF OFFICERS

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>S1 N=77</u>	<u>S2 N=63</u>	<u>S3 N=78</u>	<u>S4 N=73</u>
1969	30%	30%	5%	10%
1968	30	21	4	26
1967	22	34	26	42
1966	13	8	9	13
1965	1	3	4	1
1964	3	2	3	5
1963	1	2	15	1
1962			13	1
1961			5	
1960			3	
1959			4	
1958			5	
1957			3	
1956				
1955				
1954				
1953				1
1952			1	

DISCUSSION:

As reflected in Table 6, over 80% of the S1's and S2's were commissioned in the period 1967-1969; 78% of the S4's were commissioned in the same period, whereas the S3's were commissioned throughout a wide period ranging from 1952-1969, with 26% commissioned in 1967.

TABLE 7

RANK:STAFF OFFICERS

RANK	S1				S2				S3				S4			
	N=27	21	29	77	N=24	14	25	63	N=28	21	29	78	N=25	21	27	73
	VN	E	O	WW	VN	E	O	WW	VN	E	O	WW	VN	E	O	WW
2d LT	0%	40	26	18	0	38	31	21	0	5	4	3	0	5	20	8
1st LT	48	40	40	42	29	15	27	25	0	20	4	5	23	29	14	21
CAPT	52	20	34	40	71	47	42	54	30	75	62	54	77	66	66	71
MAJOR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	70	-	30	37	-	-	-	-

DISCUSSION:

The various ranks of the principal staff officers are shown in Table 7. It is very evident that officers are assigned responsibilities NOT commensurate with their ranks. Even in Vietnam, only 70% of the S3's surveyed were Majors. Worldwide, only 37% hold that rank. Worldwide, the S4's approached the rank of that assignment in that 71% were Captains. This situation may have a direct influence on the battalion commander's allocation of authority which is discussed later.

TABLE 8

LENGTH OF SERVICE:UNIT ADJUTANT

LOCATION	OFFICER		ENLISTED	
	\bar{X} Mos	Range	\bar{X} Mos	%
Worldwide	26	7-72	25	32
Vietnam	31	14-72	24	59
Europe	20	10-60	22	38
Other	25	7-66	27	66

DISCUSSION:

Table 8 reflects the service of the Unit Adjutants. It will be noted that the S1's in Vietnam had a mean of 31 months service as an officer, and 59% of them also had a mean of 24 months enlisted service.

TABLE 9

LENGTH OF SERVICE: INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

LOCATION	OFFICER		ENLISTED	
	\bar{X} Mos	Range	\bar{X} Mos	%
Worldwide	28	7-84	24	65
Vietnam	34	14-66	26	63
Europe	24	7-84	33	50
Other	23	8-58	21	76

DISCUSSION:

The Battalion Intelligence Officer, worldwide, had 28 months of service as an officer. Of these officers, 65% had a mean of 24 months' additional service as an enlisted man.

TABLE 10

LENGTH OF SERVICE: OPERATIONS/TRAINING OFFICER

LOCATION	OFFICER		ENLISTED	
	\bar{X} Mos	Range	\bar{X} Mos	%
Worldwide	71	8-156	39	50
Vietnam	95	34-152	32	43
Europe	47	12-142	43	52
Other	67	8-156	51	54

DISCUSSION:

The operations/training officers, as shown in Table 10, have considerably more service than the other staff officers of the battalion. Worldwide, they had a mean of 71 months officer service; some 45 months more than the S1's, some 43 months more than the S2's, and some 38 months more than the S4's. Additionally, 50% of these staff officers have had a mean of 39 more months of enlisted service. These data emphasize the distinctions held by the operations/training officers: age, rank, and experience.

TABLE 11

LENGTH OF SERVICE: LOGISTICS OFFICER

LOCATION	OFFICER		ENLISTED	
	\bar{X} Mos	Range	\bar{X} Mos	%
Worldwide	33	6-96	35	56
Vietnam	36	16-85	57	52
Europe	30	10-66	36	43
Other	32	6-96	32	70

DISCUSSION:

The Logistics Officer, worldwide, had a mean of 33 months of service as an officer. However, Table 11 shows that in Vietnam, 52% of the logistics officers there had a mean of 57 more months of enlisted service. This fact points up the great weight battalion commanders give to experience in their selection of company grade officers for this staff assignment. It will be noted in Tables 8 and 9, the S1's and S2's had enlisted service also but those who were serving in Vietnam had a mean of only 24 to 26 months respectively.

TABLE 12

COMMAND EXPERIENCE: STAFF OFFICERS

COMMAND	S1		S2		S3		S4	
	%	\bar{X} Mos	%	\bar{X} Mos	%	\bar{X} Mos	%	\bar{X} Mos
PLATOON	77	7	82	8	82	15	77	12
COMPANY	34	9	38	8	85	16	47	10

DISCUSSION:

As is well known, the S3's are the most command experienced. This is evident, as shown in Table 12, in that 85% had commanded a company for an average of 16 months, while the next most experienced was the S4 at 47% with 10 months in the command slot. It is expected that the staff members would have had platoon assignments and the data indicated between 77% and 82% did so. The Vietnam data varied only slightly from the worldwide figures.

TABLE 13CIVILIAN EDUCATION: STAFF OFFICERS

	N=77	N=63	N=78	N=73
YEARS	S1	S2	S3	S4
Under 12	2%	5%	8%	10%
12	5	10	4	7
13	12	6	6	10
14	12	19	6	12
15	3	6	4	3
16	56	41	63	53
17	8	8	6	4
18	1	3	3	-
19	1	2	-	1
\bar{X} Years	15	14	14	14
(Bachelor)	57%	45%	64%	55%
(Masters)	0%	3%	3.6%	1%

DISCUSSION:

Table 13 points up again the strength of the S3's in contrast to the other three staff officers. 64% held bachelor degrees; 3.6% had earned a master's degree. It was noted earlier, the S3 had the most service and was older than his fellow staff members.

TABLE 14MILITARY EDUCATION: STAFF MEMBERS

	N=77	N=63	N=78	N=73
COURSE	S1	S2	S3	S4
OCS	52%	65%	32%	51%
BASIC	51	40	74	53
ADVANCED	4	1	54	7

DISCUSSION:

The most significant finding depicted in Table 14 addresses the S1, S2, and S4. Only 4%, 1%, and 7% respectively were graduates of the Advanced Course. When coupled with the earlier discussions, these 3 principal staff officers are asked to perform duties and assume responsibilities under great odds. Their military service and military education are in sharp contrast to that of the S3. It is to be noted that the duties and responsibilities of battalion staff officers are presented in the Advanced Course. OCS graduates who held the majority of the staff officer assignments, received minimal instruction in staff procedures in their candidate program.

TABLE 15

ADDITIONAL DUTIES - UNIT ADJUTANT S1

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
1. Postal	25	21. Censorship	1
2. Safety	16	22. OCS Advisor	1
3. Reenlistment	15	23. CMND	1
4. Funds	10	24. Library	1
5. Voting	8	25. Recorder	1
6. Information	6	26. Class A Agent	1
7. Publications	6	27. Orphanage	1
8. A & R (Special Svcs)	5	28. Telephone	1
9. Claims	4	29. Secret Control	1
10. Education	4	30. Maintenance	1
11. Security	3	31. Casualty	1
12. Historian	3	32. Mess	1
13. Legal	3	33. Records	1
14. Forms	3	34. Currency	1
15. Insurance	2	35. Human Relations	1
16. Tax	2	36. Communications	1
17. Fire Marshal	2	37. Domestic Hire	1
18. Crypto	2	38. Junior Officer Council	1
19. Rewards	2		
20. Character Guidance	2		

TABLE 16ADDITIONAL DUTIES: INTELIGENCE OFFICER S2

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
1. Custodian Classified Documents	9	20. Insurance	1
2. Alternate Security Control	8	21. Personnel	1
3. Physical Security	7	22. U. S. Advisor Council	1
4. CBR	7	23. Command Information	1
5. Safety	5	24. Tank Gunnery	1
6. Fund Custodian	4	25. Plans	1
7. Historian	3	26. Civilian Personnel	1
8. Crypto	3	27. Cold War	1
9. P. I. O.	3	28. Education	1
10. Top Secret Control	2	29. Narcotics	1
11. Crime Prevention	2	30. VIP	1
12. Redeye	2	31. Customs	1
13. A & R	2	32. Postal	1
14. Maneuver	2	33. NCO Coordinator	1
15. Censorship	1	34. Class A Agent	1
16. Survival	1	35. Zero Defects	1
17. Fire Marshal	1	36. Tests & Exams	1
18. Junior Officer Council	1	37. Claims	1
19. Transition	1	38. Summary Court	1
		39. Damage Control	1

TABLE 17

ADDITIONAL DUTIES - OPERATIONS & TRAINING OFFICER S3

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
1. Security Control	3	16. Control	1
2. Assistant Adjutant	3	17. Court	1
3. Censorship	2	18. Facilities	1
4. Intelligence Officer S2	2	19. Tort Claims	1
5. Top Secret Control	2	20. Code Word	1
6. Safety	2	21. Ammunition	1
7. Claims	2	22. Crypto	1
8. A & R	2	23. Marksmanship	1
9. Maneuver	2	24. Tank Gunnery	1
10. Damages	1	25. Mess	1
11. Civil Affairs	1	26. Unit Funds	1
12. NCO Promotion Ed (E4-E6)	1	27. Summary Court	1
13. NATO Control	1	28. Historian	1
14. CPX Chief	1	29. Combat Development	1
15. Supervisor of S2	1	30. Information	1

TABLE 18

ADDITIONAL DUTIES - LOGISTICS OFFICER S4

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
1. Fire Marshal	14	20. Control	1
2. Mess	8	21. Transportation	1
3. Safety	5	22. RAD Survey Team	1
4. Motor	4	23. Signal	1
5. Property Book (PBO)	4	24. Conservation	1
6. Munition	3	25. Officers' Club	1
7. Damage Control	3	26. Project Stocks	1
8. Property	3	27. Communication	1
9. R & U	3	28. Education	1
10. Movement	3	29. Postal	1
11. Maintenance	2	30. Censorship	1
12. Maneuver	2	31. Cost Reduction	1
13. Support Platoon Leader	2	32. Construction	1
14. 2715 Cost Reduction	2	33. Acting Executive Officer	1
15. Logistics Readiness	2	34. CONEX Control	1
16. Assistant Adjutant	2	35. Snack Bar	1
17. Claims	2	36. Property Breakage	1
18. Loading	1	37. Ration Control	1
19. Weight	1	38. Installation Coordinator	1

TABLE 19

STAFF FUNCTIONAL AREAS

<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>INTELLIGENCE</u>	<u>OPNS/TRNG</u>	<u>LOGISTICS</u>
38-S1	30	4	1	3
39-S2	21	8	6	4
30-S3	9	8	8	5
38-S4	5	1	2	30

DISCUSSION:

Tables 15, 16, 17, and 18 list the variety and frequency of additional duties each of the principal staff officers reported during the survey. Table 19 shows that the S1 and S4 are assigned those additional duties which are functionally within their areas of responsibilities while the S2 and S3 receive the majority of their duties outside of their functional areas. For example, of the 38 additional duties reported by the S4, 30 could be classified as being logistically oriented. The other 8 were typically associated with one of the other staff positions. Also note that of the 39 duties reported by the S2, only 8 could be classified as intelligence oriented. It may be inferred from the above that the S1 and S4 staff officers are generally one dimension oriented whereas the S2 and S3 are concerned with a cross-section of the total staff functions.

TABLE 20

RATING OF THE BATTALION STAFF OFFICERS & THE STAFF

	N=84 S1	N=80 S2	N=84 S3	N=84 S4	STAFF AS WHOLE
MEAN	6.44	6.48	7.32	6.89	6.86
MODE	5	5	10	9	7

NOTE: Scale 1 thru 10 1 - Not Very Good 10 - Outstanding

DISCUSSION:

Table 20 shows data reflecting the incumbents' views of their staff officers and the staff as a whole. The S3's stand out the most respected with the S4's a close second. The S1's and S2's apparently leave something to be desired. The staff as a whole receives a better than average rating. In another question which directed the incumbents' attention to the battalion as a unit, 5% reported that their battalion had deteriorated between the date they assumed command and the day of the report. 25% indicated there had been no change. 70% said there was improvement. (On a scale of 1 through 10, with 10 suggesting an outstanding battalion, the mean was 5.05 at the time of assumption of command, 7.20 on the day of the report.)

THOUGHT PROCESSING OF THE BATTALION STAFF
AND
BATTALION COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF

The request to investigate the area of "thinking" placed a difficult requirement upon the researcher. This was primarily true because of the difficulty of handling a nebulous concept such as thinking versus the relatively more tangible areas of knowledges and skills. This difficulty was compounded by the fact that previous investigations have been characterized by a lack of systematic methodology to the extent that there is not complete agreement in the research community as to the specific definition of basic terms (e.g., thinking).

During the course of the research, and in many discussions with the sponsoring agency, it became apparent that the information desired was not accurately categorized by the term "thinking" but was more like a concept of "thought processing". The difference here is a dynamic one with the second term connoting a continuing process within the battalion organization rather than an isolated incident which may or may not be related to organizational goals. Thus, in the subsequent discussion, we shall present data on thought processing and shall attempt to explain how this differs with differing job requirements.

The term "thinking" can refer in a general sense to the process by which individuals apprehend or become aware of what is going on around them. However, the theory and research usually classified under the label of thought processing may have a more restricted referent. In particular, thought processing can refer to how effectively an individual behaves in situations in which events must be organized or structured in some way. The implication is that there is some sort of generalized process available that can be applied to a wide variety of situations. This search for organizing principles led up to the model shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1
THOUGHT PROCESSING ON THE
BATTALION LEVEL

Looking at Figure 1 from left to right, it can be seen that events occur (these may be enemy actions, friendly actions, or simple administrative requirements) which cause requirements to be initiated from two primary sources. The first source is labeled Command Imposed and this refers to a requirement imposed by a higher headquarters. Using a CPX¹ as a source of data, this requirement usually came from Brigade level.

The second source of requirements is labeled Situation Created. Again, in the context of the CPX, this indicated an area in which a requirement was generated by the situation and was mediated by Company level personnel.

These requirements generated a stream of events that necessitated action at the battalion level. This action was categorized into three behavior patterns. The first occurring of these was the Storing response. Storing, in this context, means that the communication input was simply accumulated in some form (sometimes mentally, but more usually recorded on a map or entered in a file) with no immediate action required. A common bit of communication that elicited a Storing response was the routine report of grid coordinates for a specific location. The decision as to whether a bit of information is of the Storing type was usually inherent in the communication. That is, most of the communications were either directive (and these included requests from subordinates) or non-directive in nature; and thus, there is no real decision making that occurs at this point.

The second category of behavior pattern was the Automatic response. This identifies an activity in which, due to training and experience, the stimulus automatically activates systems that lead to pre-patterned reactions. In simple terms, this means that when the officer receives a request, he knows what to do and does it. An example would be the S4 receiving a request for Class III supplies. His reaction to a request of this type is mostly automatic in that he knows exactly the sequence of events that must be initiated in order that the requesting agency will eventually receive the needed supplies.

The third category of response has been labeled Analytical. This is a very complex area and is the area that most people would probably include in the category of thinking. This type of response requires the officer to examine various alternatives in order to select the one that will apparently solve the requirement. In doing this, recall, experience, education, training,

¹This Phase of the research used as its source of data a Battalion CPX designed and conducted by Work Unit FORGE. The administrative aspects of the CPX, together with an extensive analysis of the organizational principles that were involved in the simulate, will be reported in a separate document that will be prepared by Work Unit FORGE.

sensing, judgment, imagination and perhaps fantasy are all integrated in the application of this behavior. In the data collection vehicle used here, the alternative solutions were usually examined verbally with whomever was physically present.¹ An example of this type of response is shown in Appendix I while a typically automatic response is shown in Appendix II. The request is the same in both cases and involves the identification of a Brigade Contingency Force. However, in the Analytical response this request is examined by the Bn CO, XO, S2, S3, and several possible alternatives are suggested while in the Automatic type response an immediate decision is made by one person. Table 21 below lists the major differentiating variables between Analytical and Automatic responses.

TABLE 21

MAJOR DIFFERENTIATING VARIABLES
BETWEEN ANALYTICAL AND AUTOMATIC RESPONSES

	<u>Automatic Response</u>	<u>Analytical Response</u>
1. Number of personnel directly involved in action	1	2 or more
2. Proposal of several possible alternatives	No	Yes
3. Time delay between request and reaction	None	Some

Thus, using the model shown in Figure 1 as the method of categorization, and the Work Unit FORGE CPX as the data collection vehicle, an analysis of thought processing was conducted on the battalion staff.

The initial phase of the analysis involved determining the frequencies of the Command Imposed and Situation Created categories. In review, Command Imposed indicated that an element of communication has been passed to the Battalion level from some level higher in the chain of command while the Situation Created category referred to an element of communication that was passed to battalion level from some level lower in the chain of command.

¹That is, the S1 usually talked with the S4 (and vice versa) and perhaps the XO and CO, while the S2, S3, and S31 conversed with each other and perhaps the XO and Co.

The determination of these frequencies indicated that, in general, the Command Imposed category occurred a majority of the time. However, there was some variability in these frequencies in reference to staff positions, and these differences are shown in Table 22 below.

TABLE 22
FREQUENCIES OF COMMUNICATION INITIATION
TO EACH STAFF POSITION

	<u>Situation Created</u>	<u>Command Imposed</u>
Battalion CO	23%	77%
S1	33%	67%
S2	36%	64%
S3	46%	54%
S4	39%	61%

The data would seem to indicate that direct communication with the Battalion CO tends to occur more from Brigade level than from lower levels while more company level communication is directed at the staff. This is apparently particularly true of the S3 who is the recipient of more situation-created communication than any other staff officer.

At this point in the sequence (see Figure 1), the communications from whatever source combine to feed into the battalion staff. This input creates various requirements on the commander and staff and the frequency of the resulting behavior patterns, will now be identified.

The first pattern that is of significance is that of Storing.

TABLE 23
STORING RESPONSES FOR EACH STAFF POSITION

	Amount of Storing Type Responses Per Staff Positions
Battalion CO	12%
S1	2%
S2	47%
S3	37%
S4	2%

Table 23 shows that the S2 and S3 store more responses than the S1 and S4. This is not unexpected of the S2 since his primary responsibility is the collection of information of the enemy, weather, and terrain.

The relatively low level of storing for the Battalion Commander probably indicates that storing type information is usually passed directly to one of the staff officers rather than to the CO himself.


The two other categories of behavior patterns are interactive in nature. Table 24 shows and contrasts the Analytical and Automatic type responses for each officer and each phase¹ of the simulate.

The results indicate that, in general, the Automatic response is the one most frequently occurring on the battalion staff. A Battalion Commander is the major exception to this observation. For the commander we find that he consistently exhibits Analytical type responses during all phases of the CPX. This finding would probably be expected as it is the commander who has the responsibility for making a final decision. To do this, the commander must search through a wide range of alternatives, evaluate the data presented, and select the most appropriate course of action. (Thought processing as it pertains to the battalion commander is discussed more fully in the section of this report which is concerned with the commander, per se.) The data seem to indicate that these decisions require unique solutions to the presented problems; and thus, analytical response patterns are often required. However, the fact that not all of the Commander's decisions are required to be analytical in nature would tend to indicate that some of the problem solutions are capable of pre-planning; and thus, some stability can be programmed into the response pattern picture.

The data involving the S1 present an interesting picture. Although this job has been sometimes pictured as being rather routine in nature, Table 24 seems to indicate that there is more complexity in the job than was previously supposed.

¹The FORGE simulate was divided into three phases (shown as I, II, and III in Table 24). In the first of these phases the Battalion was engaged in routine company level patrolling; in the second phase the warning order was issued for an airmobile assault; and in the final phase the airmobile assault was made and the Battalion was engaged in extensive tactical operations.

Table 24
BATTALION COMMANDER AND STAFF
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSE PATTERNS



There is a slight tendency for the response pattern of the S1 to switch from a majority of Automatic responses to a majority of Analytical responses as the intensity of the CPX is increased, but the magnitude of this switch is rather small and is probably of no practical importance. What is of interest is the fact that all during the simulate approximately 1/2 of the S1 responses are Analytical in nature. This rather high proportion of Analytical responses for this staff officer means that officers occupying this position should be prepared to assume a job in which more creativity is required than would probably be expected.

The data depicting the activities of the S2 is also worthy of special comment. This officer has often been depicted as the recipient of large amounts of fragmented information that is supposedly assessed to make meaningful patterns. The data show that, in fact, a majority of the time the S2 is making Automatic Responses. This may imply that the procedures for collecting and evaluating intelligence information are of such specificity, that the typical mode of responding is largely pre-determined. The picture that is presented to the commander by the S2 may be unique in regards to the factors assessed, but the thought processing that was involved in obtaining that picture apparently follows a fairly well laid out course.

The data for the S3 are probably predictable. It can be seen that in all phases of the simulate the Automatic response occurs a majority of the time. Since this staff officer is primarily responsible for carrying out the wishes of the commander in regards to tactical matters, it would be expected that prescribed modes of responding would probably be in the majority. It is perhaps interesting to note that during Phase II, the planning phase of the CPX, there is actually an increase in the amount of Automatic responses. This finding may underline the existence of exact administrative procedures that are involved in the planning of a tactical situation.

The data describing the actions of the S4 present a rather clear cut picture. Here we find that in all situations a great majority of S4 responses are automatic in nature. The explanation here probably lies in the well-established administrative procedures of the logistics/supply system. Most requirements that are placed on the S4 apparently require no analysis, per se, but simply require that the thought processing energize some previously established sequence of events that will meet the needs of the requesting agency. This finding should not be interpreted to mean that S4 personnel are less creative in their work than are other staff officers. The finding simply identifies a general area that is extensively organized with specific procedures that can be used by the S4 to solve most of his requirements.

In summary, it can be said that while the Battalion Commander typically engages in thought processing that can be labeled as Analytical in nature, the

thought processing of the staff is, in the majority of cases, Automatic reactions to the imposed requirements. This finding is probably in the expected direction. One would possibly assume that since it is the commander who is ultimately responsible for the actions of his battalion, he would be expected to make the majority of Analytical responses. Alternately, since it is the job of the staff to carry out the wishes of the commander, it might be assumed that the typical mode of responding for this group would be in the direction of utilizing predetermined patterns of behavior. This utilization of predetermined patterns emphasizes that for the Battalion staff, thought processing is a more descriptive concept than is the term "thinking".

THE BATTALION COMMANDER

BACKGROUND DATA

A profile of a typical commander of a Combat Arms Maneuver Battalion is presented below. A complete report and discussion on the background of the commander follows.

Source of Commission -----	ROTC
Year Commissioned --	1952
Length of Service -----	16.8 years (Officer) 2.5 years (Enlisted)
Prior Combat Experience -----	Yes
Prior Command Experience --	Platoon, 27 months Company, 28 months
Education --	Military, C & GSC Graduate Civilian, Undergraduate Degree
Staff Experience --	Battalion Brigade Division Higher Staffs

TABLE 25

SOURCE OF COMMISSION: BATTALION COMMANDER

SOURCE	N=31 VIETNAM	N=23 EUROPE	N=31 OTHER	N=85 WORLDWIDE
USMA	23%	35	29	28
ROTC	32%	48	45	41
OCS	35%	13	23	25
OTHER	10%	4	3	6

DISCUSSION:

Table 25 shows that 2/3 of the Battalion Commanders in Vietnam were commissioned via OCS and ROTC. This was also the finding worldwide with graduates of the ROTC program making up some 41% of the total. 68% of the Commanders in CONUS, Hawaii, Alaska, and Korea (OTHER) received their commissions through the OCS or ROTC.

TABLE 26
COMMISSION YEAR: BATTALION COMMANDER

N= 85

YEAR	% WORLD	% VIETNAM	% EUROPE	% OTHER
1948	2	3	-	3
1949	4	-	7	3
1950	7	6	-	13
1951	13	12	13	13
1952	22	29	22	16
1953	15	19	13	13
1954	10	3	18	13
1955	13	16	9	13
1956	8	12	9	3
1957	6	-	9	10

DISCUSSION:

It is evident from Table 26 that the bulk of the current Battalion Commanders were commissioned at the time of the Korean War 1951-1953. Of some interest is the fact that, worldwide, the commanders held commissions granted over a period of 10 years.

TABLE 27
LENGTH OF SERVICE: BATTALION COMMANDER

LOCATION	OFFICER		ENLISTED	
	\bar{X} Yrs	Range	\bar{X} Yrs	%
WORLDWIDE	16.8	12.8-24.9	2.5	50
VIETNAM	18 yrs	14-24.9	2.3	63
EUROPE	16.6	13-21	2.3	43
OTHER	17.1	12.8-21.8	2.1	45

DISCUSSION:

Table 27 shows that the respondents worldwide had approximately 17 years of service as an officer plus 2-1/2 years as an enlisted man. It is understandable that those in command in Vietnam were slightly more experienced. There, the mean for years of service was 18 years plus 2.3 years as an enlisted man.

TABLE 28

PRIOR COMBAT EXPERIENCE: % YES

	Bn Cmdr		S1		S2		S3		S4	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
WORLDWIDE	85	93	7	42	53	40	78	86	74	55
VIETNAM	31	84	27	48	24	38	28	86	26	38
EUROPE	23	96	21	29	14	36	21	81	21	62
OTHER	31	100	29	45	25	44	29	90	27	63

DISCUSSION:

It is significant that prior combat experience is reported by 93% of the Battalion Commanders, worldwide. It will be recalled that the bulk of these commanders received their commissions during the Korean War when they served as platoon and company commanders. Table 28 also points up the backgrounds of the staff officers and how they compare with the commanders. In these positions, the data indicate that less than 50% of the S1's and S2's had had prior combat experience; 55% of the S4's had been in prior combat; and, as expected, 86% of the S3's were combat experienced.

TABLE 29

PRIOR COMMAND EXPERIENCE: BATTALION COMMANDER

	N=85	
	%	\bar{X} MONTHS
PLATOON	96	27
COMPANY	95	28
BATTALION	20	8.4

NOTE: \bar{X} Mos Current Command = 8.6

DISCUSSION:

Prior command experience at the platoon, company and battalion levels is reflected in the data in Table 29. It is not unexpected that the incumbents would have had command time at the platoon and company. The prior command experience at the battalion level for some 20% of them, however, is a surprise.

TABLE 30

EDUCATION: BATTALION COMMANDER

N=85

MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
COURSE	% ATTENDED	YEARS	% ATTENDED
OCS	25	12	2
BASIC	85	13	1
ADVANCED	100	14	1
C & GSC	92	15	-
AFSC	11	16	52
WAR COLLEGE	4	17	26
		18	14
		19	4
		\bar{X} YEARS	16

DISCUSSION:

The data in Table 30 reflect the military and civilian education of the respondents. It is evident that attendance at the Command and General Staff College is an essential prerequisite to battalion command. Additionally, higher education appears to be a must since 96% of the incumbents reported having at least 16 yrs of schooling. It is significant that 30% also reported holding a Master's Degree.

TABLE 31

BATTALION COMMAND QUALIFICATIONS

ITEM	WOULD RATIOS	% WOULD
1. Upon Graduation Advanced Course	12:83	15%
2. Upon Graduation C & GSC	73:83	88%
3. Upon Completion Tour as XO or S3 on Battalion Staff	76:83	92%
4. Upon Completion of Tour on Brigade Staff	51:83	62%
5. Upon Completion Tour on Division Staff	51:83	62%
6. Upon Completion of Advanced Course and Tour of Duty on Staff of Battalion/Brigade	52:83	63%

DISCUSSION:

Table 31 shows the results of a set of questions asked of the respondents. They were requested to reflect their reactions to the questions using as a base of reference their current appraisal of the responsibilities of command. The most significant response was that made to Item 1: Would you feel qualified to command a battalion upon graduation from the advanced course at Fort Benning, Georgia? Only 12 of 83 or 15% of the incumbents indicated they would be qualified. It is to be noted that the advanced course is curriculum engineered to qualify graduates as battalion commanders. Considered also of some significance is the response to Item 3, Implied in the data is that experience as a battalion executive officer or battalion S3 after being schooled in the advanced course is necessary background for battalion command.

GENERAL DATA

Opinions were elicited from job incumbents on a variety of command matters. These are reported next accompanied by discussions, as appropriate.

TABLE 32

TRAINING TECHNIQUES: ROLE-PLAYING ENVIRONMENT

N=84

<u>TECHNIQUE</u>	<u>% FAVORED</u>
WAR GAMES	45
CPX	27
OTHERS	25
MAP EXERCISE	2
MAP MANEUVER	1

DISCUSSION:

It is known that the battalion commander performs his duties/responsibilities under the reality pressures and within c. 31s situations that frequently characterize his operations. Job incumbents were asked to express their opinions of several training techniques which best simulated this difficult "role-playing environment". The respondents opinions are shown in Table 32.

TABLE 33

ASPECTS OF COMMAND: CLASSIFICATION

<u>ASPECTS OF COMMAND</u>	<u>ART</u>	<u>SCIENCE</u>	<u>BOTH</u>
DECISION-MAKING	14%	22%	64%
MANAGEMENT	2%	45%	53%
LEADERSHIP	29%	6%	65%

DISCUSSION:

Assuming leadership, management, and decision-making compose 3 aspects of command, it is revealing to see that the respondents have varying opinions about classifying each one as either an art or science. Table 33 indicates the incumbents in this survey are not really too certain what they are. These data and those reported in Table 34 (frequency), suggest that commanders are not schooled sufficiently on these aspects of command. If they were the data would show less disagreement.

TABLE 34

COMMANDER ROLES: FREQUENCY

<u>ROLE</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>N=81</u> <u>MEAN</u>	<u>MODE</u>
LEADER				5	9	9	3	13	14	28	6.02	10
MANAGER			2	2	9	8	16	21	8	15	7.51	8
DECIDER	2		2	1	6	5	9	21	8	27	7.96	10

NOTE: 1 - Least Often 10 - Most Often

DISCUSSION:

Assuming that a commander wears the three hats: leader, manager, and decider, when asked how frequently he performs these roles, 81 incumbents reported they perform the leader role more frequently as shown in Table 34.

TABLE 35

INDICATIONS OF LEADERSHIP

<u>INDICATOR</u>	<u>N=83 MEAN</u>
MORALE	2.54
ESPRIT	3.06
DISCIPLINE	2.37
PROFICIENCY	2.02

NOTE: 1 - Most Attention 4 - Least Attention

DISCUSSION:

FM 7-20 states "the combat effectiveness of the unit can be determined only by a continuous evaluation of the indications of leadership; namely, morale, esprit de corps, discipline, and proficiency." The incumbents were asked to rank these indicators to indicate their current attention to them in their battalions. As shown in Table 35, proficiency was receiving the most attention, discipline next, followed by morale and esprit de corps in that order. Some comments follow:

"For a command in combat, maintaining proficiency is most time consuming due to rapid turnover of personnel and the necessity to change operational patterns."

"I rank all in the same priority and am attempting to devote my attention to the four equally."

"I don't think you can really separate esprit, morale, and discipline. The three are completely entwined."

"Proficiency is the basis for professionalism. If you have a group of pros as leaders, all else will follow. Not so with morale, esprit, etc."

"Good discipline leads to proficiency which is morale and esprit."

TABLE 36

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

FUNCTION	% S1 XO CO			% S2 XO CO			% S3 XO CO			% S4 XO CO		
	S1	XO	CO	S2	XO	CO	S3	XO	CO	S4	XO	CO
PERSONNEL	48%	25	26									
INTELLIGENCE				61%	13	26						
OPERATIONS/ TRAINING							53%	10	37			
LOGISTICS										52%	28	20

DISCUSSION:

Some observers indicate battalion commanders vary in the amount of authority the commanders delegate to the various staff officers. Job incumbents were asked to indicate the situation in their battalions. Table 36 presents supporting data which describes the major role of the battalion XO as one of coordinating the activities of the S1 and S4. Note that the commanders delegate 26% and 28% of their authority to their executive officers in those activities while awarding only 13% and 10% to him in the S2 and S3 areas. Noteworthy in this table is the data centering on the operations/training function. It is generally assumed that the S3s are given the most authority of the various staff officers. The incumbents of this survey, however, indicate they retain most authority (37%) in this functional area.

TABLE 37

SOME DAILY/WEEKLY ACTIONS OF A BATTALION COMMANDER

N=84	ESTIMATED	
	Last 24 Hr MEAN	Last Week MEAN
How many decisions did you make?	12.20	78.42
How many times did you act as spokesman?	2.42	11.58
How many policies did you create?	1.08	4.50
How many unit visits did you make?	3.25	19.42
How many orders did you receive from your commander?	1.40	6.82
How many officers did you counsel?	1.95	6.10
How many NCOs did you counsel?	1.51	6.80
How many EM did you talk to?	30.5	157.23
How many frag orders did you issue to your commanders?	1.78	12.94
How many staff recommendations did you receive?	3.33	21.40
How many aerial flights did you make?	1.19	8.26
How many times did you sign your name as CO?	17.59	112.16

DISCUSSION:

Table 37 offers some data which could describe a typical day of the Combat Arms Maneuver Battalion Commander. He:

Received at least one order from his commander.
 Issued at least one fragmentary order to his commanders.
 Received at least three staff recommendations.
 Created at least one policy.
 Attended at least two meetings to represent his battalion.
 Visited at least three of his units.
 Counseled at least one of his officers.
 Counseled at least one of his NCOs.
 Talked to at least 30 of his EMs.
 Made at least one aerial flight.
 Made at least 12 decisions.
 Signed his name at least 17 times.

MANAGEMENT

Job incumbents were given the following quote from FM 101-5:
"Management is the means by which a commander insures proper conduct of those continuing actions of planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling the use of personnel, money, materials, time, and facilities required for the accomplishment of administrative missions and tasks."
They were asked to report several means by which they were insuring proper conduct of the continuing actions cited in the quote. Their responses are shown in Table 38.

TABLE 38

MEANS TO INSURE PROPER CONDUCT OF CONTINUING ACTIONS

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Asking questions | 26. Establishing priorities |
| 2. Having own special file/notes | 27. Commander's meetings |
| 3. Schedules/work and projects | 28. Command inspections |
| 4. Check list | 29. Commander's letters |
| 5. Daily staff briefings | 30. Daily meeting w/Bn XO |
| 6. Officers Call each week | 31. Forecasting |
| 7. Develop SOPs and change as necessary | 32. Developing realistic estimate of time |
| 8. Spot checks by staff and experts | 33. Require staff to make estimates/recommendations |
| 9. Require staff to brief back | 34. Orientation/review of policy and procedures |
| 10. Wall charts | 35. Continuous statement of short and midrange objectives |
| 11. Maintain a suspense file/calendar | 36. Providing necessary guidance how objective can be met |
| 12. Use of Zero Defects techniques | 37. Checking, checking, and more checking |
| 13. Command visits | 38. Situation reports |
| 14. Human relations seminar | 39. Publication of unit paper |
| 15. Monitoring of status deadline vehicles | 40. Inventories |
| 16. Daily meeting with motor sergeants | 41. Critiques/formal & informal |
| 17. Weekly staff conferences | 42. Use of Chain of Command |
| 18. Daily inspections | 43. Always asking the staff "why?" |
| 19. Set goals | 44. Clearly defining responsibilities |
| 20. Set time tables to meet goals | 45. Develop maximum authority in those areas not requiring Commander's decision and periodic review to determine if such authority is still appropriate |
| 21. Acknowledge the weak areas and watch these closely | |
| 22. Establish policies | |
| 23. Comparing results with similar units | |
| 24. Requiring progress reports - oral and written | |
| 25. Informal conversations w/commanders | |

The job incumbents were given the following definition: "Management Systems -- An integrated group of procedures, methods, policies, practices, and personnel used by a commander in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and evaluating an organization (AR 310-25)."

Assuming a battalion commander uses (1) methods, (2) practices, (3) procedures, (4) policies, and (5) personnel to assist him in performing his responsibilities, the incumbents were asked to list at least one of each category that he is or has used in his battalion. The following is representative of those reported. A complete listing is at Appendix III.

<u>Procedures</u> ---	Processing newly arrived personnel Vehicle dispatching Maintenance SOP Daily resupply requests Unit readiness SOP
<u>Methods</u> ---	Legal actions centralized at Battalion Preparation of 212's at battalion level Centralization of TAERS clerk Centralized awards Decentralized promotion Centralized battalion mess operations
<u>Policies</u> --	Company commanders pay their troops Battalion commander promotes all personnel to E-7 and up Battalion tactical SOP Daily reveille for all personnel in the Rear Base 1st offenders for narcotics violations will receive the Battalion Commander's Article 15; 2nd offenders will receive a Court Martial
<u>Practices</u> --	3-day pass to members who out-shoot the battalion C.C. NCO in command every Friday "Happy Hour" on Friday afternoons with wives
<u>Personnel</u> --	Use of Chain of Command for everything CSM to start EM Council Promotion boards for all EM promotions Require staff to do work Cross-training of all personnel Assigning responsibilities so as to use intelligence and abilities regardless of rank

SITUATIONAL DEMANDS OF LEADERSHIP

The concept of leadership has been expressed in a number of ways. One way describes it as a function of the situation rather than as a number of abstract qualities possessed by a given individual.

The job incumbents were asked to describe a situation which made, or was making at the time of the survey, demands upon their leadership, and how the situation resolved itself.

The following subject titles are representative of the situations reported. A detailed account is attached as Appendix IV.

- Racial Issues
- Narcotics
- Inexperienced personnel
- Low Standards of Discipline
- Personnel Turnover
- RVN returnees close to ETS
- Lack of Experienced NCOs and Junior Officers
- Control of Radicals

LEADERSHIP AT POINTS OF DECISION

The job incumbents were given the following quote from FM 7-20: "When the commander is at the point of decision, he can gain personal information of the situation, influence the action by leadership, and establish closer control." They were asked to report any experiences at "the point of decision" where they "influenced the action by their leadership." The following reports are representative of their offerings. The complete set of reports is attached as Appendix V.

"During recent civil disturbance exercise, a large number of acting dissidents sat down in the middle of a major thoroughfare as a troop formation reached them. Junior officers and men did not know what to do. I grabbed a "bull horn" and announced to the dissidents that they had broken the law and would be apprehended. I then ordered that trucks be commandeered to take dissidents to the "local police station." Officers and men quickly reacted. Leadership required that someone do something in the face of the unexpected. I feel that it was done."
(A commander in CONUS)

"Using the present method of operation of this unit in Vietnam, the point of decision is often 3000 feet in the air at the business end of a radio. One's leadership is limited to advising, recommending, and listening. Strangely enough, this often achieves the desired results.

Example: Recon platoon was on RIF mission, Binh Tuy Province. Platoon leader reported noises, signs of base camp, and activity to indicate a sizable force to his front. He requested artillery prep. In radio discussion with him, I explained forces available, etc., and informed him I desired further information on V. C. and hoped for PW. He moved out, deployed around base camp and captured 9 VC and 9 detainees - the latter mere children. These people contributed materially to our intelligence of the units in the area and to our understanding and assessment of the entire province.

In the above case, and other similar ones, my personal information was based on prior experience in the jungle and my knowledge and understanding of the man on the ground. The battalion commander in VN must have a feel for the jungle, but he must know his subordinates - recognize nuances in the voice; know his proficiency with arty vs. gunships; is he offensively or defensively oriented; is he in a tight spot or is he exhilarated by the situation; is he still in control or is he confused. These things must, in nearly every case, be weighed and determined at some distance through the medium of a radio." (A commander in Vietnam)

"A near riot or what could possibly have turned into a riot was averted by my arrival on the scene. Two of my companies were just about to have at it because of what they believed to be just grounds. It so happened that I had the facts and after a simple explanation the crowd dispersed. It was not so much my personal leadership but I believe any officer could have handled the situation if he had the facts to explain to them." (A commander in Europe)

"My forward Co was subjected to an indirect fire and ground attack that resulted in comparatively heavy losses. The CP group immediately returned fire at an enemy some 30 meters away employing automatic weapons and RPGs. But none of the APCs moved in the direction of the attack nor did any of the friendly elements maneuver until I and my S3 ran in the direction of the attack and successfully urged APCs and troops to move in that direction. The assault was instantly effective." (A commander in Vietnam)

DEMANDING PROBLEMS

Job incumbents were asked to indicate their 3 most demanding battalion problems. The following are representative of their reports. The complete response is attached in Appendix VI.

1. AWOL
 2. Statistics
 3. Maintenance
(A commander in CONUS)
-
1. Use of drugs
 2. Lack of experienced and/or motivated junior officers
 3. Lack of experienced administrative personnel
(A commander in CONUS)
-
1. Time to accomplish all required training
 2. Shortage of personnel
 3. Shortage of equipment
(A commander in Hawaii, Alaska, Panama)
-
1. Personnel shortage
 2. Machines
 3. Discipline
(A commander in Korea)
-
1. Overcoming generalized fear of boobytraps and enemy
 2. Relearning fundamentals of individual soldier and battle techniques
 3. Widespread use of drugs and narcotics.
(A commander in Vietnam)
-
1. Maintenance
 2. Discipline
 3. Personnel
(A commander in Europe)

LEADERSHIP SKILLS

Job incumbents were given "Diagnosing the problems" of a battalion as an important leadership skill. They were asked to list other skills they were employing or had employed in the area of leadership. The following is representative of their reports. The complete return is attached as Appendix VII. It will be noted that many of the items reported as being leadership skills are actually skills in managing.

1. Allocating your time
2. Maintaining rapport with subordinates and supervisors
3. Evaluating all established priorities
4. Recognizing various indications of morale, maintenance, potential problem areas.
(A commander in CONUS)

1. Listening
2. Developing a reputation for hearing
3. Being available
(A commander in Europe)

1. Know your people
2. Listen to subordinates
3. Treat people as individuals
4. Early detection of potential problems by talking to men
(A commander in Vietnam)

1. Setting the example
2. Knowing my job
3. Knowing the capabilities and limitation of personnel
(A commander in Korea)

THE DOs AND DON'Ts OF COMMAND

The job incumbents were very generous with their offerings in their DOs and DON'Ts of command. Over 300 statements of wisdom were reported with approximately 200 given as DOs and about 100 as DON'Ts. The following tables list them as they apply to a) the commander as an individual, b) the individual as the commander, c) the commander as a communicator, d) the commander as a manager, e) the commander as a leader, and f) the commander as a decision-maker.

TABLE 39

DOs AND DON'Ts: THE COMMANDER AS AN INDIVIDUAL

<u>The Be's</u>	<u>The Don't Be's</u>
1. Consistent	1. Never become complacent
2. Flexible	2. Never show fear
3. Honest	3. Don't lose your temper
4. Fair	4. Don't lose your sense of humor
5. Seen	5. Don't vacillate
6. Generous	6. Don't want to be liked
7. Trustful	7. Don't give up
8. Professional	8. Don't lie to your subordinates or superiors
9. Loyal	9. Avoid exaggeration
10. Decisive	10. Don't forget who battalion commander is
11. Capable	11. Don't get excited
12. Natural	12. Don't overact
13. Yourself	13. Don't be something you are not
14. Confident	14. Don't be afraid to change
15. Careful	15. Don't be a "tin god"
16. Flexible	16. Don't always "bark"
17. Cool (keep)	17. Don't be a "cry baby"
18. Young (think)	
19. Calm	
20. Alert	
21. Prideful	
22. Relaxed	
23. S.O.B. (with compassion)	
24. Positive	

TABLE 40

DOs AND DON'Ts: THE INDIVIDUAL AS A COMMANDER

<u>The Knows</u>	<u>The Don't Knows</u>
1. Know your job	1. Don't bluff
2. Know your men (talking)	2. Don't kid the troops
3. Know your mission	
4. Know your capabilities & limitations	
5. Know the capabilities & limitations of your unit	
6. Know the capabilities & limitations of your staff	
7. Know the capabilities & limitations of your equipment	
8. Know maintenance (veh, wpns, communication, etc.)	
9. Know your enemy	
10. Know the terrain	
11. Know your superiors (staff)	
12. Know the employment of all combat support assets	

TABLE 41

DOs AND DON'Ts: THE COMMANDER AS COMMUNICATOR

<u>DOs</u>	<u>DON'Ts</u>
1. Keep an open door: officers & EM	1. Don't make yourself unavailable to officers/men
2. Listen	2. Don't slough off minor complaints
3. Maintain channels of commo: up/down	3. Don't be surprised. Insist that staff and subcommanders keep you informed of good & bad news
4. Make the chain of command work	4. Don't stay in the office
5. Always communicate both up/down	5. Don't ignore the troops
6. Utilize the chain of command	6. Don't stay uninformed
7. Maintain a realistic open door policy	
8. Always keep the higher commander informed	
9. Always be accessible	
10. Keep men informed	
11. Let your people know what they're doing	
12. Stay abreast of changing conditions and situations	

TABLE 42

DOs AND DON'Ts; THE COMMANDER AS MANAGER

<u>DOs</u>	<u>DON'Ts</u>
1. Use your staff	1. Don't over-control
2. Train your officers & NCOs	2. Don't tolerate inefficiency
3. Administer justice fairly/swiftly	3. Don't usurp subordinate commander's authority
4. Make personal inspections	4. Don't lower the standard to match the performance
5. Counsel your men	5. Don't make work
6. Conduct seminars w/lower grade EM frequently to become familiar w/their problems and desires	6. Don't have people "spin" wheels
7. Plan the use of your time	7. Don't try to do everybody's job
8. Issue mission-type orders	8. Don't lower your standards
9. Give simple instructions	9. Don't play statistics at expense of troops
10. Use your past experiences in the decision-making process	10. Don't carry NCOs who aren't producing
11. Study all the alternatives before making a decision	11. Don't get too involved with the bad (200,212, Art 15 ok)
12. Use the common-sense approach	12. Don't rely completely on written reports -- inspect!
13. Put the best men in the job	13. Don't assume subordinates understand or are complying with instructions
14. Put the right man in the job	14. Don't judge a man's personality
15. Delegate authority	
16. Encourage initiative and teamwork	
17. Check constantly	
18. Provide timely and adequate guidance	
19. Make subcommanders/staff plan ahead	
20. Follow-up instructions	
21. Establish policies - make sure they are understood	
22. Elaborate on basic directives and explain why if possible	
23. Let men develop their own ingenuity	
24. Maintain cmdr-to-cmdr relationship; don't command through the staff	
25. Designate priorities of all tasks assigned to commanders	
26. Work like HELL 18 hours each day	
27. Stay out of the company commanders hair	
28. Judge a man's performance and not his personality	
29. Get rid of worthless individuals	

TABLE 42, Con't

<u>DOs</u>	<u>DON'Ts</u>
30. Give maximum authority to subordinates	
31. Insist on punctuality in completing assigned requirements	
32. Establish high but reachable standards and insist that they be met	
33. Consider all the advice possible	
34. Keep men busy with useful, productive work : if cannot, then give time off	
35. Develop procedures which provide you with reaction time. (Early detection of problems permits response before they become ugly and everyone's business)	
36. Demand early identification of your soldiers who display leadership potential and groom them with increasing responsibility regardless of rank	
37. When planning, consider to the extent possible, the unexpected. It will happen	

TABLE 43

DOs AND DON'Ts: THE COMMANDER AS LEADER

<u>DOs</u>	<u>DON'Ts</u>
1. Back your subcommanders	1. Don't stifle initiative
2. Concentrate on positive programs	2. Don't talk down to your men
3. Maintain your personal standards	3. Don't bargain w/subordinates
4. Care for morale aspects	4. Don't kill your people w/kindness
5. Set the example	5. Don't tolerate discrimination
6. Stress unit integrity	6. Don't treat every man as a number -- they must be treated as an individual
7. Emphasize mission accomplishment	7. Don't apply dual standards for any group of personnel in the unit, i.e., people of different race
8. Take risks for your unit	8. Don't let a situation exist with the intention of "handling it later"
9. Make the assumption in your mind -- and let it be known -- that your soldiers are as good as they come. The troops will live up to your concept of them	9. Don't generalize with individuals-- be specific
10. Reprimand through the chain of command	10. Don't fail to compliment or chastise
11. Maintain exemplary conduct and self-discipline	11. Don't accept excuses or sloppy performance
12. Take full advantage of the "personality" of a combat unit	12. Don't overlook obvious faults
13. Make presentations of awards immediately following the action. Esprit soars!	13. Don't visit the troops in the field with polish and starch
14. Instill confidence	14. Don't compete "with" your men -- compete "for" their welfare
15. Instill high esprit	15. Don't complain about directives from higher headquarters or discuss boss' personality with or in front of subordinates
16. When in contact, make your presence available at the decision point	16. Don't become involved in personal problems of either officer or EM unless absolutely necessary
17. Brief new officers and EM	
18. Praise accomplishments in public and in writing	
19. Look out for the men and they will look out for you	
20. Demand the best of yourself	
21. "Sell" the unit's mission to the unit	
22. Treat a man like a man and he'll be a man	
23. Praise in public - chastise privately	
24. (Keep cool)	
25. Demand, encourage, insist on integrity -- the straight word from everybody	

TABLE 44

DOs AND DON'Ts: THE COMMANDER AS DECISION-MAKER

DOs

1. Be right - not half right
2. Take the "BS" out of everything possible
3. Always orient on a real objective
4. Do it right the first time
5. Assume you are being told the truth except about 3% of the time
6. Build Esprit first, the rest will follow
7. Keep your head when the situation is tense
8. Admit your ignorance in some areas; when caught, don't cover up
9. Tell it like it is
10. A lack of something to say is often considered wisdom. Keep your mouth shut, unless you know what you are going to say
11. Think young
12. Be alert to higher commander's desires
13. Do what you say you will do. Follow through on all promises or threats or don't make them
14. Do what you know is right
15. Insist on high standards of honesty, morals, appearance and of discipline
16. Seek advice from subordinates and superiors
17. Understand the problems of others
18. Support honest mistakes
19. Admit your mistakes

DON'Ts

1. Don't expect rational actions from irrational men
2. Don't accept everything from higher headquarters at face value -- question, question, question
3. Don't jump to conclusions
4. Don't second-guess yourself -- go on!
5. Don't develop an attitude "It's easier not to - it's easier not to dig a hole, shave, take off beads
6. Don't do "busy work" just for the sake of logging in hours
7. Don't promise men something that you are unaware you can make stick
8. Don't assume every young Lieutenant is as dedicated and as eager as you remember yourself as being
9. Don't make snap judgments or decisions

THOUGHT PROCESSING

Job incumbents provided sufficient and pertinent data in this investigation of the thought processes of the Combat Arms Maneuver Battalion Commander. As indicated earlier in this report, the actual thinking of the staff officer or the battalion commander was not examined. Only the elements of an individual's specific performance and the application of these elements to general performance were researched. For example, in order to determine current concentrations of effort, job incumbents were asked to report their most demanding problems. To determine some clues to their current successes and failures, they were asked to report their DOs and DON'Ts. To seek out their current methods and techniques, they were asked to report their actions in certain situations. To provide some notion of criticality, they were asked to assess a variety of OBJECTS (subject areas) associated with command. Thought processing, as it is described in the following pages, resulted from a study of these data.

The reader is cautioned that what follows may appear, at the onset, to be an oversimplification. This research focuses on the commander of a combat maneuver battalion, not on the commander of a division, corps, or field army. Nor is the research concerned with the officer in a staff job at the Department of the Defense or Army levels. The thought processing described in this portion of the report is the result of an analysis of data provided by the job incumbents. Their individual contributions have been pieced together for this academic presentation.

It will be recalled that respondents reported data in three areas of command: managing, leading, and decision-making. Thought processing associated with each of these will be presented next.

THOUGHT PROCESSING: THE COMMANDER AS A MANAGER

Examining the thought processing associated with manager role first, it is very clear that the officer brings to his command his military style which evolved over the years of service in a variety of assignments. These styles were very much in evidence in the data which job incumbents reported when asked to report the means by which they insured proper conduct of those continuing actions of planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling the use of personnel, money, materials, time, and facilities required for the accomplishment of administrative missions and tasks. These styles varied with the individual, of course. 5 styles are listed below.

Example A

1. Announce targets and goals.
2. Provide subordinate commanders and staff your concepts.
3. Monitor planning and organization to insure compliance with concept and timing.
4. Receive reports and provide direction when required to allocate additional resources.
5. Evaluate results for future use.

Example B

1. Programming activities.
2. Determining priorities.
3. Determining critical times in terms of inspecting progress on a given activity prior to completion or performance date.
4. Assigning tasks to staff and commanders.

Example C

1. Use of normal planning sequence.
2. Solution of staff and subordinate recommendations.
3. Use of chain of command, particularly squad leaders.
4. Checking compliance with instructions.
5. Demand compliance with basic fundamentals.
6. Reward where due, likewise punish.
7. Continued visits to the squad level.

Example D

It is impossible to perform all of the tasks expected of a battalion and to do them with the assets currently available. This involves determining what is most important and what can be accomplished and reorganizing to accomplish those tasks.

Example E

The 1st step is to identify the problem or mission and the resources available to accomplish the mission/task. Forecasts are the most effective tool to the commander. Insist on timely staff actions. Last minute staff actions result in poor unit performance. Establishment of priorities of effort to control the expenditure of men, money, material, and time, conscious follow-up on all actions, especially with higher staff agencies.

Using the DOs and DON'Ts described in Table 42 and the examples of methods, practices, procedures, policies, and personnel shown in Appendix III, thought processing associated with Example A becomes readily apparent. The following represents one way of expressing it.

STYLE A

As manager, he announces targets and goals (objectives) in each of the functional areas of personnel, intelligence, operations, training, logistics (others, where appropriate); he provides his staff and subordinate commanders his concepts; he monitors the planning, organization and coordination to insure compliance with his concepts and timing; he receives reports and provides direction when required; he evaluates results for future use.

THOUGHT PROCESSING

First, Establishes Objectives: The commander may do this as follows: The commander analyzes his mission (tasks) and requires his staff to make estimates and submit recommendations; he determines priorities; he assesses the state of his unit and his personnel (morale, esprit, discipline, proficiency); he makes his own commander's estimate, and arrives at the best course(s) of action (objective(s)).

Secondly, he provides his staff and commanders his concept(s): The commander may do this in many ways. Following are some examples --

- Commander's meeting
- Use of chain of command
- Weekly staff conferences
- Officer's call
- Commander's letter
- Unit paper
- Written orders

Thirdly he monitors the planning, organization, and coordination to insure compliance with his concepts and timing: The commander may do this in many ways. Following are some examples --

- Use own special file or notes
- Use of schedules
- Daily briefings
- Spot checks by staff and experts
- Use of wall charts
- Use of suspense file/calendar
- Command visits
- Daily inspections
- Commander's meetings
- Command inspections
- Daily meeting with bn XO
- Checking, checking, and more checking

Fourthly, he receives reports and provides follow-up direction when required: The commander may do this in several ways. Following are some examples --

- Asking questions
- Inventories
- Situation reports
- Informal conversations w/staff and commanders
- Daily staff briefings
- Weekly staff conferences
- Officer's call
- Commander's meeting

Fifthly, he evaluates results for future use: The commander may do this in several ways. Following are some examples --

- Comparing results with similar units
- Use of zero defects principle
- Review of policy and procedures
- Critiques

In the execution of the above, the commander is guided by his own experience and the experiences of those who went before him. Some are listed below:


Put the best man in the job	Don't overcontrol
Put the right man in the job	Don't tolerate inefficiency
Delegate authority	Don't usurp subordinate commanders authority
Make subordinate commanders and staff plan ahead	Don't make work
Give maximum authority to subordinates	Don't lower the standard to match the performance
When planning, consider to the extent possible, the unexpected. It will happen	Don't have people "spin" wheels
	Don't try to do everybody's job

THOUGHT PROCESSING: THE COMMANDER AS A LEADER

A model which best describes the thought processing of the commander when performing his leader role is presented below. It was derived from an investigation of the data which job incumbents reported as DOs and DON'Ts, Leadership Skills, and Demanding Problems earlier.

FIGURE 2

MODEL OF THOUGHT PROCESSING WHEN COMMANDER PERFORMS LEADER ROLE



There is an interaction among 3 distinct forces when the commander performs his leader role. The mission of his organization, his knowledges and skills pertaining to leadership, and his values and attitudes. Since he must always focus on his mission, he must address those problems which are or will interfere with the accomplishment of the mission. These problems may be diagnosed as either people or organizational or both. He selects from his leadership set of knowledges and skills those tentative actions which he believes will solve the problems, and chooses from the tentative list those which stand up under his personal set of BEs and DON'T BEs. To illustrate, it will be recalled that one of the job incumbents in this survey described his 3 most demanding problems as follows: 1) overcoming generalized fear of boobytraps and enemy, 2) relearning fundamentals of individual soldier and battle techniques, and 3) widespread use of drugs and narcotics. According to the model, and using data reported in Tables 39 and 43, the thought processing concerning the first problem may include something like this:

THE PROBLEM: Fear of boobytraps and the enemy.

The Leader Knowledges and Skills applicable in this problem:	Set the example; concentrate on positive programs; make the assumption in your mind --- and let it be known --- that your soldiers are as good as they come; make presentations of awards immediately following the action -- esprit soars! etc.
--	--

The Individual: Be confident, cool, seen, decisive, careful, calm, positive, never show fear, don't get excited, avoid exaggeration, don't be something you are not.

It will be recalled that the job incumbents assessed the various OBJECTS associated with the functional areas of command. In the Leadership area, the Commander has at his instant recall a vast store of knowledge and skills. Those used in the example above are only representative to express the concept of thought processing of a leader.

The process of influencing people, admittedly, is much more complex than indicated in the simple example above. The 3 forces described in the model make tremendous demands upon each other. The job incumbent knows this only too well. The decisions he must make in the leader role are not easy and clear cut. On the other hand, they are reachable with some reasonable assurance of achieving success.

THOUGHT PROCESSING: THE COMMANDER AS A DECISION-MAKER

Thought processing associated with decision-making by a combat arms maneuver battalion commander is expressible using the well known "Commander's Estimate of the Situation" and using data previously described as the DOs and DON'Ts, Demanding Problems, Situational Demands, Points of Decision, and Additional Duties of Staff Members.

It will be recalled job incumbents were given the following definition of decision-making: "the activity concerned with those decisions which are critical to the mission of the organization and which can be made only by the commander in the accomplishment of the mission." Commanders have been reaching these decisions using the "Estimate of the Situation" as the thought process for many decades. The process has withstood the changes of time. No discussion of that well-known thought process will be entered here. However, the research data did produce something which merits consideration.

First, job incumbents offered several personal observations which, collectively provide an overview of experiences to "lean on" or "measure against" when making decisions. These observations were reported in Table 44, DOs and DON'Ts: The Commander as Decision-Maker. The following are several examples. "Do what you know is right." "Seek advice from subordinates and superiors." "Be alert to higher commander's desires." "Don't make snap judgments or decisions." These could enter the decision-making thought processing in the form of a mental check-list of guideposts.

This research has uncovered still several other guides not found in existing literature. A question was raised by the excessive number of additional duties assigned to members of the commander's staff. (Discussed in the section of this report concerning the staff). Answers were found when each duty was analyzed for its purpose. For example, the additional duty "Voting Officer" was obviously an additional duty for someone to insure that the members of the battalion knew how they could request, mark, and return absentee ballots during State and Federal elections. This action is the result of the demands of the U. S. public (governors, senators, congressmen) and such demands must be attended to by the battalion commander or he soon hears from members of that segment of the public by way of the Department of the Army. It is also rather obvious that parents become involved in local and state issues and they make demands upon their sons in the service. The commander is expected to look after the parents' desires insofar as the members of the organization are concerned. Each additional duty title was examined in the above manner. These examinations resulted in identifying 5 specific

demands or pressure areas which confront the commander when making decisions. These are 1) the battalion itself or organizational pressures, for example, organizational image, organizational record, organizational esprit, 2) the demands of each individual, 3) the pressures imposed by anyone representing the U.S. government, such as the higher commanders, adjacent commanders, DA, CONARC, etc., 4) his own demands, whether they be in support of his image or his professional record, and 5) the demands of the U.S. public such as was mentioned earlier.

To determine the reliability of this finding, 5 military experts were given the duty titles and were asked to associate each title with one or all of the pressure areas. The results are shown in Table 45. Those pressures generated by the unit were ranked above the others with those of the U.S. government ranked second, those of the individual third, his own pressures fourth, and those of the U. S. public fifth.

TABLE 45

PRESSURE AREA	RANKINGS (Vertical)					Consensus
	Subject A	Subject B	Subject C	Subject D	Subject E	
INDIVIDUAL	3d	4th	3d	3d	2d	3d
ORGANIZATION	1st	2d	1st	1st	1st	1st
COMMANDER	4th	5th	4th	5th	4th	4th
U.S. GOVT	2d	1st	2d	2d	3d	2d
U.S. PUBLIC	5th	3d	5th	4th	5th	5th

A similar examination was made of the DEMANDING PROBLEMS and the DOs and DON'Ts to determine their relation to the 5 "pressure areas." Again, there was clear evidence job incumbents do indeed include these pressures in their thought processing. Thus, although battalion commanders of maneuver battalions are taught to reach decision, which must be made to accomplish the mission in a military, impersonal manner, namely, the thought processing associated with the "Estimate of the Situation," this research finds one or more pressures influence his final decision. These pressures may be those generated by the status of his organization, by those created by persons in government outside of his organization, by those generated by the individuals in the organization, by those imposed upon himself, and finally by those imposed by the people outside the military. Commanders, whether or not

they realize it, react to these pressures, and in turn influence their subordinate commanders and staff members accordingly. There is no doubt that some commanders decide they intend to make a better showing than their fellow battalion commanders because of personal image and record. In fact, many higher commanders contribute to this individual performance pressure when they pit one subordinate commander's accomplishment against a fellow commander's. Similarly, a battalion consisting of returned Vietnam veterans waiting discharge creates pressures unlike those of a battalion whose personnel are in their first stages of enlistment. An unwanted prolongation of war by the civilian populace creates pressures which a commander cannot escape. Changing mores and practices, i.e., use of drugs, produce pressures which must be recognized. Decision-making at the battalion level, therefore, is more than deciding whether to attack here or defend there as may be arrived at by the process of making an estimate of the situation. It is also the living with dynamic pressures which impinge on the rational thought processing. No two commanders feel these pressures to the same degree. Their performance record, while in command, to a great degree, is certainly a function of these pressures. To reflect on one's command performance is one thing; to command under pressure is another. Thought processing as it relates to decision-making, therefore, appears rather simple when explained but as seen above, it is most complex when executed.

CONCLUSION

In the exploratory phase of this research, it was found that experienced commanders had great difficulty in articulating the job of battalion commander because they consider their performances as being unique due to differences among battalions, i.e., assigned missions, assigned personnel, assigned equipment. No two situations were ever similar, so the argument went; therefore, no two sets of skills or knowledges could be similar. Analysis of the data generated in this study of the commander, on the other hand, not only presents the knowledges and skills in the functional areas of command, namely, Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Training, Logistics, Management, Leadership, and Decision-Making, but also identifies those which assume high priority consideration by commanders wherever they may be stationed, whichever type battalion they may be commanding, and whatever may be the assigned mission. It can be concluded from this that the job of a battalion commander is NOT unique; only the individual in the job is.

There are evidences which indicate the battalion commander is satisfied with the organization of the battalion staff but is dissatisfied with the caliber of the staff. This study concludes the dissatisfaction may be due to the military school system and the real military world being "out-of-step." Except for the battalion executive officer and to some degree the Operations/Training Officer, S-3, the principal staff officers in general, are ex-platoon leaders who are assigned staff duties and responsibilities based upon a minimum orientation received in OCS or Basic Courses and limited knowledge in staff operations due to tours of duty in a company. In some measure, this "out-of-step" situation may be the result of rapid personnel turnover. Nevertheless, the current personnel assignment system insofar as the battalion staff is concerned ignores the fact that the training for staff work occurs in the Advanced Course, not in OCS or Basic Courses; and until this off-beat situation is corrected, commanders will continue to complain about the value of the staff.

Thought processing as it pertains to the battalion commander and the principal staff officers of the battalion is expressible. The processing associated with the staff officer is one of automatic response wherein staff officers reach answers and perform actions by matching imposed requirements with established methods, techniques, practices, procedures, and policies. The processing associated with the commander is one of analytical response wherein commanders reach answers and perform actions by reasoning in a logical, systematic fashion expressed in the "Commander's Estimate of the Situation," and by sensing the real pressures of the moment generated by the unit, the government, the individual, the self, and the public.

APPENDIX I

EXAMPLE OF PROBE DEVELOPMENT - 1

DRUMFIRE 3 this is DANGER 3, Over/DANGER 3 this is DRUMFIRE 2. Send your traffic. Over/This is 3. Roger. If you'll relay for me. Future Brigade Contingency Plans call for the possible detachment of one of your rifle companies for a period of 48 hours, effective 20, 1200, March. The company selected must be available for Brigade use on a one-hour notice. There are no exceptions to this. I will need your reply by 1030 hours this morning. Request you check it out and let me know which unit it will be and its present On-Line-Strength. Over/This is DANGER 2. Roger. Over/This is 2. Thank you. Out.

- S2 He needs to know by 1030, the letter designation of the company which will be on the Brigade contingency plan. One hour notice, they pick it up and put it where they want it. It will be effective for use possibly on 20, 1200, March.
- XO Well, if we have them on a one hour stand-by, then as long as they don't move from this location.
- XO Well, we could have this company relocate their patrol base to where they're patrolling out from around the Battalion. If push comes to shove, we could accomplish it, but if we have these just on a one hour notice, that's all Brigade is going to do. Just put a tag on it and if they need them they might take them. If they take them, we might have to pull this company in to patrol out from where we are. It will cut our effectiveness down.
- XO Well, I propose to put out the one-hour notice because we have these three platoons out. We won't get them back on a one hour notice. What we could do, is put A
- CO We just got a _____ from Brigade. They want to pull one company to have a one-hour stand-by. To use as an element up there. They have a company up there at Brigade already on stand-by. Yeah, I'm going to have to have some facts and figures. We're going to have DELTA company for our FST. That leaves us without a reserve element for any one of our units out there. Yeah, but then if they pull them out, then we're tight. I tell you what we will do, they said there were no ifs ands or buts. What we will do, again our S1 at least get us status on the companies. I'm going to try to talk the Old Man out of it. I prefer that we pull one of the companies out of the field, yet keep your reserve element. OK, then you propose that A Company go? OK, got the S1 to give me the latest strength report on the line units.

XO Company on a one-hour notice and if they do pull out, I mean put DELTA Company on a one-hour notice, and if they do pull DELTA Company out, we'll pull A Company back in. A Company has 112 right now in the field, and DELTA Company has about 111. That's with the replacements. If we could pull A Company back in to cover ourselves. Well, we're going to have to have A Company as a patrol so let them report LZ and find an LZ that they can pull into around here. Then they can get one of the choppers to bring them out. No, we haven't done anything yet. Now, when he takes this on a one hour notice, immediately on the one-hour notice, we'll need 18 helicopters to be able to pick up ALFA Company to relocate it as our security so we will need helicopters on call. The minute they pull out DELTA Company, we'll have to have the lift to get ALFA Company back. Talking to S3. Another thing, S4 need 3 helicopters. They've got to go to Brigade to pick up the equipment and take it out.

APPENDIX II
EXAMPLE OF PROBE DEVELOPMENT - 2

DRUMFIRE 3 this is DANGER 3, 1000, Over/DANGER 3 this is DRUMFIRE 3, Go, Over/This is 3, Future Brigade Contingency plans call for the possible detachment of one of your rifle companies for a period of 48 hours effective, 1200, 20 March. The company selected must be available for Brigade use on a one-hour notice and there are no exceptions to this. I will need your reply by 1030 hours this morning. Request you check it out and let me know which unit it will be and its present On-Line-Strength. Over Roger, Out.

S3 Does it make a difference? Lets send CHARLIE.

DANGER 3 this is DRUMFIRE 3 1001, Over/Roger, Go. This is DRUMFIRE 3, Reference your earlier on the contingency force, be advised that CHARLIE Company with 124 On-Line-strength is the one. Roger DRUMFIRE 3 you have chosen CHARLIE with 124, Over, DRUMFIRE 3, Out.

APPENDIX III
MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES

<u>Management Technique:</u>	<u>Methods</u>
1. 210161555 (see note below)	N/A
2. 2331322910	N/A
3. 237152249	The Bn. Cmdr. personally processes all D.R.'s
4. 245111535	Org. Bn. teams for AGI & CMMI prep
5. 209162619	Centralize IT's of vehicles to ensure effective inspections
6. 224132424	Short staff studies to provide recommendations
7. 2271125815	Co. & Plt making training schedule instead of Bn.
8. 239151781	Centralized awards, recommendations, centralization of vehicle dispatches
9. 2675217912	
10. 238152303	Prep. by Court Martial & Art 15 is by Bn-trained individual
11. 222132241	Corrections through Chain of Command
12. 2741618022	Legal actions centralized at Bn.
13. 2261123712	S.O.P. for admin. of Art 15 and other military justice by Bn. Legal Clerk
14. 23531743	Giving P.T. to Bn personally brought morale up
15. 241151856	Wrote & drew a flyer to go to all officers on hall & farewell party - to give S1 idea of what I wanted in future
16. 170432293	Off call bi-monthly CSM cks all by rosters weekly

NOTE: These figures represent a code defined as follows:

- a) The first 3 digits identify the survey book number -- 210
- b) The 4th digit identifies the geographical location of the battalion being surveyed -- 1 (1-CONUS, 2-Vietnam, 3-Korea, 4-Europe, 5-Panama/Hawaii/Alaska)
- c) The 5th digit identifies the type battalion - 6 (1-Infantry, 2-Lt Infantry, 3-Mechanized Infantry, 4-Airmobile, 5-Airborne, 6-Tank)
- d) The 6th, 7th, & 8th digits indicate the number of months of service of the commander - 155
- e) The 9th or 9th and 10th indicate the number of months in the job - 10

Management Technique:	Methods
17. 1724325216	Moving maintenance from Unit Resp. to Bn. consolidation
18. 167412334	Reorganize maintenance personnel on a functional basis
19. 1644621011	
20. 168431554	Centralized supply & TAERS at Bn. level
21. 232132621	Courts & Boards Sec. at Bn. level
22. 2553627810	To improve maint. a daily motor stables all personnel required to attend
23. 269512452	Centralized control for all 212 Actions Bar to Reenlistment & Rehabilitative Assignment
24. 119211691	Employment of a recon Plt. Org. of Mortar Plt. 4.2 & 81 MM
25. 161212166	Each day Ptl. Lds will be briefed by T.O.E. Duty Off on details of night operations
26. 231162271	Preparation of 212's at Bn. level. Review of reports of survey at Bn. level
27. 1634618912	Bn. Pre-Dispatch TI of vehicles. Bn Tank Gunnery Trg.
28. 254332372	Bn. promotion board
29. 150252735	The one review referred to centralizing awards & dec. Bn. level
30. 2281320613	Conduct periodic inspections to insure compliance with instructions
31. 225132284	Ptl. ldrs. are required to be thoroughly familiar with the log books of their vehicles
32. 199432031	Centralization of morning report effort

Management Technique:	Methods
33. 198461917	Centralization of TAERS clerks & vehicular dispatched at Bn level
34. 147242721	Preparation of Awards & Decorations at Bn. level
35. 145242201	Ensure staff have all contributed to proposed recommendations
36. 202432521	Centralized Awards & Decorations at Bn. HDQS
37. 151252364	Decentralization of MR clerks by returning to units
38. 252311915	Bn level legal clerk in S-1 office
39. 1754619211	Promotion from E-4 up centralized in my office.
40. 112211792	Following fire support base attacks, a personnel team moves to the FSB to assist in casualty reporting
41. 2725122613	Driver Tng. will be centralized at Bn. level
42. 249312235	Require the staff to be equally at blame with the Co. C mdr. when 2 foul ups occur in a particular staff area of responsibility
43. 152251832	To insure the combat effectiveness of my 81 MM mortars I have centralized them under E Co. as a separate Ptl.
44. 149252163	Consolidated all maintenance & supply activities to maximize skills and offset turbulence caused by rotation and infusion
45. 191432305	Career counselor court martial change sheet
46. 258312408	(1) In serious disciplinary problems the interview is conducted by both CC& individual seated with no desk between. (2) Appear to be angry only occasionally and when impact is necessary.

Management Technique:	Methods
47. 162232165	Company admin. sections are centralized under S-1
48. 126212402	Centralized awards concept
49. 1864617610	
50. 124232405	Decentralized promotion and centralized awards
51. 273532155	Insisted on established methods of military problem solving, e.g., estimates of the situation
52. 1884625111	
53. 155222164	Resupply of Co's in the field is conducted by Co. Supply Section under supervision of Bn S-4
54. 127212511	Conduct rifle re-zeroing each time Co. returns to FSB ?
55. 173461686	I regularly sit up on my jeep and talk to the men in vehicles. I tell them how it is
56. 1744618912	Handling of 212 & Con paper-work through Spec. assigned at Bn Hq
57. 177462045	TAJO has been centralized at Bn level, i.e., not at company
58. 178462167	Planning and executing tank crew qualifications
59. 1794330610	Centralizing Bn Mess Ops under supervision and control of HHC
60. 1804318012	Certificates of Achievements to deserving individuals. Company-of-the-month plaques, etc.
61. 181431924	Plt is centralized at Bn.
62. 1824319512	
63. 1834325812	

<u>Management Technique:</u>	<u>Methods</u>
64. 2623119110	Recognizing the individual
65. 115242532	Preparation of type five Base Load lists specific requests are identified to Support light, medium and heavy fire bases to include CH-47 and CH-54 sorties needed to support S-4 & S-3 Air Monitors
66. 133211685	Meeting each evening to coordinate resources allocation for next day
67. 2665219010	S-1 takes care of all Awards and Decorations and reports
68. 157262002	
69. 251312324	Appointment of now authorized legal clerk in Bn. Hqs.
70. 234131924	Decentralized supply- Company supply rooms and supply ^ s
71. 129212313	In situations where the use of smoke to mark friendly locations for aircraft would reveal positions to the enemy, signal mirrors or 2'x2' signal power may be used
72. 134212173	Centralize any Bn functions that will release available Bn combat personnel and reduce Cadr attention
73. 135213144	Preparation of OER's at Bn
74. 1954620410	Centralized dispatch of all vehicles to insure proper control and maintenance
75. 142262172	Q service by Platoon
76. 136212265	All
77. 137212173	Centralized control of snipers in Bn

Management Technique:	Methods
78. 138212276	Directed one Co to conduct training for other Co's on mech. Ambush site they had best trained personnel
79. 140232242	Larger Cdrs will make use of AP's and LP's during the hours of darkness (2)
80. 141232643	Consolidation of Unit Clerks under the S-1
81. 522231916	
82. 132212227	Consolidation of Unit resupply at Bn level. Personnel were pulled from Co's.
83. 1664624111	Centralized testing in Tank Gunnery - by Bn decentralized tng. by companies
84. 14324323X	Centralized tng (Bn level) during tng stand downs

Management Techniques:	Practices
1. 210161555	
2. 2331322910	
3. 237152249	Bn. Cmdr and Senior N.C.O. breakfast, once a month
4. 245111535	3-day pass to members who out-shoot Bn. Cmdr.
5. 209162619	Special attention to motor pool Police after each scheduled maintenance period
6. 224132424	Officer and N.C.O. call Junior Officer and Junior EM councils
7. 2271125815	Co. discretion for Reveille & Retreat
8. 239151781	Battalion Reveille and P.T. on Fridays
9. 2675217912	
10. 238152303	Officer participation in sports with NCO's when requested
11. 222132241	NCO in command every Friday
12. 2741618022	Bn command Reveille once a week
13. 2261123712	Happy hour every Friday for Officer Boner-of-the-week award
14. 235131743	Routine vehicle dispatches must be approved by Bn. Cmdr.
15. 241151856	Set aside on Training Schedule, Tuesday and Thursday afternoons as A&R time
16. 170432293	
17. 1724325216	Command Reveille twice weekly for all preceded by 10" Inspection and followed by 2-mile run.

Management Techniques:	Practices
18. 167412334	Conducting P.T. and Dismounted Drill every morning
19. 1644621011	
20. 166431554	Bn. parades each Monday morning. Bn. runs at 0600 each Thursday
21. 232132621	Bn. Co "troop talk" after civil retreat each week - informal
22. 2553627810	Athletic events - B.B., volleyball, softball, in season between teams from each Co. Bn. staff Off/HHC forms team. Games are scheduled daily
23. 269512452	Bn. CO assigns and interviews all personnel from rank of E-6 and up
24. 119211691	Preparation of Art 15 and court martial. Establishment of fire support base
25. 161212166	A Re-Arm, Re-Fuel point mobile will be used each Airmobile Day to save blade hours
26. 231162271	"Happy Hour" on Friday afternoons with wives. Bn Retreat formations on Friday afternoons
27. 1632618912	Bn Officers Mess night once a month
28. 254332372	Greeting and saluting with the Bn. motto
29. 150252735	To hold a departure ceremony for Sr. EM & O's in Bn. rear
30. 2281320613	Be seen by your men at situations that are unpleasant for them
31. 225132284	Mandatory payday safety talks used as Bn. CMDRS. Commanders call
32. 199432031	Instituted Officer and NCO calls

Management Technique:	Practices
33. 198461917	Conduct after-duty, Officer and NCO classes in the Unit N.C.O. club in a private room
34. 147242721	The habitual use of the Bn motto as a pass word - poor practice
35. 145242201	Staff briefing daily
36. 202432521	Command retreat formation at least twice weekly
37. 151252364	Morning and evening briefings by the staff for staff and unit representatives
38. 252311915	Bring your subordinate night at Officer Open Mess for cocktails and dinner
39. 1754619211	Officer and NCO classes each Thursday evening at clubs - then beer call
40. 112211792	Move within parameters of destination
41. 2725122613	All staff personnel will attend motor stables on Mondays and Fridays.
42. 249312235	I have 3 Command staff meetings per week and a daily staff briefing
43. 152251832	I personally address each Co. as they return to Base Camp for retraining periods in order to disseminate in formation what I consider essential
44. 149252163	Ptl. will be rotated to rear area for 24 hours every 2 weeks to provide for recuperation from stress of combat opns in mountainous jungles
45. 191432305	Officer breakfast Monday at 0615.
46. 258312408	(1) Try to make each subordinate a better leader. (2) Conduct leadership classes to Officers yourself.

<u>Management Techniques:</u>	<u>Practices</u>
47. 162232165	Critiques of Officer and NCO's
48. 126212402	Rotation of companies for Fire Base Security
49. 1864617610	
50. 124232405	I move with each company on company operations one day each week
51. 273532155	Systematized maintenance procedure to ensure thorough and routine application
52. 1884625111	
53. 155222164	Co. Cmdrs. supervise unit training, Bn. provide all administrative support.
54. 127212511	Hq and Spt Co. personnel man FSB Defense 1st and last night rifle co. is in FSB. Share responsibility in-between
55. 173461686	Leadership by example is a must for Officers in everything
56. 1744618912	Frequent and detailed officer classes that are timely and project officers to troops as desired
57. 177462045	NCO/Off classes are given twice weekly
58. 178462167	Set the example
59. 1794330610	Created a special certificate which is presented to departing personnel
60. 1804318012	E-7, 8, & 9 meeting monthly with Bn. Cmdr., Off counsel, athletic teams
61. 181431924	4-hours of motor maintenance on each Monday and Thursday

Management Techniques:	Practices
62. 1824319512	
63. 1834325812	
64. 2623119110	Officer and NCO classes on specific topics
65. 115242532	Personal orientations by Bn. Cmdr. and staff for all replacements normally in the field - arty fires, small arms fire adds flavor
66. 133211685	Rear jobs are only held by officers who have served in the field
67. 2665219010	
68. 157262002	
69. 251312324	Cmdrs. call at the bar following weekly Cmdrs. retreat
70. 234131924	Happy hour each Friday for Officers and Wives. Attendance at social events not required
71. 129212313	Each Officer will receive a Bn plaque on his departure from the Bn.
72. 134212173	Any form of unit standdown which will relieve mental strain associated with combat
73. 135213144	Farewell parties for Officer and key NCO's.
74. 1954620410	Unit Drgn (?) with mounted review
75. 142262172	Officers call
76. 136212265	
77. 137212173	Organized athletics
78. 138212276	Specified standard employment of Claymore Mines for defense

<u>Management Techniques:</u>	<u>Practices</u>
79. 140232242	All personnel riding APC's will wear steel pots and flak jackets upon departing base camps and ranges
80. 141232643	In general, work will be suspended in the middle of the day because of the heat
81. 522231916	
82. 132212227	Personnel briefing by Bn. CO for all incoming personnel required by unit mission
83. 1664624111	Officer call Wednesday 4-6 p.m. Hall & Farewell party 1st Friday of each month
84. 14324323X	Bn. soldier of the month is given 3 days at Chicua Beach

Management Technique:	Procedures
1. 210161555	
2. 2331322910	
3. 237152249	All trainees will be interviewed by Cmdr & XO prior to forwarding request for termination of jump status
4. 245111535	Develop plan for unit Cmdrs, oriented toward AGI preparation
5. 209162619	Designating specific systems for tank maintenance, susp. turret, motor, etc.
6. 224132424	Maintenance and tactical S.O.P.
7. 2271125815	Project transition approval and disapproval centralized to Bn. Commander
8. 239151781	
9. 2675217912	
10. 238152303	Required actions by Bn. Duty Officer after duty hours
11. 222132241	Bn. Commander presents all awards and decorations
12. 2741618022	Bn. has SOP to prevent problems
13. 2261123712	Procedure for laying out equipment for inspection
14. 235131743	All incoming personnel are briefed by Chaplain
15. 241151856	Established requirement for man selected as Col's orderly to get 3-day pass when he wanted it
16. 170432293	Command Reveille each Monday

<u>Management Technique:</u>	<u>Procedures</u>
17. 1724325216	Establish procedures for handling and orienting replacements
18. 167412334	Preparation of detailed S.O.P.
19. 1644621011	
20. 168431554	Weekly training meeting - I conduct
21. 232132621	SOP upon return from field toward vehicles top off clean motor pool
22. 2553627810	All vehicles will receive a pre-dispatch TI. All vehicles leaving company will be commanded by an E-5 or above. Reason - cut down on accidents and better maintenance
23. 269512452	All requirements for troop details are coordinated with Bn. C.S.M.
24. 119211691	Issuance of distinctive uniform to Recon Ptl.
25. 161212166	Areas of Operation will be formerly checked for proper clearances at 1600 each day
26. 231162271	Inspection and dispatch of wheels - consolidated at Bn. level
27. 1634618912	CMMI SOP CPMI SOP
28. 254332372	SOP on eligibility for appearing before Bn. promotion board
29. 150252735	Following the Bn. procedure for welcoming and orienting all newly assigned personnel
30. 2281320613	Staff sections have established SOP's which detail normal procedures thus reducing the number of changes of instructions given subordinates

Management Technique:	Procedures
31. 225132284	S-1 is the primary staff officer for DA Form 2715 rather than S-3
32. 199432031	Twice monthly training status reports to insure maximum rating achieved at readiness report time
33. 198461917	Establishing procedure for preparing vehicle for acceptance by support maintenance
34. 147242721	SOP for leading a reechsack
35. 145242201	Establish SOP for combat operations
36. 202432521	Officer and NCO class after duty hours at least twice weekly
37. 151252364	Processing newly arrived personnel
38. 252311915	Instructions issued to reports of Survey Officer to insure proper investigations
39. 1754619211	I publish a procedure sheet for each major activity, AGI, CMMI
40. 112211792	SOP for organization and displacement of HQS 2/7 Cav Rear during combat operations
41. 2725122613	In crew special firing tests conducted by Higher HQS (no time limit) ??? (1) Class (2) day fire (3) Move to fire line (4) Get fire
42. 249312235	For decorations received i.e., IMSIM Scout Badge, I increased the requirer s to receive it at Bn. level to give the award prestige
43. 152251832	Moving vehicle violations have been repeated admin problem for the Bn. Now I have established the policy that licenses are suspended when he is written up and no punishment rendered until I have seen the situation

<u>Management Technique:</u>	<u>Procedures</u>
44. 149252163	Require more thorough staff coordination and require XO to be more knowledgeable of all aspects of the unit
45. 191432305	Maintenance motor stables etc., Awards policy
46. 258312408	Hold motor stables 3 days a week with all drivers and supervisors
47. 162232165	Nightly practice to check on status of fire base security
48. 126212402	Maximum number of personnel to forward position
49. 1864617610	
50. 124232405	A monthly letter from me to each officer and Sr. NCO. No carbons - original copies
51. 273532155	Established a viable unit admin. SOP and ensure it works
52. 1884625111	
53. 155222164	Locations of friendly units are exchanged nightly with adjacent, higher & RVNA/FWM forces
54. 127212511	On return to FSB from the field, each company turns in rusty, dirty Ammo for turn in cleaning by S-4 food/cold drinks, coffee, given 24 hours for sleep, med, attention ???
55. 173461686	XO handles the staff. I rarely give instructions to staff except S-1
56. 1744618912	Required daily formations with inspections by Co. Cmdrs and call Reveille weekly by myself

Management Technique:	Procedures
57. 177462045	Vehicle dispatch procedure
58. 178462167	Establishing standards
59. 1794330610	Published detailed maintenance SOP at Bn. level which contains sufficient guidelines for companies
60. 1804318012	Maintenance SOP's Tactical SOP's
61. 181431924	Maintenance SOP. Selection of outstanding unit and personnel monthly
62. 1824319512	
63. 1834325812	
64. 2623119110	Bn. Cmdrs. briefing of all newly assigned personnel Bn. and Co. Cmdrs initial interview
65. 115242532	PDS is at Bn. rear. PDS clerk in TOC handles all input from field. Personnel in transient must check in/out with him
66. 133211685	SOP's I use many, tactical, airmobile, vehicle, uniform, etc.
67. 2665219010	Service Plt. leader sets up procedures with motor pool
68. 157262002	
69. 251312324	Weekly orientation welcome by Bn. Co. for all newly assigned personnel
70. 234131924	Security of weapons and vehicles daily inspections by Co. Officer and vehicular dispatch procedures - to include inspections of vehicle

<u>Management Technique:</u>	<u>Procedures</u>
71. 129212313	On receipt of motor or art/fire mission, firing data will be completed, while necessary, practical military clearances are attained
72. 134212173	Cross-training in related functions following a single written SOP to further reduce personnel for admin and log.
73. 135213144	Daily resupply requests. Repeating ambush locations
74. 1954620410	Publish detailed letter of inspection on how to conduct tank gunnery range
75. 1422622172	Maintenance school
76. 136212265	
77. 137212173	SOP's
78. 138212276	
79. 140232242	Unit locations will be reported each hour
80. 141232643	Requests for air support will include following specifics ...
81. 522231916	
82. 132212227	Awards consolidated at Bn. S-4 established automatic resupply
83. 1664624111	Stand to check list and performance unit readiness SOP
84. 14324323X	Step-by-step actions to take in the employment of mechanical ambushes

<u>Management Technique;</u>	<u>Policies</u>
1. 210161555	
2. 2331322910	
3. 237152249	Payday master formation - decorations and awards are presented
4. 245111535	I brief all incoming Officers and all personnel enroute to school
5. 209162619	
6. 224132424	Written policy statement given to Officers and 1st Sgts.
7. 2271125815	Promotion policy, 10% graduates from 5A Recon school. Priority consideration
8. 239151781	Bn. Cmdr talks to troops on payday. Company Commander pays troops
9. 267521912	
10. 238152303	Company Commander's pay their troops
11. 222132241	Leaders give P.T. & DD Bn. Cmdrs must approve training schedule
12. 2741618022	Bn. Cmdr promotes all personnel to E-7 and up
13. 2261123712	Policy to rotate Officers between staff and company assignments
14. 235131743	Character guidance given by Company Commanders
15. 241151856	Will personally brief all incoming Officer and EM's regardless of difficulties

<u>Management Technique:</u>	<u>Policies</u>
16. 170432293	Bn Tac SOP Bn New Tac SOP
17. 1724325216	A requirement for promotion to E-4 or E-5 is a military drivers license
18. 167412334	No one promoted to E-4 or above without military drivers license
19. 1644621011	
20. 168431554	All maintenance personnel are EDed. All awards to ETS personnel are made by myself
21. 232132621	Weekly command Reveille and command Retreat - all officers and EM.
22. 255627810	Command Reveille each Monday. All personnel in formation to include Officers. Other days one Officer per company takes formation
23. 269512452	Personnel who are absent from training without valid reasons attend make-up training on Saturday and Sunday
24. 119211691	Standards of Dress in rear areas apply to rifle Co's.
25. 161212166	All Memorial Services will be in a company formation- Simple, dignified, short - a Salute will be fired
26. 231162271	All classes will be rehearsed. Staff Officer will not refuse commands referred to Bn. Commander
27. 1634618912	Greet all E-6 and above personally. Exit interviews all E-6 and above with me
28. 254332372	SOP's and written directives
29. 150252735	The Open Door Policy at any time at all levels of command within the Bn.

Management Technique:	Policies
30. 2281320613	Specific uniform and equipment policy are prescribed for various duty and alert situations and are never varied
31. 225132284	Awards are presented at Bn. Retreat formations
32. 199432031	Detailed haircut, mustache and sideburn policy
33. 198461917	Policy that all Officers and NCO's will be in their place of duty at least 30 minutes before work call
34. 147242721	Leave and R&R program for all incoming personnel
35. 145242201	Men will shower daily
36. 202432521	Did away with Reveille formation except for Command Reveille weekly
37. 151252364	Daily Reveille for all personnel in the Rear Base
38. 252311915	All EM passes must be approved by Sqd-leaders, Plt. leaders, 1st Sgt., and Co. Cmdr
39. 1754619211	Created in areas which need clarification such as where does a person begin to clear unit
40. 112211792	All Memorial Services will be conducted within 48 hours of death
41. 2725122613	Encourage maximum participation in education. Encourage maximum participation in A & R program
42. 249312235	Each new Officer is briefed in detail by the Bn. Commander regarding the Bn. operations
43. 152251832	I have established the policy that 1st offenders for narcotics violations will receive the Bn Comdrs Art 15, second offenders a CM

<u>Management Techniques:</u>	<u>Policies</u>
44. 149252103	Problems in unit will never be brought to Higher Command or staff without express permission of Commander
45. 191432305	Haircuts a real problem
46. 258312408	Senior occupant of vehicle is fined for speeding violation - Bad news must be reported promptly
47. 162232165	Each individual, if he does his job for one year, will receive an award for achievement and an award for service
48. 126212402	Size of patrols and ambushes
49. 1864617610	
50. 124232405	A policy that all troops served one hot meal and fresh fruit on a daily basis
51. 273532155	Established general policies for the establishment or closer control over all troop activities
52. 188462511	
53. 155222164	Units returning from combat operations have priority on all fire base facilities (mess-showers)
54. 127212511	Every Plt. will be commanded by an Officer (has required 1st Sgts. to act as XO)
55. 173461086	Staff Officer will never give a command or higher headquarters a no answer - only me
56. 1744618912	Policy for me to review changes in policy - new policy to the Bn. when warranted
57. 177462045	Leave and pass policy
58. 178462167	Control Work Unit
59. 1794330610	Officer and NCO classes held weekly at Bn. level

<u>Management Technique:</u>	<u>Policies</u>
60. 1804318012	Administrative policies on leaves, passes, etc.
61. 181431924	The Company of the Month receives a training briefing and the Sp & NCO a 3-day pass
62. 1824319512	
63. 1834325812	
64. 119110	Company level seminars as well as Bn. level seminars
65. 11524132	Bn. policy is that there is no policy on length of time a rifleman must spend in the field before being eligible for a rear job
66. 133211685	Established and republished statements
67. 2665219010	S-4 works in the supply field to put out policy
68. 157262002	
69. 251312324	Letters are sent to parents and wives of all newly assigned personnel
70. 234131924	Command Retreat held twice monthly. Awards and Decorations made at that time
71. 129212313	It is the policy in this Bn to always dig-in in night defense positions and night sites
72. 134212173	Utilize the Company Commander to determine if a 90 MM mortar or 81 MM mortar is required for a specific mission
73. 135213144	Cold drinks, soda and beer, and clean clothes upon return from field
74. 1954620410	Interview all personnel selected as supernumerary of the guard

<u>Management Techniques:</u>	<u>Policies</u>
75. 142262172	Command letters to emphasize weak pilots
76. 136212215	
77. 137212173	R&R policy within Bn.
78. 138212276	
79. 140232242	Promotions will be based primarily on ability and potential
80. 141232643	Rifle Company will be kept as close to strength as possible even by pairing the HQ and Combat Support Companies
81. 522231916	
82. 132212227	Standardized airmobile techniques based upon mission terrain and enemy
83. 1664624111	P-T training in Bn. formation. Awards and decorations after an MTA parade
84. 14324323X	All moving elements will keep rounds (artillery or mortar) on the ground (marking rounds, recon, by fire, etc.)

Management Techniques:	Personnel
1. 210161555	
2. 2331322910	
3. 237152249	Hold morale, human relations seminars to obtain views of Junior Enlisted personnel
4. 245111535	Write periodic command notes to all personnel assigned
5. 209162619	Shortage of trained communications personnel. Thus, consolidated company and Bn. communications under Bn.
6. 224132424	CSM to start EM council
7. 2271125815	Careful selection of available personnel
8. 239151781	
9. 2675217921	Personel
10. 238152303	Utilization of Chain of Command for everything
11. 222132241	Teams are organized by functions to assist companies in preparing for CMMI
12. 2741618022	Bn. talks to all new additions in Bn.
13. 2261123712	Use of staff to assist
14. 235131743	A daily Company Commanders' meeting is held with the Bn. Commander
15. 241151856	Selection of type XO and S-3 to work with my type personality
16. 170432293	S-3 checks Company training

<u>Management Technique:</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
17. 1724325216	Use of 2-man Officer, NCO teams to act as eyes and ears in 25 different areas in preparation for CMMI
18. 167412334	
19. 1644621011	
20. 168431554	All promotions are reviewed by me and all new men briefed by me
21. 232132621	
22. 2553627810	New personnel receive individual briefings during in-processing by Chaplain, S-1, Sr. NCO, CSM, etc. Bn. Cmdr. personally interviews all E-6's and above. All newly assigned personnel receive monthly orientations. Bn. Cmdr. conducts monthly CI class for entire Bn.
23. 269512452	Bn. XO and S-3 assist in making troop inspections at duty formations
24. 119211691	SGM recommendations on EM promotions
25. 161212166	S-2 will visit district at least twice each day to receive current intelligence
26. 231162271	CSM supervises activities of EM's and advises Bn. Commander. Bn. reenlistment NCO assists all companies
27. 1634618912	S-1 closely watches awards and decorations. SGM watches stats reports
28. 254332372	XO
29. 150252735	Conduct of the combat operations of this Bn.
30. 2281320613	Assigning personnel to duty positions utilizing previous experiences to maximum extent

Management Technique:	Personnel
31. 225132284	In Garrison, CO, and XO drivers work for S-1 when not engaged in driving
32. 199432031	Use of staff and SGM to supervise and keep me informed
33. 198461917	Use of available "rapid" promotion allocation to reward outstanding performance
34. 147242721	All assignments E-5 and above are approved by Bn. Commander
35. 145242201	EX Officer controls Bn. Rear Area
36. 202432521	A three day pass for those EM's selected as Col's orderly
37. 151252364	Orienting all new arrivals - talking to troops in the field about their problems
38. 252311915	Staff inspections to units in field and garrison
39. 1754619211	Mission-type orders to those who are competent - detailed instructions to the incompetent
40. 112211792	Sergeant Major advises me on and effects assignments of NCO's within Bn.
41. 2725122613	Have appointed material readiness NCO in S-4 to keep me constantly aware of status of all equipment in the Bn.
42. 249312235	I have promotion boards for all EM promotions to include PFC to Sp-4
43. 152251832	No personnel action papers come to me for signature until the adjutant has researched it and then he puts a recommendation to me in writing

<u>Management Technique:</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
44. 149252163	Ruthless elimination of incompetent officers by transfer to non-combat units
45. 191432305	A&R NCO Career Counselor
46. 258312408	(1) Assigning specific inspections by the staff (2) Require staff to do work. Don't do their job.
47. 162232165	Making a point to talk to individual soldiers and groups. I discuss achievement, current situation and future operations.
48. 126212402	Less hazardous assignments go to those who have been in the field the longest
49. 1864617610	
50. 124232405	
51. 273532155	On a regular basis, ensure that the soldier knows what is expected of him
52. 1884625111	
53. 155222164	Unclear what you want here. I use entertainers for morale, red cross personnel are available to assist.
54. 127212511	No one returns to Bn. rear area earlier than 7 days before DEROS, Officer - NCO's, and EM, alike. No "6" mos" recon to rear duties, use profiles for that.
55. 173461686	CSM is my key advisor and helper together with the XO
56. 1744618912	
57. 177462045	Command Sergeant Major, etc.

Management Technique:	Personnel
58. 178462167	Motivation
59. 1794330610	Rotate Officer personnel as practical info various positions
60. 1804318012	Boards for promotion - etc.
61. 181431924	
62. 1824319512	
63. 1834325812	
64. 2623119110	Open Door Policy. Question and answer period with Bn. Commander E-4 and below
65. 115242532	Cross training for all personnel - in the event the principal becomes a casualty there is always someone available as an immediate replacement
66. 133211685	S-3 primary operations assistant. XO primary admin/log assistant
67. 2665219010	S-3 performs all operational functions
68. 157262002	
69. 251312324	
70. 234131924	PSNCO maintained absentee files and display of personnel status by grade, MOS distribution within Bn. A daily update was provided to me. Similar status data was provided me each week by the S-4 on all equipment and by the S-1 on Boards, Art 15, Court Martials and incidents of misconduct.
71. 129212313	E-5 and above will not be transferred within the Bn unless approved by the Bn. Commander

<u>Management Technique:</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
72. 134212173	Assigning responsibilities so as to use intelligence and abilities regardless of rank
73. 135213144	XO to run the base camp
74. 1954620410	Interview all new men coming into the unit
75. 142262172	Assigning individuals with special civilian talents to a job, i.e., PIO Journalism Graduate
76. 136212265	
77. 137212173	Promotions
78. 138212276	
79. 140232242	Compiled staff actions and coordinated recommendations are reviewed
80. 141232643	Bn. XO responsible for materiel readiness
81. 522231916	
82. 132212227	
83. 1664624111	Assignment by MOS promotion as early as deserved
84. 14324323X	Well-qualified NCO's in ambush techniques are used to accompany combat ambushes to critique employment and start in upgrading proficiency

11. The concept of leadership has been expressed in a number of ways. One way describes it as a function of the situation rather than as a number of abstract qualities possessed by a given individual.

Based upon your current assignment as a Battalion Commander, describe below a situation which made (is making) demands on your leadership. How did this situation resolve itself.

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
210161555	NONE.
2331322910	NONE.
237152249	<p>Use of drugs by members of this command and the legal bars to correcting the problem pose a direct threat to the welfare of the command. All legal efforts have proven almost completely worthless. I have not solved the problem.</p> <p>High AWOL after assumption of command. An analysis of the rate and personal interviews with returnees revealed the senior NCOs were not performing the basic responsibility of helping their men with personal problems. The individual with a personal problem went AWOL as a solution.</p> <p>Officer/NCO meetings emphasizing this failure on the part of commanders and an effective open-door policy at all levels. Once the young soldier believed he could get assistance, the AWOL rate went down since most problems were solved at unit level. Within two months the rate went from highest in the Div. to the lowest.</p>
245111535	<p>An outstanding XO had greater hand in making battalion policy prior to my arrival and was not required to brief previous commander on actions as much as now. Problem was resolved by asking numerous questions of XO and staff until it was apparent that I needed answers prior to making final determination.</p>
209162619	<p>Young Company Commanders (1st & 2nd Lieutenants), tremendous turnover of troops (30 to 50% per quarter), and untrained staff require my presence and involvement in company's staff activities that should not normally be required. I find myself teaching, advising, correcting, and encouraging on a continuous basis. The situation will only resolve itself with time, as Unit Commanders learn more, gain more confidence, and exercise their authority.</p>

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
224132424	The biggest problem facing this Bn is preparation for the CMMI. As of this writing, the situation is not resolved and will not be until the CMMI is over. The problem in the future appears resolved by the attached article ("7-Point Program Ends CMMI Standdowns" by SP4 Eric A. Abbott and published in local-- <u>The Fort Carson Mountaineer</u> , Ft. Carson, Colo.--newspaper), since there will be no more standdowns for the CMMI. The effect on morale, <u>esprit</u> , and discipline has been very detrimental since the average infantryman just does not like to spend the time we have in the Motor Pool.
2271125815	Personnel--shortage, lack of experience, turnover, and lack of motivation. The personnel situation in the Army today is the worst I have seen in 21 years' service and is likely to continue to be bad for several years. DA policy, perhaps unavoidable, of programing people so they arrive back from Vietnam with two to three months duty in a unit available gives us bunches of E-5s (excess to our needs) who are only waiting to get out. Very few E-6 to E-8 experienced NCOs seem to be available. Officers are mostly newly commissioned Second Lieutenants who spend two to six months in the unit, then are gone to RVN or inexperienced-promoted too fast to Captains (very few). Skilled, knowledgeable men or officers are very scarce and they lack interest or motivation to learn in most cases.
239151781	Reduction in, and control of, AWOLs demand considerable personal time and effort. So far, the most effective action has been clearly demonstrating to the troops that I care about them--being present on weekends and holidays to check food preparation; availability of magazines and games in the Day Rooms; and making myself available to talk to them.
2675217912	NONE.
238152303	NONE.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
222132241	I took over this battalion immediately after its ORT, which was successful. Now I have to reorient everyone toward preparation for a forthcoming CMMI. The battalion is well trained tactically but the technical training has been neglected. My problem is to get everyone enthused with passing the CMMI. I'm attempting to do this by requiring certain technical classes, filling school quotas, giving classes myself, and supervising maintenance activities.
2741618022	Upon assignment to the 82d Airborne Division, this battalion was housed in World War II barracks and in a substandard Motor Pool because of a shortage of facilities in the division area. This has had a severe impact on morale and the ability of the unit to maintain its equipment. It has been necessary to spend an excessive amount of time maintaining these facilities. Through a concerted effort to create a "homey" atmosphere in the barracks, there has been a noticeable improvement in morale. A series of awards for best barracks and maintenance has also added incentive in this area.
2261123712	Morale problem stemming from an unfair rating received during a battalion test. Problem of maintaining morale, particularly among the commanders and senior noncommissioned officers. The situation is still unfolding, but appears to be resolving itself as the unit engages in other activities.
235131743	Upon assuming command, one of the problems which needed immediate attention was troop morale. Since, obviously, nothing could be done concerning the battalion's location, all efforts had to be expended toward improving what we had. This, in addition to being attentive to the needs of the troops, showed almost immediate results.
241151856	I have succeeded in changing the sway of this unit from "off course" to "on course." Our performance has improved. Morale is better. We are no longer looked upon as "that 3/325" by higher headquarters. One of our sister battalions has slipped and is engaging in a sour grapes battle. Trying to draw fire from their deficiencies to what they believe are ours, they have teed off the members of this unit who need satisfaction. Trying to reason with the CO of the unit has not worked, so the Bde CO had to be brought into it. (He has resolved it more to our favor than theirs.) And the troops had to be pacified by our chain of command.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
170432293	<p><u>Situation:</u> Training Company Commanders to Command Companies. <u>Resolution:</u> None. A continuous cycle. Only 1 of 4 is able to run his company without my personal involvement in company affairs, and his position and situation is tentative.</p>
1724325216	<p>A current situation, still unresolved, is organization of the battalion for its annual CMMI. Using technique used last year (successful, apparently, since those scores are still highest in division last two years). With drastic shortage of manpower, but still full TOE equipment, normal reliance on chain of command may not succeed. Therefore, I still hold chain of command fully responsible to me for results on CMMI. But since they may not know <u>what</u> needs to be done, I have given all 25 lieutenants in battalion a specific responsibility directly to me of a thin slice of entire battalion, e.g., all M79 grenade launchers--1 officer; to check mileages off speedometers against log books of 171 vehicles for another officer, etc.</p>
167412334	<p>This battalion is understrength in the lower enlisted grades. At the same time, it is required to perform a multitude of non-mission-type community details. I have assigned entire platoons to these tasks and incorporated mission-type training concurrently with the non-mission tasks. This has increased the efficiency of the detail, increased training, and raised the morale of the men.</p>
1644621011	NONE.
168431554	<p>A tough mission, i.e., training requirements (ORTs, MISPC, EIB), CMMIs, CPMIs, AGIs, etc., using personnel who are inexperienced, yet still trying to retain old (high) standards of proficiency. Without running the companies for the COs, it takes a lot of time and "coaching" to get the job done. I firmly believe I should not run the companies for them and will not. If I do, they will lose all initiative. This problem is a continuing one and probably one that is Army-wide. Even in Vietnam (VN) I had this same problem. There (VN) I had to run things more because mistakes cost lives; here they don't, thank God.</p>

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
2553627810	<p>The current racial ethnic unrest throughout the U. S. This has, of course, followed U. S. Soldiers into Korea. The officers in the Bn (except for the S-3-XO) have no concept of the problem or how to resolve it. I, therefore, do an unusual amount of counselling, teaching classes, talking to men, NCO's and personally counsel many officers on how to handle individual cases.</p>
269512452	<p>Situation: High AWOL rate initially from major receipt (500EM of RVN returnees.</p> <p>Resolved by: Enforcement of stricter punishments eased problems to some extent.</p>
232132621	<p>As I mentioned previously, the lack of experience of Co C.O.'s and Bn staff. None of my Cpts has more than 4 years total service (and only one has more than 3 years).</p> <p>Also large % of RVN EM returnees (many E5's) w/o experience in Mech Inf. who have only 4-6 months to ETS. Motivation and confidence problem.</p> <p>Jr. officer and ACC classes - especially in area of maintenance. Maximum use of on-Post NCO (5 USA NCO Academy and also a 1-week jr. NCO course).</p> <p>Stress importance of ATO mission briefings.</p>
119211691	<p>The recon. platoon of the Bn. is not now very highly thought of because of the way they have been employed tactically and demands placed on them without adequate recognition. In an attempt to bring the recon. platoon up to authorized strength, rifle companies were levied for personnel. Most levied individuals expressed dissatisfaction with the transfer; some refusing to go to the recon. platoon.</p> <p>After discussing the method of tactical employment with the S-2, S-3 and recon platoon leader, action was taken to correct this portion of the problem. Distinctive uniforms were issued to the platoon to set them apart from the rifle companies.</p> <p>These actions appear to have had favorable results.</p>

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
161212166	NONE
231162271	<p>ROTC support begins in June. Unit is involved in tank gunnery until mid June. ROTC support requirements are unknown but will be heavy. People must be well prepared and equipment leaves will be high. At same time leaves must be given during summer.</p> <p>Problems not yet resolved.</p>
1634618912	<p>The special Court Martial of a black Pvt for assaulting his white tank commander. Black soldiers felt the assault was justified because the black soldier shouldn't be in the Army anyway and any authority that offends them should be fought tooth and nail. I have put the black soldier in pre-trial confinement to remove him from the scene. I'm now talking to the black leaders informally in my office, trying to explain the justice system.</p> <p>It is not yet resolved.</p>
254332372	<p>The drug problem. This has become strictly a leadership problem as has V. D. There are no effective means of punishing users unless the man is on hard drugs. In fact, legal restrictions have all but made the offense of smoking marijuana unpunishable. The problem then becomes one of leadership at all levels. My personal interest and leadership determines how effective the program is at the lower levels.</p>
150252735	<p>Most any tactical situation calls upon your leadership skill. One employed here almost daily is the situation where one of my Hawk Teams (Hunter-Killer 5 to 6 men) will make contact w/a superior En force. To assist them w/all Cmbt assets available, reassure them that the entire Bn is behind them, and the Bde if necessary, then to pile on the En and destroy him. The knowledge of the Hawk team that they are "not alone" is paramount and that you will do every thing humanly possible to assist them and destroy the enemy. What they have developed is essential. Your personal actions must instill confidence.</p>

CODE NO.COMMENTS

2281320613

Without full knowledge of the situation and over my objection the Brigade Commander decided to relieve one of my Company Commanders. This officer (Cpt) was young and making mistakes; however, he was motivated, dedicated and learning. Also he was highly thought of by his men.

The relief resulted in a severe morale and esprit situation in the Company and other repercussions throughout the Bn. Several men complained to the IG and several calls were received from Governors and Congress men. The company as a whole wanted to rebel and quit. The situation was resolved by replacement of the 1st Sgt. and 1st platoon Sergeant and by my conducting a Company counselling session where I let all of the men of the Company discuss the problem freely with me and air their complaints. I tried to bear most of the blame for the relief but the men knew who had done the job. The session lasted for about 3 hours. During this time I allowed each man to vent his problems on me and get them off his chest. I took corrective actions on those complaints within my power to correct. This incident occurred about eight weeks ago and the company is now getting back to normal.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
225132284	Probably the most critical situation which makes demands on one's leadership is our current situation of a large fraction of RVN returnees and the problem of trying to motivate them to successfully complete such functions as the AGI or CMMI. This situation has <u>not</u> been resolved. The approach so far has been to orient the men on the mission(s) before us, and appeal to their sense of loyalty to the unit and each other. Because these returnees are only present for a short time (3-6 months), this appeal is not a strong one. The ever-present alternative is the threat of punitive action.
199432031	The use of marijuana by personnel in the Bn is probably the most challenging leadership problem. It has not been resolved. Some reduction has resulted from disciplinary action and added emphasis on organizing off-duty activities.
198461917	When I assumed command this battalion was seized by a critical racial problem. This has taken much time and action to correct. First step was to instill confidence in the Chain of Command and guarantee racial equality at all levels - acting decisively where prejudice was involved. Second step was to open channels of communication - up, down, and laterally. Third step was to eliminate or control agitation on both sides. Continuing action is required to isolate potential problems as close to their origin as possible and solve any minor problems before they can assume major proportions.
147242721	"This situation is not resolved". Young Captains, on their second tour of duty in Vietnam, under heavy or moderate combat conditions, are becoming overly tired. In this state, their usefulness as hard charging alert Commanders is limited till such time as they can be rested. If the tactical situation does not permit the rest, many of these young men must be relieved because their units bog down and start feeling sorry for themselves. At that time the Bn Cmdr must live with the company for 48 to 72 hours to get the motor started again.
145242201	Situation: Lack of experienced junior NCO's. Many, if not most, junior NCO's do not apply themselves in the tradition of the older experienced NCO's. They get themselves "too close" to their men and find they cannot order the men to do what is correct for fear of losing friends. I insist upon use of the chain of command wherever possible to require the junior NCO's to get into the leadership line. The experienced NCO's counsel the newer, inexperienced ones. Every attempt is made to capitalize on ways to better the junior NCO's prestige to have him face the fact that he has stripes because he is supposed to be a leader and not "one of the boys". The situation is slowly improving but has not yet been resolved.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
202432521	Ability to accomplish rather difficult and demanding tasks with rather inexperienced but highly motivated officers and senior NCO's. Through their inexperience these officers and NCO's lack the professionalism and knowledge which I believe they should possess in order to do an outstanding job.
151252364	NONE
252311915	<p>A situation is developing which is taxing myself and my subordinates in the field of racial discrimination charges. In all cases, so far, the charges have proven unfounded; however, the time required to investigate and report on each charge is allowing less time to be devoted to more important matters of the command. (There appears to be a definite movement in this direction which will require constant attention).</p> <p>I am sure this trend will reverse itself after a period of time has elapsed.</p>
1754619211	<p>Problem: Causing young officers to assert their authority.</p> <p>Solution: Continued instruction (by myself) - Continued example (by myself) - Continued counseling (by myself).</p>
112 211792	<p>A recent CBS telecast reported that one of my companies had staged a "minor rebellion" after receiving an order to move on a road. The company, of course, has not seen the telecast. The demands on leadership began when the troops received mail from home inquiring about the situation. Prior to that, most of the unit was unaware of any telecast of a "minor rebellion." The situation has been resolved and the company was the first U. S. unit to air assault into Cambodia.</p>

CODE NO.COMMENTS

1522516:2

As described on page 38, the professionalism of the Battalion is at a low ebb. The correction of this while actively engaged in combat operations is a real challenge. Currently we are engaged in a complete retraining program with emphasis on fundamentals (marksmanship, radio procedures, squad tactics, scouting and patrolling, adjustment of fires, etc.). In the meantime I spend a considerable amount of time discussing operations, techniques and principles with my officers. As a generalization, Junior leaders, both officers and enlisted, show a real lack of knowledge pertaining to tactics and operational techniques and therefore, I must ensure that they know "why" as much as possible when I give them direction. This problem is resolving itself by already a perceptible increase in effectiveness of the unit.

149252163

Basic problem is accomplishing the mission without taking casualties. Pressure exists from above to go slow but sure to avoid casualties but counter to this is the need to maintain an offensive spirit within the unit.

Solution adopted is to absorb the brunt of command pressure and monitor unit commanders' action without interference in subordinate actions. Judging the time to step in extremely difficult and if done too often or with the wrong approach can destroy confidence and unit effectiveness. Have not yet had to step in and hope I never do.

191432305

The racial problem is by far the situation which taxes leadership to the utmost. Fairness and equal treatment of all must be understood and rigidly enforced. The old soldier is the particular culprit. He states he is fair yet he'll put road-blocks at every step of the way, to inhibit communication between the lifeblood of any Inf Bn - the PVT - and the commander. The situation is still unresolved yet progress is being made. The problem of keeping the lines of communication open, (open door policy, etc.) and keeping the morale of senior NCOs up is the line or tight rope that must be walked.

258312408

The use of drugs by soldiers. The problem here is to overcome the popular concept that marijuana is not harmful. This means challenging popular civilian publications - all means at my disposal are used to bring to the soldier facts concerning the use of drugs. The chain of command is most important here.

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
258312408	<p>Con't.</p> <p>The situation is not resolved. Only when the soldier himself is convinced of the harm to himself will he stop. This requires constant education of unit leaders and constant emphasis to the soldier. Attempts to stop the source have met with fair success - this means community cooperation which in this environment is difficult.</p>
162232165	<p>Use of drugs and marijuana. Approximately 40% of the individuals in the Battalion use marijuana and 10% use drugs. Usage of drugs has been arrested by the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Tu Binh Phuoc (Bn basecamp) raids were conducted on houses that sold drugs. This was done in conjunction with Vietnamese authorities. b. Troop orientation on effects of drugs. This was easy as we had four or five individuals who were bombed out of their minds and tried to kill officers and/or NCOs. Charges were preferred against these individuals and they dried out in the stockade. c. Six weeks of continuous combat operations in the field. <p>Marijuana problem has been resolved partially by extended combat operations. Fortunately, most individuals do not use it when conducting field operations. Battalion Commanders cannot resolve this problem under current requirements for guilt, USARU policy of not jailing first-time offenders and lack of Special Court authority at Battalion level. Use of marijuana is a social problem in the U. S. and Battalion Commanders are supposed to resolve it through dynamic leadership. This might be accomplished if a chain of command existed in Battalions. Most of my chain of command are draftees who do a fine job in the field and some of them smoke pot.</p>
125212402	<p>The training of young energetic, but inexperienced officers. The Battalion is involved in daily combat actions and learns from each action. Relating this lesson to the officers (and Senior NCO) in my daily visit to the widely separate companies is my principal means of training the leaders. Supervision of these lessons then becomes a requirement - like the old 7th Army says "The unit does best what the boss checks."</p>

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
124232405	The unit was hit hard in November by a large NVA force. Although the unit took heavy casualties, they won the battle. The general impressions were of failure. This was caused by the relief of the S3 and other personnel changes. My problem was to instill confidence back into this very fine unit. I did this by using the division newspaper and taking them back into the area. Always telling the so-called Vets what an expert job they had done. Public (Company and battalion) formations for awards. After three months they now believe (which is time) that they won the battle. This was my most severe problem.
1864617610	I have an experienced 1st Lt, due for CPT next month, that I tried to use as a company CO. For some reason, he cannot relate to people and the company morale, efficiency and conduct went from the top in the Bn to the bottom in a short time. My problem was, and is, to restore the situation. The 1LT is competent and career minded and can become so discouraged that he could be useless. I have relieved him and assigned him a principal staff job and given him careful counselling. Both he and, more importantly, his former company appear to be showing improvement.
249312235	The Bn Lieutenants refused to join the small local officers mess because of the cost and they could not legally be ordered to do so. Personal interviews with the Lieutenants to determine the problem. Detailed information about the club disseminated. I convinced them that I was genuinely interested in their problem. The point was made that loyalty to the C. O. is a two way street and I outlined the examples of loyalty that had come down to them and decided to show some "upward" loyalty and join the mess under some protest.
2725122613	The officers and NCOs do not prepare themselves for actions to take place during the day, i.e., they did not study manuals and other reference data to make certain they know the correct way. It is gradually resolving itself by my requiring officers and NCO classes and by asking specific questions of officers and NCOs during my numerous visits to units.

CODE NO.COMMENTS

155222164

My battalion area of operations is Binh Tuy Province. Presently, the battalion operates 6 fire support bases/supply points within this area. All of FSB/supply points are in various states of construction. The land area encompassed approximately 100 Km by 50 Km. The battalion habitually has OPCON of DTys, 17th Cav and M Co., 75th Rangers. The brigade support base is 100 Km from the AO. There has been no reduction in the tempo of operations. (Average: 90 Co days in field of 120 possible). Operations dictate constant fluctuation of requirements at each location; personnel turbulence is extreme; aircraft assets are limited; 70% of roads can be traveled only by escorted convoy; 40% of road is trafficable by tracks only; it is impossible to visit each location daily.

The situation is not resolved; however, some partial solutions include: mission-type orders; establishing daily priorities; use of Hq Co and E Co commanders in coordination/liaison roles in addition to primary duties; use "short-timers" to reduce overhead.

1794330610

At the time of assumption of command, this battalion was described as substandard. This situation existed because of a shortage of officers and NCOs. A negative attitude prevailed among the few leaders which had permeated to the lower ranking men. Fortunately, the unit was scheduled to move to a major training area one week after the assumption of command. This provided the opportunity to motivate the men by letting them know the importance of upcoming training, the purpose of the training, where each man fit into the scheme and that the training would be concluded by testing. Through personal contact, battalion and company formations and leader counseling sessions the men began to have a sense of belonging and a feeling that they could overcome the adverse personnel situation and give a good account of themselves. While the initial training did not progress with the degree of satisfaction desired, the morale and esprit de corps improved greatly which, by the time the training period ended, spilled over into training and each element was rated "combat ready."

178462167

Very rigorous combat training coupled with poor weather, extreme fatigue, maintenance problems less than pleasant living conditions and often combined with the additional mental pressure of competition can result in some unpredictable situations.

CODE NO.COMMENTS

178462167

Con't.

The growing acceptance by younger soldiers and ready access of narcotic drugs such as . pep pills, barbiturates, amphetamines, marijuana and others contribute to these unpredictable situations. Another contributions factor is the difficulty in being able to identify or recognize a person using narcotics. For example, very recently a tank crew at Seventh Army Training Center trained for its annual Tank Crew Qualification Course on Range 80. The training progressed extremely well with a selected crew. The tank was also a commanders vehicle in which the CO had challenged the entire unit to beat his record. The crew initially responded extremely well and the early scores were tops for the battalion. The day prior to Range 80 the crew negotiated Table VII A & B on Range 42 with a score of 2100. However, at midnight after completing the night run it was found that a fuel injector line was broken. The tank crew then worked thru the night with the maintenance section getting the tank repaired and ready to lead the battalion down Range 80 the following morning. On Table VIII A the score was 1040 and the experienced Tank Crew Examiner commented that this was one of the finest crews he had ever observed. The crew, less the commander, then returned to the cantonment area for rest in order to make the night run (Table VIII B). The crew returned in the late afternoon and began preparing their vehicle for the night run. The commander noticed that the loader did not follow instructions very well and was told by the gunner that the loader "had a cold." had taken Contac, and would be better. The tank was moved to the test firing line to check range finder calibration, test machine guns, and confirm main gun zero. Here the coax failed to fire because the loader improperly loaded the weapon and then denied knowing the proper way. This was corrected by the gunner and the weapon tested. The Tank then moved back to Range 80 to load ammo and negotiate the course. The loader had trouble connecting up the Tank Crew Examiners communications and required help. The first main gun engagement was late partially due to the loader's ineptness in that final lay can only occur after the round is chambered. The second target was a machine gun engagement in which the coax failed to fire. The loader applied immediate action - still failed to fire. The loader was told to check for a ruptured cartridge and had to be told how. He reported a ruptured cartridge in the barrel. He had to be told to remove the barrel; however, he was unable to. The gunner then moved over, quickly removed the barrel (no ruptured cartridge), replaced the barrel and reloaded the weapon; however, he did not check the solenoid wire.

CODE NO.COMMENTS

178462167

Con't.

After main gun engagements the loader of this crew always puts the expended brass shells into the floor honeycomb - ready rack. After the third engagement (main gun) the loader failed to do this. The TC instructed him to do it. He replied that the racks were already full when in fact there were only two rounds in place (Rack can hold 11 rounds). The next machine gun engagement the coax failed again this time it was suggested to check the solenoid. Then the weapon functioned properly. In the process of eliminating the stoppage the TC dropped his flashlight onto the turret floor and asked the loader to retrieve it. The loader just sat down on the floor and seemed to fumble around. The TC said "Forget it" and continued the course.

After the completion the loader was extremely awkward in his actions. When introduced to two very senior colonels he remained seated with his hat low over his eyes and only offered his hand. He left the debriefing and remained aloof in the dark. For the first time, the tank commander did some reflective thinking and became convinced that this soldier was under the influence of drugs and even though the crew did complete the course, the possibilities of a serious accident were very present.

273532155

During the early days of our current extended field training period, a fight broke out in the battalion area between a small group of white and black soldiers. For a few moments it appeared that there was the possibility of an explosive racial situation. Early the following morning I called the entire battalion together and spoke frankly and openly on the situation. The talk had positive results. The men of the battalion identified the ring leaders of a small "black power" clique. The leader of the group subsequently went AWOL and is now in confinement. Literally hundreds of men have commented favorably on the effect my personal intervention in the incident and subsequent talk had on their opinions and outlook. There has been a closer inner esprit and morale - more "salt and pepper" relationships and a marked increase of identification as a squad, platoon and company rather than on racial, ethnic or language groups. Genuine friendships are obvious.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
1884625111	NONE
177462045	<p>The situation is the continuing over commitment of an <u>under strength inexperienced</u> unit. The situation will not resolve itself until more senior leaders face facts.</p> <p>Two specific actions are being taken to attempt to perform the mission. (1) A constant evaluation and assignment of priority to missions allows the unit to perform in the most important areas. (2) An increase in number of NCO/Off classes has assisted in filling the experience gap.</p>
1744618912	Would prefer to do this later if required.
173461686	<p>What do you folks want, a book?</p> <p>For questions like this, I suggest you people come to the field and talk - dozens of incidents in a day.</p>
127212511	<p>For as far back as anyone can remember - our records show 4/3 Inf has been engaged in search and destroy missions - originally (67 time period) Bn sized - then company sized. When assigned this AO over a year ago mission was to interdict movement of NVA/VC between contact (heavily populated area) and interior (base areas) of southern Quang Nau Province. Company operations consisted of company in single file thrashing "thru jungles" looking for enemy. Operations were not based on intelligence but more or less on where Company and Staff thought the enemy might be. My concept of operation (mission is still interdiction) is to develop information on terrain (terrain & drainage analysis of AO to determine local construction routes of enemy movement and base camps). Research of CPNS journal (past 6 months) to match all contacts to terrain. Then I assigned AO's to each company with mission to conduct multiple sound patrols and ambushes in assigned AO. Companies kept out for 12-day periods with air resupply every 3 days. Company CP obtains security from mortar platoon (carries 181 mm mortar) and digs in to protect 81 and 292 antennae necessary to communicate w/sqds. & Bn. Swamps saturate assigned Company AO (Co Cmdr further breaks down AO) patrol to ambush site. Use mechanical AP's - do <u>not</u> dig in. Move early next day to "lay-up site," move in late in P.M. to make ambush location - select site and report progress. Return to Co C LCN 3rd day for resupply - may or may not move to new segment of Co AO. Co CP moves at least every 3 days. Demands on leadership have been to convince</p>

CODE NO.

COMMENTS

127212511

Con't

men they are more secure under this concept than in unwieldy, noisy company formation, and can accomplish mission. To date (10 June) Bn has killed 25 VC/NVA since 14 May & captured 4. In period 1 Jan - 30 Apr Bn killed 35 NVA/VC and lost 25 US KIA. We have not lost any men, has required me to operate w/Plts & Co's.

1804318012

The biggest leadership challenge at present is the problem of inexperienced men - commissioned officers at the squad level. As a result of Vietnam we are receiving E-5's with little or no command experience and are not able to cope with the day-to-day problems in a new Combat Division. This problem is compounded by the fact that we have a shortage of senior NCOs and Commissioned Officers; and thus, the E-1(?) must assume greater responsibilities. At present we are conducting an NCO program which consists of the following: Classification of Squad leaders; Reassignment or elimination of non-trainable squad leaders; Instruction of squad leaders on what their responsibilities are and how to perform their duties. This program has proved successful to date on improving the quality of squad leadership.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
181431924	<p>Racial issues. Narcotics. Inexperienced personnel. Low standards/discipline.</p> <p>None of these situations have resolved themselves and will be a long time before they do except for standards and discipline.</p>
1824319512	<p>Type personnel. Sociality permissiveness. Youth in officers and NCO corp. Maintenance and supply systems. Personnel systems (administrative).</p> <p>These are never resolved. I solve related problems as they present themselves. This is a difficult period for Commanders at all levels and will only be resolved by time. The phase-down period is always difficult.</p>
1834325812	<p>When I assumed command of this battalion, there were 8 officers assigned including myself and the doctor. Each company was commanded by a lieutenant (2 were 2LT's). There were no first Sgts and no SGM. The three staff members I had were also lieutenants. In fact, it was similar to commanding one large company. Eventually the Bn was filled up with officers and two first sergeants, also a CSM.</p>
2623119110	<p>Racial tensions - post wide - conducting troop seminars with each ethnic group of all ranks particularly. It was found that many "grievances" were founded and many were only imagined. It proved to be most helpful in relaxing tension and added to the morale of the teams as a whole.</p>
115242532	NONE
133211685	<p>My Battalion is operating in an area of operations that is heavily infested with mines and boobytraps. Numerous casualties, usually resulting in loss of limb have occurred. The area is also one of the most NV pacified in Vietnam which means that in spite of the excessive casualties, operations must continue. The problem of keeping the men going in such a situation is the most challenging leadership problem I have ever faced. Obviously the situation has <u>not</u> resolved itself!</p>

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
2665219010	Discipline problems take up most of the time and require about half of a day and part of the night. Duty time normally exceeds 12 hours per day plus problems caused at home.
157262002	NONE
251312324	<p>I am faced with the continuing necessity to convince commissioned subordinates that they must place demands on their subordinates and must know what is going on within their area of responsibility.</p> <p>I hold with those that define leadership in terms of abstracted qualities. The leader demands, teaches, enforces, learns, all functions of situations best accomplished in degrees because of force, integrity.</p>

CODE NO. COMMENTS

234131924 Increased demands at the Company level and very rapid turnover in personnel had demanded:

1. That I assist the Co Cmdr's in anticipating and detecting their problems.
2. That essential aspects of training be closely monitored and recycled frequently.

129212313 A surprising number of men in my Bn have the mistaken idea that they are entitled to a rear job after spending 8-10 months in the field. I find that some of them develop this notion/attitude based on remarks made in basic training, while others picked up the idea by rumor somewhere in the pipeline between CONUS and my Bn. This causes a significant morale problem, especially for those men who have been harboring this belief after several months in the field and still expect to go to the rear for their last 2-3 months in the country.

I personally welcome, orient and brief each new man before he reports to his company. In my briefing, I emphasize the fact that this tour here is 12 months, all of which will probably be in the field. The few rear jobs that are available are filled by soldiers who have done well in the field and have qualified for the rear job. I quell any preconceived belief that they will automatically go to the rear after a certain number of months in the field. I emphasize that most men will stay in the field until 7 days prior to DEROB, which is the Bn policy. For the benefit of those men who were in the Bn prior to my arrival, I cover this point in my talks with the troops in our stand down area.

134212173 This situation is making demands and has not resolved itself: How to deal with RADICALS (bona-fide and imitative) in a combat organization without impairing or reducing combat proficiency:

Radicals - by contemporary definitions - are in combat units - reduce combat efficiency in that commanders must give an inordinate amount of time to their control and elimination. The judiciary and administrative processes available make control and elimination difficult. Bn resources must be provided to control these individuals until elimination can be completed. The resources which effect the combat strength less must come from the leadership available in the log functions. However, this reduces combat service support and will eventually have an effect on combat operations.

CODE NO. COMMENTS

134212173 CON'T

Since the radical won't tolerate or respond to the normal motivation techniques and restraint, means are becoming increasingly limited to the commander, the strongest leaders are required to control radicals until elimination - either by judicial or administrative means - thus reducing leadership availability.

My tentative solution is the elimination of radicals from the service as quickly as possible without regard for rehabilitative attempts.

135213144 A poor state of successful unit combat proficiency. The problem is not solved but is being aggressively attacked by a small unit training program being administered during maintenance and rest periods.

1954620410 Racial tension has been a major problem. I have made a policy of talking personally to each new man in the unit and also the men already assigned to make sure all are aware of their part in reducing the tension.

Preparation for Annual General Inspection with inexperienced officers and NCOs. This situation was resolved by my extremely detailed inspections and showing all concerned how to do "their job".

142262172 Proper training and equipping of the battalion while conducting combat operations.

This situation is being resolved by establishing a maintenance and training program. Constant surveillance is being applied to have subordinates responsible for their jobs. There have been people relieved and reduced.

136212265 The greatest demands on leadership are caused by inexperienced personnel and shortages of key personnel. These two matters have not and are not being resolved at this time.

An additional problem that must be faced by a commander is national attitude towards the Army and in particular the feelings for against the war in S.E. A. The attitude of the junior officer's and NCO's places a tremendous strain on the commander and it is one problem that must be dealt with continuously.

CODE NO. COMMENTS

137212173 Periodically, I am approached by men who seek non-combat jobs in the Battalion rear area. For one reason or another, these individuals feel they cannot continue to serve in an "on-line" position. Naturally, there is a shortage of rear-area jobs. The reverse is true in the field. It is a continuing challenge to try to inspire these men to return willingly to their on-line jobs, without resorting to the negative leadership of threats of punishment, etc.

138212276 The greatest problem facing a Bn Cmdr today is that of racial tensions and minority group identity. This is a problem the Bn Cmdr must face daily. This Bn has not had any "incidents" however, the problem is always present.

I do not have a "book" solution to this problem. We have been able, so far, to preclude incidents by recognizing that the problem does exist and by insuring that each man is treated fairly and as an individual.

140232242 Small unit leaders are not well trained. They are quite capable and intelligent. But the life and death proposition in direct combat does not permit OJT. As an interim measure, squads led by newly arrived E5s are placed under the immediate supervision of combat tested platoon leaders and platoon sergeants.

I am now in the process of developing a Battalion-run, week long, combat leaders course for all E5s and NCCs with no combat experience. Their performance will be evaluated during the course and subsequently by the Company Commanders. Those considered not suited to duty as a combat leader will be assigned to other duties.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
141232643	<p>Lack of and turn over of officer personnel.</p> <p>At this moment or within 10 days I will be without either of the 2 authorized Majors (XO & S3) and lose the S1, S2, S5. There are no liaison officers. One Captain, recently arrived -- not selected for promotion to Major -- and with fair experience is functioning as the S3 AIR or in fact S3.</p> <p>By and large each company has 50% of its officers and cannot afford to lose any - since the depth of NCO's is also lean.</p> <p>The Battalion is operating in a combat environment with attendant dispersion CP, Companies, Trains, Rear -- and the myriad problems of logistics, personnel etc. devolving on the Bn CO without the advantage of the key people - with experience and training needed. He will make it and with excellence.</p>
522231916	<p>The race problem, mostly in the rear area, however, it exists even in the combat units. Anyone who says we don't have a race problem in the Army is mistaken. I worked out my problem by identification and ruthless elimination from any agitator, of both color, without regard for statistics or appearances.</p> <p>(2) Actively searched for several senior black NCOs and junior officer, so as to have black leadership represented in each company, and platoon, if possible. It took 60 to 90 days, and my race problem became relatively insignificant. I also openly talked about it, as a race problem, with both races at fault.</p>
132212227	<p>The unpopularity of the Vietnamese war creates serious problems. The men are not fighting for "God, motherhood, and country." Motivation of the Bn towards offensive operations against a hostile force was a major problem. It was overcome by selling the men on being proficient in doing their job and hurting the enemy before he could hurt friendly units. It worked because the Bn was able to find the enemy before he was ready for offensive operations.</p>
1663624111	<p>Preparation for the Annual General Inspection (AGI) is a function of test scores and inspection ratings - most of these can be measured by established numbers in applicable tests and MSs. Some judgement factors are involved (about 33% of total ratings). I merely push my commanders and staff into preparing and training for the measured score results I desire - objective is always 100% or number 1. On judgement matters I inspect and am the sole authority as to whether a unit is superior, excellent, satisfactory or unsatisfactory.</p>

CODE NO. COMMENTS

143?4323X There are an increasing number of junior officers arriving in Vietnam that are anti-war and anti-Vietnam in outlook. Many express a doubt as to their willingness to take a unit into combat. They will not refuse an order to take a unit but expressed reservations on exactly how they will have it performed. Generally this seems to be designed to influence the commander toward putting them into a rear area job. (A commander must really question their motives). This puts the commander on the spot - if he orders the officer to take a platoon and the officer does less than his very best the platoon is the one to suffer, possibly with unnecessary casualties. This situation has not been completely resolved - careful orientation, counseling, close supervision, buddy systems, etc., are being used to overcome the trend.

APPENDIX V

8. FM 7-20 states:

When the commander is at the point of decision, he can gain personal information of the situation, influence the action by leadership, and establish closer control.

Have you had any experiences at "the point of decision" where you "influenced the action by your leadership?" If so, please relate below what "your leadership" entailed.

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
210161555	NONE.
2331322910	Physical presence to issue orders and see they're followed through, especially in combat or other unchoice activities.
237152249	NONE.
245111535	1) Improved personnel attendance at training by demonstrating how a company status report can assist commanders through accounting and by briefing details and individuals who may perform more than one task; 2) revealed technique used long ago as an example to improve maintenance; 3) personally inspected weakest unit; and 4) required instructors to brief me and rehearse classes to improve training.
209162619	During recent civil disturbance exercise, a large number of acting dissidents sat down in the middle of a major thoroughfare as a troop formation reached them. Junior officers and men did not know what to do. I grabbed a "bull horn" and announced to the dissidents that they had broken the law and would be apprehended. I then ordered that trucks be commandeered to take dissidents to the "local police station." Officers and men quickly reacted. Leadership required that someone do something in the face of the unexpected. I feel that it was done.

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
224132424	Some situations during field training exercises where my on-the-spot presence and subsequent decisions influenced the situation favorably.
2271125815	Having knowledge of the overall situation and resources available, committing resources in a different way or uncommitted ones in order to affect the outcome more favorably. The knowledge must be relatively accurate and up-to-date. Resources can include men, money, and/or materiel, but frequently involves a man more knowledgeable and experienced or with more drive replacing someone who isn't doing a job well enough. Knowing what is available from higher headquarters and being on the spot to know when it's required so it can be immediately requested can be decisive. Commitment of additional men (or units), firepower (or other outside support), or a few more dollars (even if out of leader's own pockets for nice-to-have items), if done in a timely manner, can obtain significantly better results.
239151781	NONE.
2675217912	My Bn is a training Bn. Physical training (daily) has been implemented as a matter of policy culminating with an endurance run of approximately two miles. Several individuals attempted to fall out before completion. I feel that I influenced them to remain by leading the Bn and setting the example.
238152303	I believe my leadership "at the point of decision" has been demonstrated when I have found individual soldiers and units not accomplishing their missions because of fear. By briefing the men on the situation--informing them that they have been trained to accomplish hard tasks--and by disciplining them, they became confident in themselves and accomplished their missions in an outstanding manner.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
222132241	During preparation for CMMI within past 24 hours, actions being taken did not meet my expectations and too much discussion was being made relative to problems encountered. I had to show the persons concerned how I wanted things done in accordance with my previously announced plan, and counseled them that action, not discussion alone, would solve our problems.
2741618022	Being at the point of decision is an everyday problem for a Battalion commander in the 82d Airborne Division. During the last month this has included receiving Army CMMIs, conduct of small-arms firing, and preparation for a joint STRIKECOM demonstration. In each case, I was required to make decisions and effect coordination to insure completion of each mission in a successful manner. In each case, inexperienced officers had made poor decisions which resulted in "foul-ups." I changed leaders, reallocated materiel and ammunition, and personally supervised each operation until I was sure they were running smoothly.
2261123712	During a battalion ORTT, the battalion was attacked in its flank by a strong armored force. This flank attack was the "point of decision." My leadership entailed disposing the elements of the battalion to meet the flank threat. By being at the scene, I had a full appreciation of the situation and, consequently, was able to direct the two companies immediately involved by issuing order directly (face-to-face) to the commanders. Additionally, I placed crew-served weapons where they could bring fire to bear on the attack.
235131743	NONE.
241151856	We recently supported the USAIMA in a two-week exercise in the field as part of their SF officers' course. Prior to our two-week commitment 3, the XO and I decided to have one week of preparation. During this week, he and I particularly spent time at the training site and in front of the troops--talking to them, to our junior leaders, and to the people we were to support. During the two weeks of the exercise we visited our troops (although we had no control over them; they were released to the USAIMA) as often as possible. As a result, we were personally, and as a unit, commended by the Division CG for outstanding performance (also by USAIMA), and our troops gained valuable, if difficult, field experience. Personal attention, awareness and presence of leaders has immense influence upon outcome.

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
170432293	Impossible! In today's Army in Europe, <u>every</u> major task, e.g., EIB, AGI, CMMI, ORT, DR, Reup, Savings, Mess, etc., must be personally influenced by the action and leadership of the battalion commander. You have to be at the critical place at the critical time, rehearsed, prepared, and able to influence the action.
1724325216	Yes, almost daily. Attitude of men in working longer hours in preparation for CMMI. My explanation to them as to advantages to them in doing the job well the first time and no reinspections. The sudden institution of a battalion motto picked up quickly and exchanged in salutes within the battalion.
167412334	NONE.
1644621011	NONE.
168431554	While a company (in VN) was searching for a MIA, I landed and personally led, or rather renewed, the search. By talking it up, the men who were tired from a long fight renewed their efforts and energetically went about the task. In addition to finding the MIA, 12 more NVA were located and killed. My presence with them, I feel, led to their renewed efforts.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
2281320613	<p>The most common leadership aspect is command presence. Merely by my being present at a critical time and place to calm the excitement of a tense situation, I have favorably influenced the situation. These situations have generally involved Civil disturbance situations.</p> <p>I frequently have influenced the action at a critical time by my example. Experience has enabled me to anticipate critical places and times and be there to set the example.</p>
254332372	<p>At the point of decision the leadership entailed clear and concise orders. Before the point of decision all the practices, procedures, methods, etc., can be employed. But at the point make your subordinates know what they must do and then supervise to see they do it.</p>
150252735	<p>What is "The Point of decision" decisions? To me it is the logical result of individual thought, analysis and staff advice. I progress toward a decision, rarely if ever have I arrived at a "Point of decision." Whereas if by some magic my thought process was swayed to course of action "A" as opposed to "B." That would seem to me to be decision by intuition which has no place in decisions which carry dire consequences.</p>
1634618912	<p>During tank gunnery at Grafenwohr several tank crews did not want to go down range - they found minor things wrong with their tanks. First I took the first battalion tank down range 42 myself and qualified. I bet each tank a fifth of whiskey I'd beat them. I was in each and every tank cheering the crews on and showing them how to fix things and generally letting them know I cared.</p> <p>I followed each tank down range and was on the spot when trouble developed, such as thrown track, etc. My battalion led the 3rd Div. in qualification and took high tank, platoon, and company in the division.</p>
231162271	<p>At tank gunnery, with new and inexperienced company commanders and platoons leaders and with new members who were mainly infantrymen with little armor training, I supervised the training of every crew. This demonstrated to the company commanders and platoon leaders who observed me closely, the proper techniques. I reassured all that the course could be successfully fired. I then took a green crew and fired the course first indicating that it could be done successfully. As a result all commanders, NCO's and men took heart and we qualified 52 out of 54 crews.</p>

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
161212166	Usually leadership is exhibited when in contact, by insuring all available fire power is used before allowing platoons to close with the enemy.
119211691	None as yet (2 weeks command)
232132621	<p>None in particular. I get mine personally involved through constant vents and talks w/men in the Bn. (day-night-weekend) so that I probably can move on top of many situations than most of my Co. CO's.</p> <p>I influence the action - not so much by leadership exactly - as by my personal knowledge of the situation. I have so many more years of experience than my company CO's and staff that although I try not to over-supervise and control, I still must monitor very, very closely all that goes on in the Bn.</p>
269512452	<p>Based on late evening recon, the following concept for attack during a training exercise was developed.</p> <p>Battalion attacks 0530 hours with three companies abreast to seize three objectives: Co B on left obj 1; Co A center obj 2; Co C on right obj 3.</p> <p>By 0730 Co A and B had seized their objectives. Bn CO by helicopter observed that Co C was having very difficult going because of terrain and was still only halfway to obj 3.</p> <p>Estimate of situation led to revised plan. Co A continued attack to seize obj 3; Co C became reserve and occupied obj 2.</p>
2553627810	<p>In combat, only as a platoon leader in Korea. I was usually out front.</p> <p>As Bn CO a tank was swamped while fording a river. The crews life was in danger. Initial attempt , prior to my arrival, was to get a man with a line to the crew. By knowing the capabilities of all Bn vehicles, a swimmer (M-577) was put into the water, the crew provided a means of escape and no lives were lost. The tank was recovered some 7 days later. A previous incident in the Bn approximately one year prior to that incident resulted in the death of one officer and loss of much more equipment.</p>

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
225132284	I have not had such experiences in my current environment.
199432031	None significant as Bn CO.
198461917	<p>This occurs frequently and takes many forms. The leadership applied can consist of nothing more than your presence. Leadership can also be applied by motivation in the form of encouragement to do better, a compliment for duty well performed, or corrective action taken in the form of a good dressing down. On many occasions leadership is applied by stopping a particular action, criticizing faults or inadequacies, giving specific directions and personal supervision to insure proper performance. Effective leadership also entails establishing confidence between the commander and subordinates - each must believe he can depend on the other - each must confide in the other - each must be prepared to help the other.</p> <p>There is also an important relationship that can be developed through off-duty association in a semi-formal manner.</p>
147242721	Acting as point man for a rifle company moving into a bunker complex which had held the unit up for 3 days. (I used 200 rounds of 8-inch delay on the area before this fool hardy trick. All the enemy encountered were dead.)
145242201	During a combat air assault one unit was supposed to go into a pre-determined Landing Zone. This was only one among many units making assaults at the time. The particular LZ at the last moment became cloudy with low cloud cover. An immediate decision was required as to whether risk going in as planned or direct to an alternate LZ. The decision made was based on a very fast evaluation in my mind of many alternatives, pros & cons, enemy situation, knowledge of the weather and terrain, experience of my subordinate leaders ability, and other factors. There was not much time to deliberately evaluate all the possibilities and actions that could happen. Instinctively, I felt a certain decision was best. It may have been that way because of my training, background and experience. A quick evaluation of the situation added a ? of approval on what I felt instinctively best. So I made the decision. It turned out to be the correct thing to do.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
202432521	During the recent battalion ORTT I influenced the action by my personal presence at the point where the action had to be initiated.
151252364	During a contact with a small enemy unit, the company commander was wounded and had to be med-evacuated. Two platoons were still on the scene and appeared to be confused as to their mission. This was especially critical since contact had been lost with one of their squads. An LOH was requested to insert me into the contact area, after which the platoons were given specific missions, chain of command directed and units moved out. I remained with the unit throughout the night and after being satisfied that the unit was once again operating effectively under one leader, I was extracted and returned to the forward command group.
252311915	Recently, a fire broke out in an 81 MM mortar position which endangered personnel, equipment, and neighboring units. By going into the evacuated area and carrying out burning 81MM ammunition (HE and WP), I believe other personnel gained courage and followed my example. Approximately 20 officers/EM assisted in evacuating the undamaged equipment, although small arms ammo and 81MM HE rounds were detonating in the grass fire.
1754619211	One of three elements are always done by myself in these situations: Instructions Example Ass kicking
112211792	I can think of no specific instances.

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
2725122613	It concerns maintenance. My leadership entailed being in the Co. areas and in the motor pool during scheduled maintenance. I demonstrated a knowledge of maintenance to the officers and men. I mean a detailed knowledge of the requirements both maintenance and records of maintenance. As a result my officers and NCOs took the "hint" and began to actively supervise this heretofore neglected period.
249312235	During a search for an infiltrator on the DMZ. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Helicopter support requested. 2. Commit all off duty personnel to the search. 3. Request bloodhounds and search dogs. 4. Continue the search when it appeared that the infiltrator had escaped. 5. Personal participation in the search. 6. The infiltrator was captured in the area of operations primarily due to the Bn Cmdr's decisions and presence.
1864617610	The commander influences the action "by his leadership" constantly, but generally in small ways. To do this at the "point of decision" seems to mean and to require that the commander at battalion, for example, take control of a subordinate element, say platoon or tank, for a short time in order to prevent, correct, redirect, etc. I have done this many times. The most easily remembered occurred during the recent ORT when my lead team badly handled its attack and the entire Task Force was in danger of bogging down. I passed one trail team through and personally controlled the maneuver of its platoons through the team Co to regain the lost momentum and to react to the pointed suggestions of the umpire. Had I not intervened, as the umpire assured me later, we would have had to re-evacuate the assault and would have been severely penalized.
124232405	I relieve and refuse to promote incompetent officers. This has been done three times and the battalion has been much better for this action.
126212402	Not that I'm aware of!

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
162232165	This Battalion was the first U. S. unit to invade Cambodia. The mission was to advance as rapidly as possible to cut Highway 7, a MSR that the NVA used. Highway 7 runs East and West and is critical to NVA to stock their Caches. The second day the Battalion met determined resistance from the NVA enroute to Highway 7. Leadership involved was the time and effort to be used to reduce four separate NVA ambushes, and yet push through to secure Battalion objective astride Highway 7. Decisions involved were when to break contacts, mount up on tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers and continue on the Axs of Advance to objective. Battalion killed approximately 50 NVA soldiers and experienced six wounded U. S. soldiers. The objective which was occupied by the NVA was secured at 1800 hours - one hour prior to darkness.
258312408	A serious incident occurred in which a soldier had to be forceably stopped from committing murder. As a result the soldier died. Extreme pressure was extended to relieve the unit commander. The Bn Co was successful in retaining the unit commander. Relief of unit commanders should be as the result of demonstrated poor performance not solely on the basis of a serious incident occurring within their command.
191432305	During a recent Bn ORI a particular company had done poorly in a night withdrawal closing into an assembly area only 1 hr before a dawn attack was to take place. The Unit CO was despondent and almost ineffective because he shouldered the blame for his unit's poor performance. I went to the unit, told him that his CO would lead the attack because I felt they were the best company in the Battalion and could accomplish the most difficult mission. He looked at me in almost disbelief. He had rather expected a chewing or relegation to a reserve role. His morale went from 0 to 100. He led the attack in such a manner as to be singled out by the Bde Commander. I gained a more effective commander, company, and immeasurably more effective Bn.
149252163	NONE
152251832	NONE

CODE NO.COMMENTS

1804318012

Get up and tell your men what you expect of them:

Units in the Division were having problems passing CMMI type inspection and ORT's. In both cases felt it necessary to address the troops and explain what the purpose of the inspection test was and exactly what was expected of each of them. After this, I followed through by insuring that I was present during their preparation, not to harras out to assist and supervise when necessary. The results were rewarding - only unit in Division to have a perfect CMMI record. Only unit in Bde to pass ORT the first time around.

1794330610

Personal visits, counseling, correcting, commending and expressing confidence in individuals and teams.

178462167

(Letter to all Pickle Tankers)

In case you hadn't realized it, the Pickle Battalion is now at MTA Grafenwohr for Annual Tank Crew Qualification.

Table VIII has been modified and is now a new challenge. It requires a high degree of crew coordination and drill. Being new and unknown, the table tends to make some crews uneasy. You shouldn't be - 100% qualification is entirely possible for the Battalion.

I intend to command the lead Pickle Battalion tank down Range 80 and qualify. Every tank crew of the Battalion that betters my score is entitled to a free fifth of whisky at my personal expense. GOOD LUCK!

This battalion is now the top battalion in the 3rd AD in crew qualification.

273532155

During preparation for the recent AGI, a company commander lost effective control of the company's administrative operations. The final pre-inspection indicated that the company was completely unprepared and its performance would probably have resulted in an overall unsatisfactory for the battalion. In effect, I assumed command of the company but was judicious to ensure that all instructions/orders were issued through the CO. In less than forty hours, the company was raised from an unsatisfactory in all areas to satisfactory to superior. By personally inserting my personality, leadership, knowledge, experience, and close and detailed supervision, an unfavorable trend was reversed. This was done without undermining the prestige of the commander.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
1884625111	NONE
177462045	In a non-combat situation I feel that influencing the action by leadership is not so much "at the point of decision" as spread over a longer time, i.e., a time line (vs point) of decision. A positive, friendly-but-firm and can-do attitude under recent adverse conditions seems to have worked well in getting the job done. I can't glorify it by saying I was at the point of decision.
1744618912	During tank gunnery, which is our biggest event of the year, I chose to influence the action by being on firing ranges throughout the program. It is my belief that this on the tank and in the turret type leadership gave me the advantage of knowing my crews better and being best able to direct their efforts. I would strongly advocate this technique to others (Bn CMDRS) in getting the best out of their tank crew members.
173461686	I have commanded (led) a platoon, troop and squadron in combat. I know countless situations in these past jobs. Attested to by 18 decorations for valor. However, in this job, only one significant thing in a leadership role has been done recently. I commanded the first tank down range for tank crew qualification. My qualification score was the 2nd highest in the battalion. All my commanders qualified. The battalion qualified more tanks than any other battalion in this division. This act " <u>influenced</u> " the action as you say.
127212511	Prior to taking command of this Bn on 14 May, it had suppressed <u>heavy</u> casualties in 2 of the line companies from artillery rounds rigged as boobytraps. This capped a period (1 Jan - 30 Apr) which had seen the Bn kill or capture only 35 NVA/VC against 25 US KIA, and upwards of 100 men WIA. To be blunt, the men were terrified of moving about the AO - to the extent companies did not move at night and very little during daylight. Companies dug into a perimeter defense and went through motions of searching and destroying - making certain the enemy knew where they were so he could avoid them (noise, lights, random firing, no camouflage). In the month preceding my take over, 1 rifle company broke under fire, and one refused to obey an order to move. The day following my take over another company refused to make a night move to a position from which it could be extracted at dawn the following day (emergency mission). Reason given was <u>fear</u> of boobytraps. I joined the company, took the point and navigated to PZ in time for extraction.

CODE NO.COMMENTS

155222164

Using the present method of operation of this unit in VietNam, the point of decision is often 3000 feet in the air at the business end of a radio. One's leadership is limited to advising, recommending, and listening. Strangely enough, this often achieves the desired results.

Example: Recon platoon was on RIF mission, Binh Tuy Province. Platoon leader reported noises, signs of base camp, and activity to indicate a sizable force to his front. He requested artillery prep. In radio discussion with him, I explained forces available, etc., and informed him I desired further information on B.C. and hoped for PW. He moved out, deployed around base camp and captured 9 VC and 9 detainees - the latter mere children. These people contributed materially to our intelligence of the units in the area and to our understanding and assessment of the entire province.

In the above case, and other similar ones, my personal information was based on prior experience in the jungle and my knowledge and understanding of the man on the ground. The battalion commander in VN must have a feel for the jungle, but he must know his subordinates - recognize nuances in the voice; know his proficiency with arty vs. gunships; is he offensively or defensively oriented; is he in a tight spot or is he exhilarated by the situation; is he still in control or is he confused. These things must, in nearly every case, be weighed and determined at some distance through the medium of a radio.

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
181431924	NONE
1824319512	NONE
1834325812	A near riot or what could possibly have turned into a riot was averted by my arrival on the scene. Two of my companies were just about to have at it because of what they believed to be just grounds. It so happened that I had the facts and after a simple explanation the crowd dispersed. It was not so much my personal leadership but I believe any officer could have handled the situation if he had the facts to explain to them.
2623119110	Disregarding combat actions and staying with this Bn., most apparent recently is a notification of a CMMI. A lot of action was generated by the Company but they were spinning wheels. About 15 minutes of guidance involved, i.e., Company, Platoon Leaders, Squad Leaders - Organization, they came through in good shape. Take things one at a time and don't try to do everything at once.
115242532	NONE
133211685	Primarily being at the critical place at the point of decision so that I could use my knowledge or experience to assist subordinates in their performance of their missions. Your presence reassures them that you really care what they are doing and how they are doing it. I strongly feel that the most important role of the leader in combat is to somehow bring order and direction to the chaos that is war.
2665219010	Actual moving around with the troops during recon ORTT's and during inspections to ensure they understand that I really care about their proficiency. Daily check of all maintenance facilities and a check of projects in preparation for AGI. Participation in the PT program with troops and visits to all athletic events. Constant talking to troops during daily visits.
157262002	NONE
251312324	None so identified or recalled.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
2341311924	<p>I assumed command two weeks prior to the AGI. The Bn was not ready & their preparations were uncoordinated - working frequently at cross-purposes. I directed & personally supervised: (1) the preparation of a detailed estimate of what was subject to inspection & its relative importance. (2) Conduct of a comprehensive survey/inspection to determine our status and provide a daily "update". (3) Development of a time-phased program which coordinated necessary preparations, assigned responsibilities and illustrated the interrelationship of each facet of our preparatory effort. (4) An effort to keep all members of the Bn informed about our preparatory activity and the importance and role each had to play.</p> <p>The result was a Bn marching in step along appropriate routes toward our AGI - the outcome of the inspection was an overall "excellent" - no unit coming close to an unsatisfactory rating.</p>
129212313	<p>There have been numerous occasions where my presence has "influenced the action", but none significant enough to mention here.</p>
134212173	<p>Not in a combat situation, thus far - which is surprising, since the helicopter provides the means to be at the point of decision. However, I believe that Bn Co's do not have to influence the actions by personal leadership because the company grade officer and NCO - especially those who are products of the NCO Candidate Program - exhibit a high degree of professionalism, devotion to duty, and motivation not seen in previous wars. This is a tribute to the Army School Systems. The young men are mission-oriented and need only enemy contact to show their true colors. Possibly the fact that a Bn CO can get to the point of decision so fast is in itself the influencing factor.</p> <p>In non-combat situations the paragraph is true especially where professional knowledge and force are the required traits to be exercised.</p>
135213144	NONE
1954620410	<p>Yes. Accurate information is a must if you are to make intelligent decisions. Frequently the best way to insure that information is accurate is to be at the scene.</p>

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
142262172	<p>On several occasions during a contact, I have been able to influence the action and keep the motivation. A good commander must be careful in this type situation. In Vietnam in many cases there is over control. This comes with the availability of the helicopter. It was common both in Korea and home.</p> <p>With small unit actions, I believe we should stress the development of subordinates by letting them run the show instead of having Co's, Bde Cmdr's and Bn Cmdr's running platoons.</p>
136212265	<p>At battalion level in Vietnam, considering the lack of experienced subordinates, the commander influences almost every action by his personality and leadership ability. To cite specific acts and circumstances borders on the impossible.</p>

CODE NO. COMMENTS

137212173 NONE

138212276 The extensive use of the helicopter in VN has allowed Bn Cmdrs to influence a high majority of combat actions and to influence those actions. I have been above, and actually acted as the eyes of my companies, almost every contact.

By being able to see what is going on the Bn Cmdr can influence all aspects of the operation from which way to maneuver, what supporting fires can best be utilized even to deciding and delivering special equipment such as flame throwers and shaped charges.

140232242 My forward Co was subjected to an indirect fire and ground attack that resulted in comparatively heavy losses. The CP group immediately returned fire at an enemy some 30 meters away employing automatic weapons and RPGs. But none of the APCs moved in the direction of the attack nor did any of the friendly elements maneuver until I and my S3 ran in the direction of the attack and successfully urged APCs and troops to move in that direction. The assault was instantly effective.

CODE NO. COMMENTS

- 141232643 Rifle Co, dismounted, in contact with unknown enemy force. Co halted and pulled back. Ascertained flanks of friendlies, joined Rifle Co., called in supporting fires and caused unit to eliminate enemy opposition by offensive action through fire and maneuver.
- Unit ambushed and elements separated by enemy force. Friendlies - company - withdrew in different directions. Enemy force was still intact. Joined Co Commander; caused unit to reunite and attack enemy ambush site. Use of friendly mortars and arty coupled with ground maneuver resulted in the entire area being swept with no friendly losses (subsequent to initial ambush) and Enemy KIA. (4)
- 522231916 In a combat action, where the situation is truly tense, the most significant expression of leadership that I have found most effective, is being cool, and knowing your (my) job. As a Bn cmdr in combat, my most significant contribution is keeping my subordinate leaders calm, then executing, with professionalism, my job of getting the subordinates all the help they need to include suggested ways to cope with the situation.
- 132212227 Primarily being on the ground with the men during critical situations. The goal was to lend the men confidence in themselves and their supporting weapons.
- 1663624111 TCQC (tank crew qualification course) was led by me as the Bn Commander. As the troops saw me Commanding and maneuvering my own tank, they, and their leaders were influenced to excel through my example. Again during a recent FTX I maneuvered the battalion from my tank, being close to the scene of decisive action in order to make quick and effective decisions in attaining the objective.
- 14324323X Several Firebases and defensive areas within the Battalion came under a coordinated indirect fire and ground attack almost simultaneously. Fire support (Artillery, ARA, Tactical Air, Flare Ships, etc) was being employed at many points throughout the AO. Several Radio Telephone Operators (RTO's) were extremely excited and one could feel a tension developing through the command. By getting on the Radio and calmly asking for situations and giving clear and concise instructions, I was able to dispel some the anxiety which was infectious throughout the command leading to a successful defense of the AO. (Results 28 NVA KIA, 3 POW's) (No friendly casualties)
- Although the above is not a single "point of decision" there were several points of decision during the course of the fight - the overall influence required during these decisions was control which was accomplished as stated.

APPENDIX VI

17. What are the three most demanding battalion problems you face today?

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
210161555	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Trying to prepare a battalion for an annual training test that is made up of many inexperienced personnel. b. Trying to maintain a low vehicular deadline rate with only half of the maintenance personnel you are authorized. c. Taking a trained rifleman (MOS 11B) just out of Vietnam, with an average of six months retainability, and retraining him to be a tanker (11E) so that they can go through a tank gunnery qualification program.
2331322910	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Lack of qualified officer personnel. Plenty of officers--in fact, 50% overstrength--but only a rare few can be considered qualified, or have the desire to be. b. Shortage of qualified NCOs. Have 100% excess E-5 personnel, but only are E-6 and above. E-5 and E-6 types received are qualified basically as E-3 or E-4. c. Training time. Too many nontactical requirements imposed on unit. Results: Only 50% or less available for training or to do work. Also, too many profiles who cannot perform in their MOS or even as basic soldiers (about 10% of Bn strength in this category).
237152249	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Use of drugs associated with instances of poor discipline and resulting in lowered morale of good troopers and a steady stream of disciplinary actions and board actions involving substandard personnel. b. Lack of experienced and/or motivated junior officers capable or willing to adequately perform their duties. I am trying my third complete set of staff and company officers in eight months. c. Lack of experienced administrative personnel in the hard skill areas capable of keeping abreast of the daily administrative requirements.
245111535	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. AWOL. b. Statistics. c. Maintenance.

CODE NO.

COMMENTS

209162619

- a. Personnel turbulence vs. training requirements, i.e., making effective Armor crewmen of infantry-type replacements, a high percentage of which either ETS or are reassigned in 3 to 6 months.
- b. Maintaining a high level of wheeled and tracked maintenance with relatively unskilled personnel.
- c. Coping with numerous and varied soldier problems and disciplinary problems, e.g., personal problems, drug abuse, etc.

224132424

- a. Preparation for CMMI.
- b. Complete turnover of personnel every 7 to 8 months and the impact on training and maintenance.
- c. Trying to maintain morale, discipline, and esprit in face of the above.

2271125815

- a. Personnel shortages, particularly in senior NCOs and skill MOSs. Shortage of 1st Sgts and Plt Sgts compounds the problem, causing the few good Plt Sgts to act as 1st Sgts and depriving platoons of their abilities and experience.
- b. Personnel turnover, caused primarily by VN requirements. Men with 3-4 months left in service create more problems than they solve generally. By the time they're well oriented and functioning, they start clearing and new men come in to start over.
- c. Lack of motivation. "Short-timer" attitude of VN returnees. Poorly oriented and motivated junior officers.

239151781

- a. Teaching young, inexperienced officers and NCOs to properly discharge their responsibilities.
- b. Controlling AWOLs and the narcotics problem.
- c. Maintaining barracks, equipment, and unit areas despite lack of funds.

2675217912

- a. Time to accomplish all required training.
- b. Shortage of personnel.
- c. Shortage of equipment.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
238152303	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Understanding my men and their problems. b. Getting all of my men trained and keeping the units highly trained and combat-ready all the time. c. Maintaining the discipline of the command.
222132241	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Training all personnel, especially junior officers and NCOs, in all aspects of their job and what is expected of them. b. Getting personnel to follow through on known requirements. c. Maintaining high standards in conduct and appearance.
2741618022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Excessive personnel turnover resulting in nearly 100 percent change in personnel every six months. b. Maintenance problems with track vehicles. This is caused by the age of the vehicles and a shortage of trained mechanics. c. Meeting required readiness condition in all areas. The problems in "a" and "b," above, have a direct impact on this problem.
2261123712	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Extreme personnel turbulence; 1/3 battalion turns over every two months. This personnel problem overrode all else. b. Attitude of today's soldier returning from Vietnam has created a motivation problem. c. General lack of pride and discipline among society today which has impacted upon the Army causing intensified AWOL, drug, and theft problems.
235131743	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Inexperienced officers in the staff and companies. b. Maintenance--at all levels. c. Morale.
241151856	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>AWOLs</u>: A symptom of our times. Frustration with harassment and lack of communication with leaders causes it. b. <u>Barracks and appearance</u>: The cause of many Army problems in barracks life (it is outmoded, should be discontinued, and all soldiers be given enough money to live off post--not quite that simple). Appearance: Haircuts and youths' nonchalance cause lack of pride.

CODE NO.COMMENTS

- c. Personnel turbulence: Lack of reasonable length of assignment for just about any rank or grade makes this problem extremely difficult to solve and exceptionally time-consuming. Second lieutenants (4 months). Have two 1st LTs in unit. Captains somewhat stable. Every day have to give a name or two to higher headquarters for a position they have to fill. Only two 1SGs; others are E-7s.
- 170432253
- a. Maintenance of equipment.
b. Lack of EM necessary to accomplish the mission.
c. Lack of senior NCOs to control the troops.
- 1724325216
- a. Trying to meet all missions and commitments with limited resources.
b. Trying to produce a superior unit out of average people.
c. Trying to produce a future citizen--proud of his service to his Nation and proud of his Nation--from the raw product produced by and entrusted to our care by today's society. A raw product representative of militant or apathetic youth, with concomitant problems of narcotics usage, racial tensions, and anti-military.
- 167412334
- a. Personnel shortages, combined with overcommitment and personnel turbulence.
b. Maintenance of full TOE equipment with shortage of personnel and lack of experienced leaders.
c. Trying to meet training goals with shortage of personnel, restrictions on training, and lack of experienced personnel.
- 1644621011
- a. Communication between myself and the soldiers of the battalion. The "word" often doesn't get to the soldier, hence the soldier acts/reacts on rumor and/or misinformation.
b. Establishment of priorities so that X amount of resource can be applied to 2X amount of requirements.
c. Obtaining and/or creating and maintaining experienced personnel. In the past 10 months, the authorized enlisted strength of this battalion has turned over 135%.
- 168431554
- a. Inexperienced officers and NCOs.
b. Failure of SJA officers trying Summary and Special Courts to give guilty personnel stiff sentences.
c. Maintenance: Inexperienced personnel, lack of parts.

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
2281320613	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Inexperience and immaturity of Company Commanders. b. Low quality and lack of motivation of intermediate NCO's, E-6's & E-7's. c. Rapid turnover of personnel. Approx. 40% per quarter.
254332372	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Personnel shortage. The problem of carrying out our mission with the shortage of trained personnel. b. Machines. Keeping the vast arsenal of equipment present in a Mech outfit in the Green & Amber. c. Discipline. The need for stronger discipline in the new changing Army.
150252735	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Conduct of combat operations. b. Logistical support of combat operation. c. Effective utilization of personnel.
1634618912	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Black-white relationships b. Narcotics problem E-5 and below. c. Deadline report vs people and parts available.
231162271	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Training over 100 new replacements for another tank gunnery cycle. Most have never seen a tank before. Very few experienced NCO's. b. Organizing the tank gunnery complex and running the ranges. Complex is 45 minutes from base and tents, mess, CP, maintenance areas, ammo storage, guards, etc., must be analyzed. c. Keep maintenance at a high status. Equipment is being used by relatively inexperienced personnel and qualified mechanics are in short supply. Requires continual training and supervision.
161212166	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Requiring rifle platoons to search areas thoroughly and completely for the enemy. They cannot be allowed to let booby traps or difficult obstacles impede or prohibit access. b. Insuring that rifle company "paddy strength" is maintained at the highest possible number and that they actually go to the field. c. Insuring discipline and morale are maintained.
119211691	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Causing company commanders and platoon leaders to use their squad leaders (giving the squad leader authority and responsibility). b. Causing the individual and small unit leader to perform basic fundamentals. c. Convincing the small unit leader that they must discipline

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
119211691	(Con't) their men, and not attempt to be a "nice guy".
232132621	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Breakdown of time available to accomplish <u>well</u> all missions w/o slighting any or w/o merely going thru the motions. b. Safety - instilling in all officers and EM constant awareness both in field and garrison, off and on duty the hazards that exist. A recent rash of accidents has made this particularly of concern. c. Instilling an urgency of need for building confidence and maintaining proficiency in maintenance of all equipment -- especially truck and wheeled vehicles.
269512450	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Personnel turbulence in key slots. b. Shortage of intermediate leadership Lt's, E-6 - E-7. c. Attitude and challenge by RVN returnees with DEROS facing him in near future.
2553627810	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Maintenance of old equipment. The Bn is equipped with M 48A2C tanks, trucks initially build in 1951-1953 and is low in priority in getting replacement parts. b. Shortage of personnel. (Strength). The short tour coupled with the traditional summer relation creates humps and lows. I am entering the low period where 70% of the Bn has less than 90 days. c. Attitude of officers. Numerous officers volunteer for Korea rather than being assigned to Vn. They want to serve their two years, expending as little effort as possible, and get out!

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
225132284	<p>Personnel turn over - 43% per quarter</p> <p>"Short time" attitude of Vietnam returnees who make up about 70-80% of my strength.</p> <p>Little, if any, break between missions and/or conflicting requirements.</p>
199432031	<p>Troop morale and welfare - marijuana, billets, recreation.</p> <p>Maintenance of vehicles and other equipment.</p> <p>Establishing priority of effort among training - CMMI's - AGI and a variety of other "crisis" activities.</p>
198461917	<p>Training preparatory to annual service firing and qualification. The battalion is short in numbers and experience. The situation requires most supervision and attention.</p> <p>Training the young officer and NCO - the battalion is critically short in most areas in experience levels deemed adequate. The officers and NCO's are called on to perform duties well beyond the normal experience level - for example - line companies commanded by Lts with less than 2 years experience.</p> <p>Discipline and morale - based on the general attitude prevalent in the under 25 age group - compounded by racial tension and narcotic usage.</p>
147242721	<p>Shortage of junior officers</p> <p>Shortage of junior NCO's.</p> <p>Shortage of sleep.</p>
145242201	<p>Developing sense of urgency in EM - to get them to be alert and to get them to do their duty so they will not be needlessly killed or injured.</p> <p>Finding ways to accomplish a thousand tasks with only limited assets - management of resources - establishing priorities.</p> <p>Getting all to work in harmony towards a common goal - keeping in touch with the (?) of actions and tasks and jobs to be done in the battalion.</p>

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
202432521	Continuing to be the best mechanized infantry battalion in this division. Keeping up the morale and esprit de corps of the battalion. Continuing to keep down the vehicle dead-line rate.
151252364	Getting desirable responsiveness from Jr. Officer leaders. Following through on policy and inspecting their men on a daily basis. Control of marijuana. Ready access to the troops makes control one sided. Once you have sufficient evidence, then crack down hard. Slow but effective. Constantly shifting priorities to try and get two men to do the work of three men. This pertains to the requirements placed on the bn by higher Hqs as well as an additional burden placed on the companies by this bn Hqs.
252311915	(1) Inexperience of NCO's in lower grades (E-6/E-5). (2) Inexperience of staff officers (all one or two grades below authorized) Loss of personnel with no replacement in sight. Racial discrimination charges (unfounded) being made by a very small minority.
1754619211	Instilling a sense of urgency in young officers. Causing company commanders to be hard but fair. (They are cream puffs) Causing officer to learn criteria before they put their travpo to work.
112211792	Getting my battalion reestablished in Chouc Vinh after moving the Hqs from Tay Ninh and the combat element from Cambodia. Filling personnel shortages - both officer and enlisted. Reorienting a unit that has been fighting in company-size elements against NVA regulars. Our current operations are squad size against VC individuals.

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
1864617610	<p>Maintenance of discipline at the lowest level. This is made difficult by pot, prejudice, and protest.</p> <p>Personnel turn-over is so great that the experience level is very low at all levels and the unit has an extremely short official or institutional memory. We do everything the first time.</p> <p>The training load caused by the above is made difficult by changing priorities from higher Hq.</p>
124232405	<p>Personnel shortage in the officer ranks.</p> <p>Motivating the soldiers to include the key issue the Doves are not right.</p> <p>Fighting the problem. (It's easier not to)</p>
126212402	<p>Finding the enemy.</p> <p>Supervising Subordinates.</p> <p>Administrative processing of malcontent personnel.</p>
162232165	<p>Trying to make my S-1 section operate effectively. My personnel and finance records are in Tan Son in the Delta, my S-1 section is in Tay Nihn. I have personnel at the Bde CP in Tieu Nhon and I am with maneuver elements with an asst S-1 in Cambodia. I have been in this posture for 6 weeks except with 4 different brigades.</p> <p>Trying to accomplish my mission of searching for arms, ammunition and rice in Cambodia. Artillery direct support units change almost daily, my AO changes almost daily, and my companies are pulled for additional Bde missions on short notice. I don't know day to day what my mission is or how I will have to accomplish it. It is not a major problem and I appreciate the political ramifications.</p> <p>Keeping my equipment maintained and my people clean and in good spirits. This battalion has been in sustained combat for 6 weeks and it is beginning to tell on equipment and personnel.</p>

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
258312408	<p>Inexperience of junior leadership levels especially company commanders.</p> <p>Use of Drugs by individual soldiers.</p> <p>Inexperienced operators of equipment as well as shortages of qualified specialists in these fields. Motor maintenance, cooks, etc.</p>
191432305	<p>Schooling Officers and NCO's in establishing communication between them and their soldiers.</p> <p>Getting Officers and NCO's to after issuing orders to SUPERVISE out from behind their desks etc., and finding out how their orders are being carried out.</p> <p>Trying to keep up with the administrative workload. There's too much damn paper work required. Reports, surveys, etc.</p> <p>The Bn is at the end of line and on the receiving end of requirements devised by Bde, Div, Corps, Army, Theatre, ?, JCS, Defense. Put them all together and WOW.</p>
149252163	<p>Asset utilization: Efficient and effective use of assets necessary to perform the combat mission which are not organic to the Battalion and must be requested from Brigade.</p> <p>Troop motivation: Maintaining morale and esprit at a level which will counter the reluctance of certain individuals to fight. The reluctance being fingered by attitudes expressed at home and in publications.</p> <p>Drug abuse: The inherent difficulty in identifying an individual under the influence of marijuana and the restrictions on search and seize.</p>
152251832	<p>Command proficiency in basic soldiering.</p> <p>Discipline.</p> <p>Lack of personnel for responsible positions at the lower leadership level.</p>

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
249312235	<p>Disciplinary problems in Korea in an operational environment. This includes use of "Mary Jane" and hard drugs. Increasing racial problems.</p> <p>A poor but somewhat improved Division logistical set-up. The average soldier spends a lot of money buying equipment - paint, etc. - in the local economy because it is difficult to get through regular channels.</p> <p>Teaching young Captains with little experience how to be company commanders. Learning how to adjust to a permissive society of free-thinking young Lieutenants.</p>
2725122613	<p>Making the battalion proficient as individuals and as (a) unit(s).</p> <p>Teaching junior officers and NCOs to apply principles of leadership, i. e., know your men and equipment. Know job - Lead by example. Set high standards. Demand them of your men.</p> <p>Establishing of standards of conduct and discipline throughout the battalion.</p>

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
1804318012	<p>Lack of experienced leaders.</p> <p>High personnel turn-over.</p> <p>Lack of adequate training areas when not at a Major Training Area.</p>
1794330610	<p>Maintaining combat readiness.</p> <p>Coping with continuous personnel turn-over and a shortage of NCOs and other enlisted men.</p> <p>Maintaining morale and esprit de Corps in the current environment.</p>
178462167	<p>Motivation.</p> <p>Knowledge of job by subordinates.</p> <p>Problem solving.</p>
273532155	<p>Inexperienced officers and noncommissioned officers. Rapid promotion through the junior grades (E-4, E-5, O1-2) does not produce skilled leaders.</p> <p>Lack of technically qualified supervisors. For some reason there are not enough to go around to meet the needs of the Army.</p> <p>Rapid turn-over of senior enlisted leaders. It is my conviction that the demands on Infantry NCOs for repetitive short tours has eroded the morale of the NCO corps. I see an increase of family problems, especially children, resulting from successive extended absences.</p>
1884625111	<p>Personnel strength - too low to properly perform all assigned tasks.</p> <p>Personnel turbulence - frequent change of key personnel required constant repetition of policy, instructions, training. Even though, a lot slips between the cracks when people change.</p>

CODE NO.COMMENTS

1884625111

Con't.

The multitude of relatively small problems associated with welding the young soldier and officer coming from a changing civilian society into a traditional military force. This includes closing the generation gap (e.g., translating and enforcing hair cut policy, military courtesy and discipline, uniform, etc.), racial problems, and the like. Today the Bn Cmdr is the lowest of older generation having direct contact with the younger generation and as such he is the buffer, the translator, the go-between.

177462045

Lack of personnel.

Inexperience of Company Grade Officers and NCOs E-7 & below.

Attitude of the average soldier as reflected in current national attitude-principal areas are racial relations, drugs and the no-work for anything attitude.

1744618912

Meeting dates on correspondence such as this - (Leadership).

Organizing Bn for CMMI and AIG - Both will hit us at end of month.

Assisting two new Cmdrs get advanced in their jobs as well as three new Staff Officers (S-3, S-4 and Main't Off).

173461686

Lack of qualified personnel primarily non-commissioned officers. Low fill of workers.

Distracting missions other than the primary training mission - i.e., time to do everything. To much guard duty for troops!

Old, poorly maintained equipment.

127212511

Overcoming generalized fear of boobytraps and enemy.

Relearning fundamentals of individual soldier and battle techniques.

Widespread use of drugs and narcotics. "Black Power".

CODE NO.

155222164

COMMENTS

Maintaining morale and esprit throughout the battalion while operating over an unusually large AO at an intensive tempo while simultaneously trying to construct a decent rest area for the troops.

Establishing and maintaining a smoothly functioning logistics system to cover the entire AO. The system must be responsive to a multitude of contingencies.

Individual and small unit training.

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
181431924	Narcotics. Racial issues and inborn and learned feelings and prejudices on both sides. Inexperienced personnel - officers and junior NCO's.
1824319512	Personnel Maintenance. Mission.
1834325812	Maintenance. Discipline. Personnel.
2623119110	Critical personnel shortage. (Below 50% strength). Qualified maintenance personnel (Mech). Difficulty in obtaining common use spare parts, i.e., tire patches, spark plugs, etc., a continuing problem that causes many vehicles to be on the D/C needlessly.
115242532	Personnel shortages, both officer and enlisted. See page 34. I consider this as a problem since its solution is out of my hands. I have one rifle company which has only 76 men in the field. (Absentees are legitimate.) Split trains areas. My battalion has been OPCON to four brigades and an armoured cav regt in the past 20 days. My rear is split in two locations which severely compounds combat service support aspects of command. This is a temporary situation which will probably resolve itself in 4-5 weeks. Shortage of TO&E equipment. Radios and canteens are critically short - almost to the point of mission impairment. Highers are aware of the problem. Companies operating in the jungle with temps above 100° use water - similarly they've got to be able to communicate since contact is always imminent. We rob Peter to pay Paul and continue the march.

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
133211685	<p>Extremely poor leadership on the part of junior officers and NCO's and a critical shortage of 11B E6, E7.</p> <p>Excessive casualties from mines and boobytraps seriously affecting the morale of the battalion.</p> <p>Lack of motivation to engage the enemy on the part of the men based on increasing indications of withdrawal from combat and an end of U.S. participation in the war.</p>
2665219010	<p>Discipline - Drugs .</p> <p>Maintenance .</p> <p>Training management .</p>
157262002	<p>Discipline of troops to include use of drugs and disrespect for officers and NCOs .</p> <p>Lack of experience in company Commanders , platoon leaders , and NCOs .</p> <p>Continued effort to maintain high standards of maintenance of combat vehicles .</p>
251312324	<p>Reduction of drug abuse and use of marijuana .</p> <p>Inexperience and educational level of company grade officers .</p> <p>"Generation gap."</p>

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
234131924	<p>Far too great a personnel turnover. (In the past three months I lost 48% of my TO&E strength - replacements were received.)</p> <p>Inadequate experience among critical personnel (Ex. 1st Sgts were E7's except one who was an E6 - Co Cmdrs averaged 2 1/2 yrs. service - S1 was 2LT).</p> <p>Keeping the troops out of trouble- incidence of misconduct is high among men who have a few months remaining until ETS (55% of the Bn is in this category).</p>
129212313	<p>Keeping key positions filled with qualified officers/EM. I am considerably understrength in both. For example, if I lost a Company Commander right now, I'd be hard pressed to replace him - I have no Captains available and none of my LT's are capable of commanding a company.</p> <p>Getting my people to stick to the fundamentals of small unit combat operations, i.e., proper dispersion, fire and maneuver, noise, light & movement discipline within night ambushes, aiming low at targets in poor visibility, etc.</p> <p>Maintaining alertness and aggressiveness during periods of little or no contact.</p>
134212173	<p>Maintaining combat proficiency due to personnel shortages, and including missions.</p> <p>Finding the time to motivate in matters not related to combat actions.</p> <p>Finding a successful way to deal with radicals without reducing combat proficiency.</p> <p>The situations and higher command usually dictate the decisions - indirectly. Systems tend to manage, so its a matter of obeying the system and adjusting as far as leading goes.</p> <p>If you accept the interpretation of leadership as <u>deciding</u> what has to be done and then getting people to do it, you wind up with something like this: Bn Commanders really make few decisions - operationally and administratively; have established systems which assist in managing and must devote his abilities and energies to motivation matters - which you are touching only lightly as in this study.</p>

CODE NO.	COMMENTS
135213144	<p>A critical shortage of experienced NCOs followed only by a shortage of officers.</p> <p>A poor state of combat proficiency among the individual soldiers.</p> <p>A morale problem caused by the fact that our draftee soldiers are serving in an unpopular war and they are well aware of it. I should explain that this is a general attitude which permeates the military environment in 1970 - it is <u>not</u> specifically directed at the battalion or most of its leaders to whom the rank and file demonstrate a surprising amount of loyalty.</p>
1954620410	<p>Insuring that day-to-day training is well conducted.</p> <p>Maintenance of equipment and instilling the desire to maintain the equipment at a high level.</p> <p>Personnel actions are timely and well prepared, e.g., OER's are prepared on time and reports are timely and well prepared.</p>
142262172	<p>Personnel.</p> <p>Well maintained equipment.</p> <p>Not well defined requirements of higher Hdq.</p>
136212265	<p>Inexperience.</p> <p>Personnel shortages (key personnel).</p> <p>Attitude of Junior Officers, NCO's, EM and their friends and relations on the American scene.</p>

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
137212173	Finding the enemy. Lack of trained, experienced junior leaders. Personnel shortages in general.
138212276	Personnel shortages. Incipient minority group tensions. Time to accomplish all the tasks a Bn Cmdr should accomplish.
140232242	Weak leadership at the squad and platoon level. Lack of proficiency among NCOs. Inadequately trained staff officers.

<u>COI E NO.</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
141232643	<p>Experience level of officers and non-commissioned officers. Simple things are made hard because of the lack of experience and practical knowledge of officers and NCOs.</p> <p>Shortage of NCOs quantitatively and qualitatively.</p> <p>Finding and fixing the enemy.</p>
522231916	<p>A lack of mid-level, experienced NCOs (E6s, with more than forty five minutes service)</p> <p>Instilling the will to close with the enemy, in the junior leaders.</p> <p>Attention to the details, of caring for the troops, again in our junior leaders.</p>
132212227	<p>Constant rotation of key officers and men.</p> <p>Lack of land routes for resupply.</p> <p>Extremes of climate - heat and rain.</p> <p>Health of command - malaria - jungle etc.</p>
1663624111	<p>Shortage of personnel in terms of numbers and a shortage of MOS trained personnel (quantity and quality).</p> <p>A progressively constrictive supply system (shortage of funds) which will eventually choke out the timely replenishment of repair parts.</p> <p>Shortage of experienced Captains for command and staff positions.</p> <p>The growing drug-abuse problem by troops is a nagging and time consuming problem.</p>
14324323X	<p>Shortages of personnel - officers, NCOs, and EM (particularly specialists).</p> <p>Maintaining a sense of alertness within the command. (During periods of low enemy contact the troops tend to become complacent).</p> <p>Instilling a sense of urgency in the Vietnamese Territorial Forces.</p> <p>(Bn conducts combined operations with the Vietnamese.)</p>

APPENDIX VII

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP				
	a	b	c	d e
1. 210161555	Allocating your time.	Maintaining rapport with subordinates and supervisors	Evaluating all established priorities	Recognizing various indications of morale, maintenance potential problem areas
2. 2331322910	N/A			
3. 237152249	Identify facts	Positive guidance	Definite responses to subordinates	
4. 245111535	Encourage communication between individuals	Associating myself with common goals of the Bn.	Recognizing individual excellence.	
5. 209162619	Personal appearances	Discuss problems with men. Open Door.	Improve living conditions	Talk to soldiers and officers wives and make them a part. Consult frequently with 1st Sgts and other NCO's.
6. 224132424	Junior Officer Council	Junior EM Council	Officer's Call	Daily staff briefing Liberal Open Door Policy

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
7. 2271125815	Use knowledge and experience to guide others.	Use rank & experience to expedite.	Buffer between higher HQ's & subordinate.	Use knowledge & experience to judge select men key positions.	Committing resources to important tasks.
8. 239151781	Identify factors to consider.	Clearly identify properties.	Suggesting ways to get the job done efficiently.		
9. 2675217912	Solving the problem.	Eliminating wasted time.	More meaningful training		
10. 238152303	Understanding new situations.	Looking out for men assuring proper training.	Delegation of authority and responsibility.	Personal attention to selection and supervision of leaders.	Priority - men and self.
11. 22132241	Personally giving Officer and NCO classes.	Setting example in appearance.	Showing an interest in what troops are doing.	Using Chain of Command in making corrections.	Going to NCO and EM councils.
12. 2741618022	Analyze capabilities of Jr. Officers.	Gain confidence of EM - Grade 1-5.	Separate major problems from minor.	Directing many areas simultaneously.	Skillful assignment of personnel to keep leadership balance.

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
13. 2261123712	Acting as Judge between Commander and staff.	Talking to EM on a personal basis - and placing in motivation.	Evaluating people and placing in right job.		
14. 235131743	Personal presence.	Be a good listener.	Talk to the troops.	Set the example.	Be available.
15. 241151856	Listing the priorities.	Supplying the imagination.	"Getting or selling them in the trough "		
16. 170432293	Clinical Psychologist.	Group Therapy expert.	Marriage counselor.	Maintenance Officer.	Teacher.
17. 1724325216	Determine priorities for Bn.	Allocation of limited resources.	Protector of interests and welfare of men.	Training of young Officers and NCO's.	Intermeshing of all outside influences on Bn.
18. 167412334	Organizing Bn. to accomplish a mission.	Determining what is important.	Managing resources.		
19. 164421011	Listening.	Developing a reputation for hearing.	Being available.		

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
20. 168431554	Motivating others to do more than just their job.	Teaching experienced Officers & NCO's their jobs.	Setting the example.	Leading by doing.	
21. 232132621	Building confidence in men new to Mech. Inf.	Instilling sense of NATO mission of the unit.	Setting example for Jr. Officers with obvious interest in welfare of EM.		
22. 2553627810	Knowing each individual man.	Keeping my men informed.	Setting & Maintaining high standards of proficiency and personal conduct.		
23. 269512452	Knowing people.	Providing praise, admiration at proper time.	Respect for seniority.	Striving for consistency.	
24. 119211691	Requiring subordinate leaders to use the Chain of Command.	Delegation of authority through task assignment.	Orientation or fundamental discipline.	Setting the example for personal drive.	Constant inspection of subordinate elements to ensure compliance with the intent of directives to orders.

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
25. 161212166	Decisiveness - no vacillation.	Take official notice of all disciplinary transgressions.	Attempt to constantly upgrade troop amenities.	Insist on the best performance of all.	
26. 231162271	Personal leadership.	Management of resources - men, money, facilities, supplies.	Instruction.	Sound advance planning.	Keeping men informed and looking after their welfare.
27. 1634618912	Personal leadership - talking to the soldiers at all hours.	Faithful Open Door policy 24 hours a day.	Officer classes on leadership.	Letters of commendation to soldiers for routine things.	Good awards system. News letter to tell troops what is happening 6 months ahead.
28. 254332372	Setting the example.	Knowing my job.	Knowing the capabilities and limitations of personnel.		
29. 150252735	Tactical experience.	Personnel management.	Problem solving techniques.	Employment of all staff agencies.	Leadership by example.
30. 2281320613	Anticipating problems.	Instructing subordinate leaders.	Presenting the example.	Providing the example.	Giving positive direction.

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
31. 225132284	Organizing and planning ahead.	Disseminating information to the troops on a timely basis.	Trying to maintain consistency.	Acting as a buffer between higher and lower Hdqs.	
32. 199432031	Knowing Officers and men.	Keeping informed.	Setting priorities.		
33. 198461917	Determining the capabilities of individuals rapidly.	Maintaining informal channels of communication with Officers & NCO's.			
34. 147242721	Weapons proficiency.	Compassion.	Personal morale.		
35. 145242201	Lesson learned evaluating actions interviews to improve operations.	Training Junior Officer and inexperienced staff Officers.	Improving communications, soldiers to NCO's to Officer - among all.		
36. 202432521	Knowing your men.	Knowing their problems.	Being professionally knowledgeable.		

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
37. 151252364	Giving Company Cmdrs. mission type orders and holding them responsible for accomplishment of the mission.	Enforcing standards of conduct.			
38. 252311915	Keeping personnel informed through all means possible.	Keep yourself informed in all areas. Be a good listener.	Develop mutual confidence & trust with subordinates.	Public praise when deserved by individual units.	Employing personnel & units in accordance with capabilities.
39. 1754619211	Ascertain the exact criteria.	Be most knowledgeable before talking.	Set the example.	Be hard & fair.	Keep new people informed.
40. 112211792	Understanding the capabilities of individual soldiers.	Proper utilization of supporting fires. This enhances leadership rapidly.		Establishing priorities of tasks.	
41. 2725122613	Give recognition for good work.	Look after your men and their welfare.			

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
42. 249312235	Set high standards and maintain them.	Ability to inspect the most vulnerable areas for inspection.	Ability to set correct priorities on the numerous requirements.	Ability to operate with a minimum of supervision.	To remain calm when all is confusion around you.
43. 152251832	Setting logical goals.				
44. 149252163	Accessibility to Officers & men.	Keeping men informed.	Recognition for work well done.	Constant weeding of undesirables.	
45. 191432305	Interracial seminars.	Communicating at every opportunity with as many men as I can.		Knowing every man in this Bn. as well as I can.	
46. 258312408	Setting the example.	Insure fair and impartial treatment to <u>all</u> soldiers.	Work through the Chain of Command.	Analyze decisions for effect three to four months in the future.	

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
47. 162232165	Instilling in the Bn. a "Spirit of Professionalism," i.e. - the Bn and all elements when operating indepen- dently always accomplish their mission in a 1st-class manner.	Training of subordinate unit commanders.	Communicating with the individual soldiers.		
48. 126212402	Knowledge of all phases of Bn. operations.	Previous experience at Bn. level.	Familiarity with the employment of force in combat.	Ability to employ all means of fire support.	An appreciation of ground tactical problems & Platoon & company time space factor.
49. 1864617610	Attention to detail.	Person-to-person communication counseling.	Public speaking.		
50. 124232405	Each Officer must believe in himself. *Check book for complete answer.				

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
51. 273532155	Technical competence of all unit equipment to include operation.	Officer call to foster open discussion on areas of drug abuse, etc., with aim of developing leadership skills.	Enforced learning situations group study of selected extension courses.		
52. 1884625111	Getting the most out of the people assigned to you.	Setting high standards but not so high that failure is inevitable.			
53. 155222164	Know your men and show concern for their welfare.	Keep the Command informed.	Swift readiness for failure. Wide speed recognition for success.	Equal distribution of tasks.	
54. 127212511	Taking care of security, training, etc., as opposed strictly to creature comforts.	Maximum use of all available means of fire support.	S.L.A. Marshall-type critique-discussion of combat actions with new men on return to FSB.	Providing clear mission-type orders with up-to-date intelligence on purposes AO -details, briefings, ample time for troops leaving processing down chain of command. Keeping men informed on when they will go to the field, where, why, how long.	Be seen talking with riflemen in the field. SGM also.

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
55. 173461686	Timely decisions.	Right man in the right job.	Long range planning.	Insist on strong loyalty up and down.	Eyeball to eyeball contact with people combined with straight poop-no "Bull Shit Theory"
56. 1744618912	Teaching-training young officers & NCO.	Organizational ability - skill in knowing when ORM needs change.	Motivating.	Briefing.	Evaluating.
57. 177462045	Management of men and their time to prevent misuse.	Daily communication with lowest ranks.	Constant emphasis on assigning authority & responsibility to Junior Officer.	Emphasis upon awards program for both good & bad performance.	
58. 178462167	Setting the example.	Counseling others.	Improving our proficiency.		
59. 1794330610	Keeping men informed.	Accessibility to Officers & men.	Timely decisions.	Expressing confidence.	Fair & impartial airing of each problem no matter how small.

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
60. 1804318012	Flexibility in dealing with situations.	Ability to properly motivate troops.	Giving credit when necessary to deserving individuals.	Personal presence of commander.	Ability to select the right type person for a job.
61. 181431924	Understanding of people.	Setting the example.	Eliminating the unnecessary.	Knowing what the troops are thinking.	
62. 1824319512	Personal contact.	Asking of leading questions.	Discussion.		
63. 1834325812	Recognize the problem.	Tell it like it is.	Do something.		
64. 2623119110	A 1-1/2 hr. briefing of all new troops when they arrive. Same day.	Officer classes Art 15, Surge boards, conduct & customs.			
65. 115242532	The XO & S-3 are focal points for ills of administration & operations respectively, they get general guidance from me and I hold them responsible for corrective actions in these areas. I deal directly with Company Commanders in their present strengths and weaknesses. The chain of command is used and emphasized.				

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP				
	a	b	c	d
			Giving guidance and counsel.	Establishing attainable standards.
	Evaluating subordinates.			Evaluation of unit results.
66. 133211685				
67. 2665219010	Stressing my availability for problem solving.	Questioning daily during visits.		
68. 157262002	Anticipating the problems.	Know your commanders and men.		
69. 251312324	Salesmanship. Sell the program.	Counseling, new military personnel problems.		
70. 234131924	Anticipation and detection of problems.	Stimulation of priorities - everything is important. However, CONUS units at this time have difficulty doing more than one thing well at a time. The Cmdr. must accurately establish meaningful priorities or he and his unit will go down the tube.		

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
71. 129212313	Know the capabilities and limitations of each Co. Cmdr.	Critique each company immediately after an operation.			
72. 134212173	Getting the facts good & bad to the troops.	Guiding a group decision to be the right decision.	Recognizing talent and using it.	A liberal reward system.	A hard discipline policy.
73. 135213144	Did not complete this section.				
74. 1954620410	Understanding and knowing people.	Be an expert in your field.			
75. 142262172	Developing subordinates by decentralization of authority.	Inspections & corrective actions.	Command policy letters.	Talking & discussing with staff.	
76. 136212265	Knowledge & understanding of men.	Professional knowledge.	Understanding capabilities of men & materials.	Knowledge of the enemy & his tasks.	Self confidence & decisiveness.
77. 137212173					

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
78. 138212276	Know your people.	Listen to subordinates.	Treat people as individuals.	Many problems can be nipped in the bud by early detection. This can be gained by knowing & talking to people in a unit.	
79. 140232242	Evaluating intelligence.	Formulating policy.	Setting goals.	Conducting staff work-shops.	Inspecting.
80. 141232643	Effective problem solving.	Overcoming lethargy, rumor & indifference.	Establishment & continuity of communication to soldiers.	Stimulating offensive attitude while employing defensive position in base camp, ladders, & night defensive positions.	
81. 522231916	Experience as a troop leader at all levels.	Ability to express myself orally. Be able to talk.	Sense of humor.	Good memory.	A healthy source of cynicism.

SKILLS EMPLOYED IN LEADERSHIP

	a	b	c	d	e
82. 132212227	Frequent visits to units and staff agencies.	Closed monitor of company radio nets.	Get out of your headquarters.		
83. 1003624111	Diagnosing leadership abilities in Officers and NCO's.	Being thoroughly knowledgeable in material readiness.	Coordination ability.	Diplomacy with people.	Forecasting problem areas.
84. 14324323X	Checking, checking, checking.	Weighting leadership capabilities of subordinates.	Use of lessons learned and immediate critiques.	Establishment of traditions help in building esprit.	Special orientation on the situation keeping people in formed.